Belton rule in New Jersey

2018The Court's words bear repeating: *411 Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful" and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ State v. Pierce , 136 N.J. 184 , 214, 642 A.2d 947 (1994) (citation omi

2018The Court's words bear repeating: *411 Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful" and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ State v. Pierce , 136 N.J. 184 , 214, 642 A.2d 947 (1994) (citation omi

2020Super. at 159 ("[E]xcept for its rejection of the Belton rule,[6] our Supreme Court generally has not 'afforded greater protection regarding the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest under our State Constitution than that provided in Chimel's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.'" (quoting Dangerfield, 171 N.J. at 462 )).

2020Super. at 159 ("[E]xcept for its rejection of the Belton rule,[6] our Supreme Court generally has not 'afforded greater protection regarding the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest under our State Constitution than that provided in Chimel's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.'" (quoting Dangerfield, 171 N.J. at 462 )).

2018The Court's words bear repeating: *411 Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful" and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ State v. Pierce , 136 N.J. 184 , 214, 642 A.2d 947 (1994) (citation omi

2018The Court's words bear repeating: *411 Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful" and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ State v. Pierce , 136 N.J. 184 , 214, 642 A.2d 947 (1994) (citation omi

2006The Court in Eckel , as part of its rationale for rejecting the Belton rule, relied upon the fact that "once the occupant has been removed from the vehicle, placed under custodial arrest and seated in a police car, there is no danger that the arrestee might reach into his own vehicle to gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 536 , 888 A. 2d 1266 (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 , 235 n. 15, 440 A. 2d 1311 (1981)).

2006The Court in Eckel , as part of its rationale for rejecting the Belton rule, relied upon the fact that "once the occupant has been removed from the vehicle, placed under custodial arrest and seated in a police car, there is no danger that the arrestee might reach into his own vehicle to gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 536 , 888 A. 2d 1266 (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 , 235 n. 15, 440 A. 2d 1311 (1981)).

2005Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful," and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," [ State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 105-06 , 519 A. 2d 820, 825-26 ], vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ Id. at 214, 642 A .2d at 962 .] A conce

2005Because probable cause "is the constitutionally-imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is lawful," and "occupies a position of indisputable significance in search and seizure law," [ State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 105-06 , 519 A. 2d 820, 825-26 ], vehicle searches sustainable under the "automobile exception" and based on probable cause stand on firmer ground than those that depend for their validity on a judicially-created exception to the warrant requirement, such as the Belton rule, which requires no proof of probable cause. [ Id. at 214, 642 A .2d at 962 .] A conce

2006Therefore, our Supreme Court's rejection of the Belton rule relating to the geographical scope of a search incident to the arrest of an occupant of an automobile did not reflect any conclusion concerning the temporal limits of a search incident to an arrest under the New Jersey Constitution. *475 Furthermore, except for its rejection of the Belton rule, our Supreme Court generally has not "afforded greater protection regarding the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest under our State Constitution than that provided in Chimel's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Dangerfie

2006Therefore, our Supreme Court's rejection of the Belton rule relating to the geographical scope of a search incident to the arrest of an occupant of an automobile did not reflect any conclusion concerning the temporal limits of a search incident to an arrest under the New Jersey Constitution. *475 Furthermore, except for its rejection of the Belton rule, our Supreme Court generally has not "afforded greater protection regarding the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest under our State Constitution than that provided in Chimel's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Dangerfie

2005In analyzing counsel's performance in light of the Strickland/Fritz [3] test, the Court "examine[d] the law as it stood at the time of counsel's actions, not as it subsequently developed." Id. at 597 , 803 A .2d at 111 .

2005In analyzing counsel's performance in light of the Strickland/Fritz [3] test, the Court "examine[d] the law as it stood at the time of counsel's actions, not as it subsequently developed." Id. at 597 , 803 A .2d at 111 .

2005Eckel, supra, 374 N.J.Super . at 100, 863 A .2d at 1049-50 .

2005Eckel, supra, 374 N.J.Super . at 100, 863 A .2d at 1049-50 .

2004Once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment. [ Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2132 , 158 L.Ed. 2d at 914 .] Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, concurring, expressed what could only be charitably described as extreme reservations about the Belton rule.

2004Once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment. [ Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2132 , 158 L.Ed. 2d at 914 .] Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, concurring, expressed what could only be charitably described as extreme reservations about the Belton rule.

2004In Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476 , 483 n. 3 (Wyo.1999), the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in following Belton under the Wyoming Constitution, catalogued the cases that have accepted and rejected Belton .

2004In Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476 , 483 n. 3 (Wyo.1999), the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in following Belton under the Wyoming Constitution, catalogued the cases that have accepted and rejected Belton .

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994The majority cautioned, however, that the bright-line Belton rule combined with the statutory authorization to law-enforcement officers to arrest without a warrant any person violating any provision of Chapter 3 or 4 of Title 39 of the New Jersey statutes, “create[s] a potential for abuse.” Ibid.

1994The majority cautioned, however, that the bright-line Belton rule combined with the statutory authorization to law-enforcement officers to arrest without a warrant any person violating any provision of Chapter 3 or 4 of Title 39 of the New Jersey statutes, "create[s] a potential for abuse." Ibid.

1994Surely the operator of a motor vehicle should not be required to submit to a search of his person or his automobile, merely because he parks too close to a fire hydrant, fails to stop at a stop sign, passes a red light, exceeds the speed limit, or commits like traffic violations. [State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.Super. 427, 434-35 , 202 A.2d 448 (1964) (citations omitted).] We also perceive that the Belton rule, as applied to arrests for traffic offenses, creates an unwarranted incentive for police officers to “make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which t

1994Surely the operator of a motor vehicle should not be required to submit to a search of his person or his automobile, merely because he parks too close to a fire hydrant, fails to stop at a stop sign, passes a red light, exceeds the speed limit, or commits like traffic violations. [State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.Super. 427, 434-35 , 202 A.2d 448 (1964) (citations omitted).] We also perceive that the Belton rule, as applied to arrests for traffic offenses, creates an unwarranted incentive for police officers to “make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which t

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994In the former, there need be no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 38 , 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (distinguishing search during routine traffic stop from Belton search incident to lawful arrest); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 , 461 A.2d 1128 (1983) (distinguishing Belton); Alston, supra, 88 N.J. at 235 n. 15, 440 A.2d 1311 ) (declining to consider effect of Belton on Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. 346 , 419 A.2d 1123 ).

1994Justice Stevens, dissenting in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981), expressed that concern specifically in respect of Belton’s potential application to searches incident to traffic-related offenses: But if there were no reason to believe that anything more than a traffic violation had occurred, I should think it palpably unreasonable to require the driver of a car to open his briefcase or his luggage for inspection by the officer.

1994Justice Stevens, dissenting in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981), expressed that concern specifically in respect of Belton’s potential application to searches incident to traffic-related offenses: But if there were no reason to believe that anything more than a traffic violation had occurred, I should think it palpably unreasonable to require the driver of a car to open his briefcase or his luggage for inspection by the officer.

1994See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44-45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1142 , 103 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1982); cf. United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search invalid as not contemporaneous with arrest of defendant who was handcuffed and secured in police car thirty to forty-five minutes prior to search).

1994See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44-45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1142 , 103 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1982); cf. United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search invalid as not contemporaneous with arrest of defendant who was handcuffed and secured in police car thirty to forty-five minutes prior to search).

1994See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44-45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1142 , 103 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1982); cf. United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search invalid as not contemporaneous with arrest of defendant who was handcuffed and secured in police car thirty to forty-five minutes prior to search).

1994See, e.g., United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44-45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1142 , 103 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Collins, 668 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir.1982); cf. United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search invalid as not contemporaneous with arrest of defendant who was handcuffed and secured in police car thirty to forty-five minutes prior to search).