termination of parental rights hearing in Utah

2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id.

2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id.

2007See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ¶12 , 150 P.3d 540 (evaluating whether legislature could have effected different intent by choosing different language).

2007See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ¶12 , 150 P.3d 540 (evaluating whether legislature could have effected different intent by choosing different language).

2006As this court explained in In re A.H., "[P]arties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision." Sufficient notice will "advise the parties of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet." Parties are deprived of due process when they are not properly informed of the nature of a proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to allow preparation. 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 745 (quoting In re K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 579 (U

2006As this court explained in In re A. H., “[Pjarties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision.” Sufficient notice will “advise the parties of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet.” Parties are deprived of due process when they are not properly informed of the nature of a proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to allow preparation. 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 745 (quoting In re K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 579 (

2006As this court explained in In re A.H., "[P]arties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision." Sufficient notice will "advise the parties of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet." Parties are deprived of due process when they are not properly informed of the nature of a proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to allow preparation. 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 745 (quoting In re K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 579 (U

2006As this court explained in In re A. H., “[Pjarties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and must be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that issue before decision.” Sufficient notice will “advise the parties of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet.” Parties are deprived of due process when they are not properly informed of the nature of a proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to allow preparation. 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 745 (quoting In re K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 579 (

1998See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 , 1311 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (holding trial court judge could revisit prior judge's interim order in same case because two judges were "a single judicial office for law of the case purposes"). [4] Having a different judge presiding at the dispositional review hearing and at the termination of parental rights hearing is not the normal practice in our juvenile courts.

1997See State in re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah.Ct.App.1995).

1997See State in re J.L.W., 900 P.2d 543, 549 (Utah.Ct.App.1995).

1997“We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court’s interpretation.’” State in re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345 , 349 (Utah.Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted).

1997STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether the juvenile court had authority to postpone the dispositional review hearing and combine it with a termination of parental rights hearing is a question of law dependent on an interpretation of section 78-3a-312 of the Utah Code. "`We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation.'" State in re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah.Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted).

1997Cf. Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah.Ct.App.1991) (instructing district court not to consider “attorneys fees incurred in pursuing the underlying appeal” because “[tjhis procedure promotes judicial economy and prevents expenditures of time on matters which will be moot if the [appellants] ultimately do not prevail on appeal.”).

1997Cf. Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah.Ct.App. 1991) (instructing district court not to consider "attorneys fees incurred in pursuing the underlying appeal" because "[t]his procedure promotes judicial economy and prevents expenditures of time on matters which will be moot if the [appellants] ultimately do not prevail on appeal.").