termination of parental rights hearing in North Carolina

2006This Court has held that where the thirty-day time requirement for entry of an order terminating parental rights has not been met, "prejudice must be shown before the late entry will be deemed reversible error." In re C.J.B., 171 N.C.App. 132 , ___, 614 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2005); see In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 316 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 391 , disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). "[T]he need to show prejudice in order to warrant reversal is highest the fewer number of days the delay exists....

2006See In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 315 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2004) (order entered eighty-nine days after the hearing), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004).

2006This Court has held that where the thirty-day time requirement for entry of an order terminating parental rights has not been met, "prejudice must be shown before the late entry will be deemed reversible error." In re C.J.B., 171 N.C.App. 132 , ___, 614 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2005); see In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 316 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 391 , disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). "[T]he need to show prejudice in order to warrant reversal is highest the fewer number of days the delay exists....

2006See In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 315 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2004) (order entered eighty-nine days after the hearing), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004).

2006See In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 315 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2004) (order entered eighty-nine days after the hearing), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004).

2006See In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 315 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2004) (order entered eighty-nine days after the hearing), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004).

2022E.g., In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408 (2019) (“[T]he trial court in this case relied partly on evidence from prior proceedings and findings in earlier orders, which . . . is proper and appropriate.”); In re M.N.C., 176 N.C.

2022E.g., In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408 (2019) (“[T]he trial court in this case relied partly on evidence from prior proceedings and findings in earlier orders, which . . . is proper and appropriate.”); In re M.N.C., 176 N.C.

2022E.g., In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408 (2019) (“[T]he trial court in this case relied partly on evidence from prior proceedings and findings in earlier orders, which . . . is proper and appropriate.”); In re M.N.C., 176 N.C.

2022E.g., In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408 (2019) (“[T]he trial court in this case relied partly on evidence from prior proceedings and findings in earlier orders, which . . . is proper and appropriate.”); In re M.N.C., 176 N.C.

2010Since the minor children's GAL in this case did not attend the termination of parental rights hearing pursuant to section 7B-1008, we must presume prejudice as this Court did in R.A.H. [1] R.A.H., 171 N.C.App. at 431 , 614 S.E.2d at 385 ("[W]e must presume prejudice where, as here, a child was not represented by a guardian ad litem at a critical stage of the termination proceedings.").

2010Since the minor children’s GAL in this case did not attend the termination of parental rights hearing pursuant to section 7B-1008, we must presume prejudice as this Court did in R.A.H. 1 R.A.H., 171 N.C.

2019On remand, the trial court should inquire into "efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing" and determine "whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding." In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ; see also In re D.E.G. , 228 N.C.App. 381 , 386-87, 747 S.E.2d 280 , 284 (2013) ("[B]efore ... relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a heari

2019See In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ("[W]e remand for determination by the trial court regarding efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing and whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding."); cf. State v. Fair , 354 N.C. 131 , 167, 557 S.E.2d 500 , 525 (2001) ("Indeed, because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal."), cert. denied , 535 U.S

2006This Court has held that where the thirty-day time requirement for entry of an order terminating parental rights has not been met, "prejudice must be shown before the late entry will be deemed reversible error." In re C.J.B., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 614 S.E.2d 368 , 369 (2005); see In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311 , 316, 598 S.E.2d 387 , 391, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). "[T]he need to show prejudice in order to warrant reversal is highest the fewer number of days the delay exists. . . .

2006This Court has held that where the thirty-day time requirement for entry of an order terminating parental rights has not been met, "prejudice must be shown before the late entry will be deemed reversible error." In re C.J.B., 171 N.C.App. 132 , ___, 614 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2005); see In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311, 316 , 598 S.E.2d 387, 391 , disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68 , 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). "[T]he need to show prejudice in order to warrant reversal is highest the fewer number of days the delay exists....

2005Gen.Stat. § 7B-1109 (2003), held that a delay of over six months between a termination of parental rights hearing and the resulting order was "highly prejudicial." In re L.E.B., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 610 S.E.2d 424 , 426 (2005) (emphasis omitted), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2005 WL 1754664 (2005).

2005Gen.Stat. § 7B-1109 (2003), held that a delay of over six months between a termination of parental rights hearing and the resulting order was "highly prejudicial." In re L.E.B., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 610 S.E.2d 424, 426 (2005) (emphasis omitted), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 616 S.E.2d 538 , 2005 WL 1754664 (2005).

2016Moreover, even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient as Mother claims, and that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as defined by Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561 -62 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 , DSS presented "overwhelming" evidence to support the adjudications of S.B., and Mother does not contend that counsel's representation was otherwise not "vigorous and zealous." See In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. 76 , 86, 646 S.E.2d 134 , 141 (2007) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where, (1) assuming arguendo, "counsel failed to make proper objections to testimony [du

2016Moreover, even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient as Mother claims, and that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as defined by Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561 -62 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 , DSS presented "overwhelming" evidence to support the adjudications of S.B., and Mother does not contend that counsel's representation was otherwise not "vigorous and zealous." See In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. 76 , 86, 646 S.E.2d 134 , 141 (2007) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where, (1) assuming arguendo, "counsel failed to make proper objections to testimony [du

2005"A termination of parental rights hearing is a civil rather than criminal action, with the right to be present, to testify, and to confront witnesses subject to `due limitations.'" In re Faircloth, 153 N.C.App. 565, 573 , 571 S.E.2d 65, 71 (2002) (citing In re Murphy, 105 N.C.App. 651, 658 , 414 S.E.2d 396, 400 , aff'd, 332 N.C. 663 , 422 S.E.2d 577 (1992); In re Barkley, 61 N.C.App. 267, 270 , 300 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1983)).

2005"A termination of parental rights hearing is a civil rather than criminal action, with the right to be present, to testify, and to confront witnesses subject to `due limitations.'" In re Faircloth, 153 N.C.App. 565, 573 , 571 S.E.2d 65, 71 (2002) (citing In re Murphy, 105 N.C.App. 651, 658 , 414 S.E.2d 396, 400 , aff'd, 332 N.C. 663 , 422 S.E.2d 577 (1992); In re Barkley, 61 N.C.App. 267, 270 , 300 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1983)).

2022The GAL relies, in part, on In re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C.

2022The GAL relies, in part, on In re H.L.A.D., 184 N.C.

2022App. at 469 , 831 S.E.2d at 882 (citation omitted). ¶ 33 Here, the trial court concluded “there is a high probability that the neglect will continue in the foreseeable future.” After the children were removed from Mother’s care and adjudicated dependent and/or neglected on three separate occasions, at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, Mother: (1) participated in therapy inconsistently; (2) was unable to appropriately discipline her children; and (3) failed to develop and implement a plan to properly supervise her children in her home given their inappropriate sexual behav

2022App. at 469 , 831 S.E.2d at 882 (citation omitted). ¶ 33 Here, the trial court concluded “there is a high probability that the neglect will continue in the foreseeable future.” After the children were removed from Mother’s care and adjudicated dependent and/or neglected on three separate occasions, at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, Mother: (1) participated in therapy inconsistently; (2) was unable to appropriately discipline her children; and (3) failed to develop and implement a plan to properly supervise her children in her home given their inappropriate sexual behav

2021Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, 301 N.C. 689, 694 (1981). ¶9 DSS argues that there was overwhelming, unrebutted evidence to support the termination of parental rights, reciting the testimony of the witnesses DSS tendered at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing.

2021Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, 301 N.C. 689, 694 (1981). ¶9 DSS argues that there was overwhelming, unrebutted evidence to support the termination of parental rights, reciting the testimony of the witnesses DSS tendered at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing.

2021We are not persuaded by these representations of respondent-mother. ¶ 19 This Court has recognized that “parental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019).

2021We are not persuaded by these representations of respondent-mother. ¶ 19 This Court has recognized that “parental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019).

2021Decades ago, this Court in In re Montgomery designated the trial court’s determination at the disposition stage of a termination of parental rights hearing as discretionary. 311 N.C. 101, 108 (1984) (“[W]here there is a reasonable hope that the family unit within a reasonable period of time can reunite and provide for the emotional and physical welfare of the child, the trial court is given discretion not to terminate rights.” (emphasis added)).

2021Decades ago, this Court in In re Montgomery designated the trial court’s determination at the disposition stage of a termination of parental rights hearing as discretionary. 311 N.C. 101, 108 (1984) (“[W]here there is a reasonable hope that the family unit within a reasonable period of time can reunite and provide for the emotional and physical welfare of the child, the trial court is given discretion not to terminate rights.” (emphasis added)).

2021“If either of the . . . grounds [for termination of parental rights found by the trial court are] supported by findings of fact based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the order appealed from should be affirmed.” In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982).

2021See In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404 .

2019On remand, the trial court should inquire into "efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing" and determine "whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding." In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ; see also In re D.E.G. , 228 N.C.App. 381 , 386-87, 747 S.E.2d 280 , 284 (2013) ("[B]efore ... relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a heari

2019On remand, the trial court should inquire into "efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing" and determine "whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding." In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ; see also In re D.E.G. , 228 N.C.App. 381 , 386-87, 747 S.E.2d 280 , 284 (2013) ("[B]efore ... relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a heari

2010Since the minor children's GAL in this case did not attend the termination of parental rights hearing pursuant to section 7B-1008, we must presume prejudice as this Court did in R.A.H. [1] R.A.H., 171 N.C.App. at 431 , 614 S.E.2d at 385 ("[W]e must presume prejudice where, as here, a child was not represented by a guardian ad litem at a critical stage of the termination proceedings.").

2010Id.

2026The findings that C.M.’s home was re-evaluated as a potential placement and approved less than two months before the termination of parental rights hearing does not negate or impact the court’s findings and conclusions that there is “a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by [Respondent-Mother],” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 , 788 S.E.2d at 167 , and there “is a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to [his or] her parents.” In re M.B., 382 N.C. 86 , 876 S.E.2d at 264.

2026The findings that C.M.’s home was re-evaluated as a potential placement and approved less than two months before the termination of parental rights hearing does not negate or impact the court’s findings and conclusions that there is “a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by [Respondent-Mother],” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 , 788 S.E.2d at 167 , and there “is a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to [his or] her parents.” In re M.B., 382 N.C. 86 , 876 S.E.2d at 264.

2008Our Supreme Court has stated that in a termination of parental rights hearing, "the trial court must admit and consider all evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed or occurred either before or after the prior adjudication of neglect." In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716 , 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)(emphasis omitted). "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." N.C.

2008Our Supreme Court has stated that in a termination of parental rights hearing, "the trial court must admit and consider all evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed or occurred either before or after the prior adjudication of neglect." In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716 , 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)(emphasis omitted). "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." N.C.

2019On remand, the trial court should inquire into "efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing" and determine "whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding." In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ; see also In re D.E.G. , 228 N.C.App. 381 , 386-87, 747 S.E.2d 280 , 284 (2013) ("[B]efore ... relieving an attorney from any obligation to actively participate in a termination of parental rights proceeding when the parent is absent from a heari

2019See In re S.N.W. , 204 N.C.App. at 561 , 698 S.E.2d at 79 ("[W]e remand for determination by the trial court regarding efforts by Respondent's counsel to contact and adequately represent Respondent at the termination of parental rights hearing and whether Respondent is entitled to appointment of counsel in a new termination of parental rights proceeding."); cf. State v. Fair , 354 N.C. 131 , 167, 557 S.E.2d 500 , 525 (2001) ("Indeed, because of the nature of IAC claims, defendants likely will not be in a position to adequately develop many IAC claims on direct appeal."), cert. denied , 535 U.S

2016Moreover, even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient as Mother claims, and that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as defined by Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561 -62 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 , DSS presented "overwhelming" evidence to support the adjudications of S.B., and Mother does not contend that counsel's representation was otherwise not "vigorous and zealous." See In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. 76 , 86, 646 S.E.2d 134 , 141 (2007) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where, (1) assuming arguendo, "counsel failed to make proper objections to testimony [du

2016Moreover, even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient as Mother claims, and that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as defined by Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561 -62 , 324 S.E.2d at 248 , DSS presented "overwhelming" evidence to support the adjudications of S.B., and Mother does not contend that counsel's representation was otherwise not "vigorous and zealous." See In re Dj.L., 184 N.C.App. 76 , 86, 646 S.E.2d 134 , 141 (2007) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where, (1) assuming arguendo, "counsel failed to make proper objections to testimony [du

2007And the longer the delay in entry of the order beyond the . . . deadline, the more likely prejudice will be readily apparent.") (internal citation omitted); In re T.W., 173 N.C.App. 153, 161 , 617 S.E.2d 702, 707 (2005) ("[T]he need to show prejudice diminishes as the delay between [a termination of parental rights hearing] and the date of entry of the order terminating parental rights increases.

2007And the longer the delay in entry of the order beyond the ... deadline, the more likely prejudice will be readily apparent.") (internal citation omitted); In re T.W., 173 N.C.App. 153 , 161, 617 S.E.2d 702 , 707 (2005) ("[T]he need to show prejudice diminishes as the delay between [a termination of parental rights hearing] and the date of entry of the order terminating parental rights increases.

2007While "a trial court's violation of statutory time limits . . . is not reversible error per se . . ., the complaining party [who] . . . appropriately articulate[s] the prejudice arising from the delay . . . justif[ies] reversal of the order." In re S.N.H., 177 N.C.App. 82, 84 , 627 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2006).

2007While "a trial court's violation of statutory time limits . . . is not reversible error per se . . ., the complaining party [who] . . . appropriately articulate[s] the prejudice arising from the delay . . . justif[ies] reversal of the order." In re S.N.H., 177 N.C.App. 82 , 84, 627 S.E.2d 510 , 513 (2006).