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9 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.green1 sentence2023See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pikegreen1 sentence2007In her motion, Fappiano claimed that she was entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered evidence, specifically, a long history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse she endured which resulted in her suffering from battered woman syndrome. 8 In Commonwealth v. Pike, 431 Mass. 212, 221 (2000), which was decided after Fappiano’s trial, the Supreme Judicial Court discussed the relationship between a claim of battered woman syndrome and newly discovered evidence. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellygreen1 sentence2007In describing the syndrome, the court wrote: “Battered woman syndrome has been described as a ‘ “series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.” State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences2000In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 431 (1983), we examined the relationship between the clause “the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and the phrase “personnel and medical files or information.” We concluded in that case that, based on the structure, language, legislative history, and comparison with the analogous Federal public records exemption on which it is based, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6) (1994), 11 the Massachusetts exemption, G. 2000L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c), creates two categories of records exempt from public disclosure: first “personnel and medical files or information” and second “other materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., supra at 434. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Saferiangreen1 sentence1992We have said that a defendant is entitled to appellate relief if trial counsel failed to meet a minimum standard of performance (Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 [1974]), and if the defendant *682 has also shown that, but for counsel’s error, something material might have been accomplished in the defendant’s favor (Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 [1977]). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Satterfieldgreen1 sentence1992We have said that a defendant is entitled to appellate relief if trial counsel failed to meet a minimum standard of performance (Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 [1974]), and if the defendant *682 has also shown that, but for counsel’s error, something material might have been accomplished in the defendant’s favor (Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 [1977]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John Scarpa v. William Murphy
green
2 sentences2009If the reason for the failure to complete service involves a failure by someone other than the plaintiff (e.g., negligence on the part of the process server, willful evasive action taken by the defendant etc.), it makes no sense to demand that the moving party demonstrate “excusable neglect.” See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228 , 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1986). 2004If the reason for the failure to complete service involves a failure by someone other than the plaintiff [e.g., negligence on the part of the process server, willful evasive action taken by the defendant etc.), it makes no sense to demand that the moving party demonstrate “excusable neglect.” See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228 , 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1986). | 2 | 2004–2009 |
Lorenzon v. Employees Retirement Plan Of The Sperry And Hutchinson Company
green
2 sentences2009If the reason for the failure to complete service involves a failure by someone other than the plaintiff (e.g., negligence on the part of the process server, willful evasive action taken by the defendant etc.), it makes no sense to demand that the moving party demonstrate “excusable neglect.” See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228 , 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1986). 2004If the reason for the failure to complete service involves a failure by someone other than the plaintiff [e.g., negligence on the part of the process server, willful evasive action taken by the defendant etc.), it makes no sense to demand that the moving party demonstrate “excusable neglect.” See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228 , 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1986). | 2 | 2004–2009 |
Commonwealth v. Colturi
green
1 sentence2008“If . . . the Commonwealth were to proceed only on a theory of impaired operation [instead of on both theories] and offered a breathalyzer test result of .08 or greater, without evidence of its relationship to intoxication or impairment and without the statutorily permissible inference of intoxication eliminated by the 2003 amendments, the jury would be left to guess at its meaning. . . . [I]n such circumstances, the ‘prejudicial effect of such evidence [would outweigh] any possible probative value.’ While it is difficult to envision a situation in which the Commonwealth would proceed in this | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dias v. Brigham Medical Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives
green
1 sentence1986In Opinions of the Justices, 386 Mass. 1223 (1982), I concluded that a taxation bill not meaningfully different from the statute now before us (G. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.