enunciated standard (Michigan) · Go Syfert
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enunciated standard in Michigan

9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1974–1992 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Erbgreen
michctapp · 1973 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1974–1975
2 sentences

1975Burns, concurred in by this writer, wrote: "In People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622, 630 ; 211 NW2d 51, 55 (1973), this Court enunciated the standard to be followed by trial courts when instructing on the question of alibi when we said: " 'An instruction to the jury concerning the defense of alibi must clearly explain that this defense offers two avenues of relief for the defendant.

1975Burns, concurred in by this writer, wrote: "In People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622, 630 ; 211 NW2d 51, 55 (1973), this Court enunciated the standard to be followed by trial courts when instructing on the question of alibi when we said: " 'An instruction to the jury concerning the defense of alibi must clearly explain that this defense offers two avenues of relief for the defendant.

12

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Kenyon v. Second Precinct Lounge green
michctapp · 1989
2 sentences

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

31990–1992
Flick v. Crouch green
okla · 1967
2 sentences

1992Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 302-303 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979) (quoting Flick v Crouch, 434 P2d 256 [Okla, 1967]).

1991Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 302-303 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979) (quoting Flick v Crouch, 434 P2d 256 [Okla, 1967]).

31990–1992
Nichol v. Billot green
mich · 1979
2 sentences

1992Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 302-303 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979) (quoting Flick v Crouch, 434 P2d 256 [Okla, 1967]).

1992Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 302-303 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979) (quoting Flick v Crouch, 434 P2d 256 [Okla, 1967]).

31990–1992
Derigiotis v. J M Feighery Co. green
michctapp · 1990
2 sentences

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

21991–1992
Tucker v. County of Newaygo neutral
michctapp · 1991
2 sentences

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

1992In Tucker v Newaygo Co, 189 Mich App 637, 639-640 ; 473 NW2d 706 (1991), this Court, quoting from Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185 Mich App 90, 94-95 ; 460 NW2d 235 (1990), set forth the standard of review and legal principles to be applied in such cases: In Kenyon v Second Precinct Lounge, 177 Mich App 492, 497 ; 442 NW2d 696 (1989), a panel of this Court enunciated the standard for deciding motions for summary disposition on the issue whether a company is the employer of a worker under the wdca: "Whether a company is a particular worker’s 'employer,’ as that term is used in the workers’ com

11992–1992
People v. Warner green
mich · 1977
2 sentences

1984This Court enunciated this principle as follows: "The right to suppression is personal to the one whose right to privacy was violated.” People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 203 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977) (opinion of Williams, J.).

1984This Court enunciated this principle as follows: "The right to suppression is personal to the one whose right to privacy was violated.” People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 203 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977) (opinion of Williams, J.).

11984–1984
People v. Gengels green
mich · 1922
2 sentences

1984Over 61 years ago, this Court enunciated a rule rejecting such a defense in People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632 ; 188 NW 398 (1922), which involved a similar charge under the former statutory rape statute.

1984Over 61 years ago, this Court enunciated a rule rejecting such a defense in People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632 ; 188 NW 398 (1922), which involved a similar charge under the former statutory rape statute.

11984–1984
Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. green
michctapp · 1975
2 sentences

1981In Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1 ; 235 NW2d 42 (1975), this Court enunciated a test for determining whether a given injury is within such a liability policy: "In summary, we conclude that while the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile and which causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for.

1981In Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1 ; 235 NW2d 42 (1975), this Court enunciated a test for determining whether a given injury is within such a liability policy: "In summary, we conclude that while the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile and which causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for.

11981–1981
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

11979–1979
People v. Crawford green
michctapp · 1978
2 sentences

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

11979–1979
People v. Walker green
mich · 1965
2 sentences

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

1979Affirmed. 1 People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331 ; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 ; 10 ALR3d 974 (1965). 3 In this case, the Court enunciated the standard as follows: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the de

11979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.131 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

LA 39 (1949–2021) CA 21 (1936–2023) FL 19 (1930–2005) NY 16 (1868–2012) IL 15 (1934–1989) VA 12 (1924–2012) PA 11 (1951–2015) TX 10 (1937–2015) MI 9 (1974–1992) WV 7 (1943–2008) AL 7 (1952–1995) MS 6 (1977–2005) NJ 5 (1878–2010) NC 5 (1983–2018) IN 5 (1965–1998) RI 4 (1984–1996) MT 4 (1988–1993) OH 4 (1978–1991) OK 4 (1915–1984) MD 3 (1975–1978) NM 3 (1982–1991) CO 3 (1981–1994) NV 3 (1966–1989) KS 3 (1945–1984) IA 3 (1990–2018) DC 3 (1980–1998) MO 3 (1874–1972) OR 3 (1963–1998) WI 3 (1960–1972) NH 3 (1985–2002) KY 2 (1945–1997) WA 2 (1992–1996) GA 2 (1986–1997) AR 2 (2002–2008) SC 2 (1996–2018) MN 2 (1981–1987) UT 2 (1983–2001) ID 2 (1984–1991) NE 2 (1991–1992)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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