termination of parental rights hearing in Pennsylvania

2019We also note with disapproval that counsel failed to file a brief on appeal advocating -7- J-S80016-18 for M.W.H., Jr.’s, and J.J.D.’s legal interests.4 See id. (“Counsel’s duty to represent a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing.”).

2018See T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d at 590 (“Counsel’s duty to represent a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing.”). -7- J-S42039-18 Further complicating this matter, Child’s preferred outcome is not clear from any other source in the record.

2018See T.S., supra (citing L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 188 (Baer, J., dissenting)). -6- J-S47030-18 permanency, I use this opportunity to point out that it is best practice for attorneys and orphans’ courts to place on the record a brief explanation of which attorney represents which child, the capacity in which the attorney represents the child, and whether the attorney is advocating for a child’s preferred outcome, best interests, or both.5 In addition, “[c]ounsel’s duty to represent a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing.” In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184

2018As this is an ever-changing area of law and this Court attempts to expedite these cases in order for children to achieve permanency, I suggest that it is best practice for attorneys and orphans’ courts to place on the record a brief explanation of which attorney represents which child, the capacity in which the attorney represents the child, and whether the attorney is advocating for a child’s preferred outcome, best interests, or both.2 In addition, “[c]ounsel’s duty to represent a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing.” In re Adoption of T.M.L.M.

2025See, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a); In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 , 1235-37 (Pa. 2020); In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018). -4- J-S24001-25 The orphans’ court summarized the evidence presented at the termination of parental rights hearing as follows: At the onset of the proceeding, the Agency moved to admit the following exhibits into evidence, without objection: [Agency Ex.] 1 Receipt of Service/Attempt to Mother; [Agency Ex.] 2 Receipt of Service/Attempt to Father; [Agency Ex. 3 through 7] Juvenile Dependency Dockets (25-29 of 2024); [Agency Ex.] 8 Dependency Petitions; [Agenc

2025According to Father’s testimony, Mother has sporadically contacted him to ask if she can provide ____________________________________________ termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, where there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best interests can also represent the child’s legal interests.” In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018).

2020See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that the failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in the waiver of that issue); In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (concluding that a mother’s failure to raise a timely objection to an error during a termination of parental rights hearing resulted in waiver of that issue on appeal).

2019In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding waiver when Mother failed to raise an objection at the termination of parental rights hearing) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-476 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

2017The party moving for termination must "prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 251 l(a)." In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2017The Agency "must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 251 l(a)." In re L.M, 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2025In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) In the instant case, Mother contends that even though she admitted that she could not care for Child at the termination of parental rights hearing, her parental rights should not be terminated because she had the “fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of [Child.]” Mother’s Brief at 19 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

2021In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). - 14 - J-A28012-21 These continuous failures to address her drug addiction—which is a necessary predicate to her reunification with the Children— indicates a settled purpose by Mother to relinquish her parental rights.

2018See In re Adoption of J.L. , 769 A.2d 1182 , 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001) ; see also In re M.T. , 414 Pa.Super. 372 , 607 A.2d 271 , 276 (1992) (observing that child's counsel abdicated his legal responsibilities to his client because counsel, inter alia , failed to file a brief, indicate that he joined another party's brief, or otherwise notify this Court of his client's position).

2018See In re Adoption of J.L., 769 A.2d 1182, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also In re M.T., 607 A.2d 271, 276 (Pa. Super. 1992) (observing that child’s counsel abdicated his legal responsibilities to his client because counsel, inter alia, failed to file a brief, indicate that he joined another party’s brief, or otherwise notify this Court of his client’s position).

2024Ultimately, at a termination of parental rights hearing, a trial court must determine whether terminating parental rights is in a child's best interest, “with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing [the parent-child] bond.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2019Ultimately, at a termination of parental rights hearing, a trial court must determine whether terminating parental rights is in a child's best interest, "with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing [the parent-child] bond." In re N.A.M. , 33 A.3d 95 , 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2022V, §10; and thereby, for the purpose of circumnavigating any further delay in this matter, we direct the adoption court, on remand, to set forth and enforce procedural expectations substantially aligned with the Orphans’ Court Rules, specifically Chapters III (petition practice), VII (hearings), and XV (adoptions), adapted as needed in the court’s discretion to ensure the expeditious and just resolution of this preliminary matter now pending for over two and a half years. 23 As a final prudential matter, we note the termination of parental rights hearing in this case occurred on March 6, 2017,

2018See T.S., supra (citing L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 188 (Baer, J., dissenting)). -6- J-S47030-18 permanency, I use this opportunity to point out that it is best practice for attorneys and orphans’ courts to place on the record a brief explanation of which attorney represents which child, the capacity in which the attorney represents the child, and whether the attorney is advocating for a child’s preferred outcome, best interests, or both.5 In addition, “[c]ounsel’s duty to represent a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing.” In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184

2018This Court then examined the differences between custody, adoption, and termination of parental rights matters, and concluded that unlike custody and adoption hearings, “[n]o statute or case law exists which requires or permits the child’s testimony” in a termination of parental rights hearing.1 Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).

2016See In re: B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa. Super 2001).

2026Cf. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 707 (Pa. 1998) (noting that due process requires provision of public funds to appoint an expert necessary to prepare a defense in a criminal trial).

2025In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) In the instant case, Mother contends that even though she admitted that she could not care for Child at the termination of parental rights hearing, her parental rights should not be terminated because she had the “fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of [Child.]” Mother’s Brief at 19 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

2025In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) In the instant case, Mother contends that even though she admitted that she could not care for Child at the termination of parental rights hearing, her parental rights should not be terminated because she had the “fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of [Child.]” Mother’s Brief at 19 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

2025Mother further argues that because she made arrangements for members of her family to care for Child, “she cannot be deemed to have abandoned or otherwise failed to act in [Child’s] best interests.” Id.

2025See In re Adoption of L.B., 258 A.3d 506 , 2021 WL 2396340 , at *14-*15 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 822 (Pa. 2004) (holding that criminal defendant’s right to counsel was not violated when an attorney who had not formally entered their appearance nonetheless represented the defendant during a critical stage of the criminal trial).

2025See N.T., 8/7/24, at 40; see also, e.g., In re H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1263-64 (Pa. Super. 2023).

2025When conducting a termination of parental rights analysis, if the orphans’ court finds sufficient record support for termination exists pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court then proceeds to an analysis under Section 2511(b), which requires the court to “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 .

2021In re Quick, 559 A.2d 42, 46 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating “[i]t is unsupportable that an experienced trial judge is incapable of making factual determinations and legal findings in regard to the same child at different hearings . . . without being subject to bias or prejudice”).

2020See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that the failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in the waiver of that issue); In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (concluding that a mother’s failure to raise a timely objection to an error during a termination of parental rights hearing resulted in waiver of that issue on appeal).

2019In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding waiver when Mother failed to raise an objection at the termination of parental rights hearing) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-476 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

2016Once the moving party in a termination of parental rights hearing has met the conditions of at least one of the sections delineated in 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), the moving party must show that termination promotes the emotional needs and welfare of the child as set ____________________________________________ 1 The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re J.L.C. and J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247,