enunciated rule in West Virginia

2008This Court also articulated the distinction between motions filed under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) in syllabus point three of Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197 , 423 5.E.2d 600 (1992), as follows: “A motion which would otherwise qualify as a Rule 59(e) motion that is not filed and served within ten days of the entry of judgment is a Rule 60(b) motion regardless of how styled and does not toll the four month appeal period for appeal to this court.” See also Rose v. Thomas Memorial Hosp.

2008The Court’s enunciated rule “makes decisions easier for both judges and litigants and, because Rule 59(e) tolls the time period for appeal, which Rule 60(b) does not, it makes it easier for an appellate court to be sure when it has jurisdiction over an appeal.” Id.

1993In syllabus point 1 of State v. Byers, 159 W.Va. 596 , 224 S.E.2d 726 (1976), this Court enunciated the rule for determining when there is adequate probable cause for arresting an individual for driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

1993In syllabus point 1 of State v. Byers, 159 W.Va. 596 , 224 S.E.2d 726 (1976), this Court enunciated the rule for determining when there is adequate probable cause for arresting an individual for driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

1992This Court enunciated the rule regarding employee handbooks and unilateral employment contracts in Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 176 W.Va. 368 , 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986).

1992This Court enunciated the rule regarding employee handbooks and unilateral employment contracts in Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 176 W.Va. 368 , 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986).

1988The Court enunciated that the test for the particularity of the description is whether the “description is such that the officer with a search warrant can[,] with reasonable effort[,] ascertain and identify the place intended.” 8 267 U.S. at 503 , 45 S.Ct. at 416 , 69 L.Ed. at 760 .

1988The Court enunciated that the test for the particularity of the description is whether the “description is such that the officer with a search warrant can[,] with reasonable effort[,] ascertain and identify the place intended.” 8 267 U.S. at 503 , 45 S.Ct. at 416 , 69 L.Ed. at 760 .

1987In syllabus point 4 of State v. Knight, 168 W.Va. 615 , 285 S.E.2d 401 (1981), this Court enunciated the standard to be applied in determining whether a prosecuting attorney should be disqualified from prosecuting a particular case: “Under circumstances where it can reasonably be inferred that the prosecuting attorney has an interest in the outcome of a criminal prosecution beyond ordinary dedication to his duty to see that justice is done, the prosecuting attorney should be disqualified from prosecuting the case.... ” In light of the foregoing, it is essential to determine whether the prosecu

1987In syllabus point 4 of State v. Knight, 168 W.Va. 615 , 285 S.E.2d 401 (1981), this Court enunciated the standard to be applied in determining whether a prosecuting attorney should be disqualified from prosecuting a particular case: “Under circumstances where it can reasonably be inferred that the prosecuting attorney has an interest in the outcome of a criminal prosecution beyond ordinary dedication to his duty to see that justice is done, the prosecuting attorney should be disqualified from prosecuting the case.... ” In light of the foregoing, it is essential to determine whether the prosecu

1978The court enunciated its rule as follows: “We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to employment contracts the rule that ‘in every contract there is an implied con-venant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” [ 364 N.E.2d at 1257 ] [Emphasis in original] California dealt with the doctrine in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. A

1978The court enunciated its rule as follows: “We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to employment contracts the rule that ‘in every contract there is an implied con-venant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” [ 364 N.E.2d at 1257 ] [Emphasis in original] California dealt with the doctrine in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. A

1978The court enunciated its rule as follows: “We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to employment contracts the rule that ‘in every contract there is an implied con-venant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” [ 364 N.E.2d at 1257 ] [Emphasis in original] California dealt with the doctrine in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. A

1943In that case expert testimony to the effect that the “plaintiff’s condition might have been caused by a shock, a- fall or anything that produces a shock to the spinal column” was held unobjectionable, and there is specific mention that “By other evidence this condition was connected with the accident.” *617 Without reference to the enunciated rule in the Barker case, it was held in Foose v. Hawley Corporation, 120 W.

1943Va. 334 , 198 S. E. 138 , that “Respecting a physical injury of which a person is suffering, a physician, grounding his testimony on direct information or a proper hypothetical question, may give in evidence his opinion of the cause of which the injury is the resultant”.