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8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dowardgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . 2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2002See, also, Brown at 352 , 588 N.E.2d at 115 (stating that the warrantless search of the automobile violated the Ohio Constitution). {¶ 14} A close reading of both Belton and Brown reveals that, although the Brown opinion attempted to distinguish that case from Belton based on the differing facts of the two cases, the attempt was unfounded. 2002See, also, Brown at 352 , 588 N.E.2d at 115 (stating that the warrantless search of the automobile violated the Ohio Constitution). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Fernongreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . 2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hillgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 87 (noting "the defendant bears the burden to prove the existence of any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence" and "the trial court did not err by denying Belton's motion for a jury instruction that he bore no burden at the mitigation phase"), and State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438 (1995) ("[t]he trial court clearly and correctly instructed the jury more than four separate times in final penalty instructions that the aggravating circumstances had to outweigh mitigating factors before the jury could recommend the de | 1 | 1 |
State v. Belton (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2020See State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 87 (noting "the defendant bears the burden to prove the existence of any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence" and "the trial court did not err by denying Belton's motion for a jury instruction that he bore no burden at the mitigation phase"), and State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438 (1995) ("[t]he trial court clearly and correctly instructed the jury more than four separate times in final penalty instructions that the aggravating circumstances had to outweigh mitigating factors before the jury could recommend the de 2020See State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 87 (noting "the defendant bears the burden to prove the existence of any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence" and "the trial court did not err by denying Belton's motion for a jury instruction that he bore no burden at the mitigation phase"), and State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438 (1995) ("[t]he trial court clearly and correctly instructed the jury more than four separate times in final penalty instructions that the aggravating circumstances had to outweigh mitigating factors before the jury could recommend the de | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Belton
red
2 sentences2002Furthermore, on its face, Belton’s rule applies only if an arrest is “custodial.” Id. 2002Furthermore, on its face, Belton’s rule applies only if an arrest is “custodial.” Id. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Knowles v. Iowa
green
2 sentences2002The United States Supreme Court, in Knowles v. Iowa (1998), 525 U.S. 113, 118-119 , 119 S.Ct. 484, 488 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497-498 , found that a “search incident to citation,” in which a police officer searched a vehicle incident to the issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest in a routine traffic stop, violated the Fourth Amendment when there was no prior arrest to justify the search. 3 Belton does not authorize indiscriminate fishing expeditions; only motor vehicles very recently occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to a Belton search. 2002The United States Supreme Court, in Knowles v. Iowa (1998), 525 U.S. 113, 118-119 , 119 S.Ct. 484, 488 , 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497-498 , found that a “search incident to citation,” in which a police officer searched a vehicle incident to the issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest in a routine traffic stop, violated the Fourth Amendment when there was no prior arrest to justify the search. 3 Belton does not authorize indiscriminate fishing expeditions; only motor vehicles very recently occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject to a Belton search. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. James Allen White, Jr.
green
2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . 2002See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133 Md.App. 41, 57-58 , 754 A.2d 463, 472 ; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994), 41 F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1 ; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989), 871 F.2d 41, 44 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
California v. Greenwood
green
2 sentences2002The Brown opinion then included a footnote to the effect that if the two cases were not distinguishable, the decision to decline to adopt Belton’s rule was based on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 2 : “ ‘Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.’ ” Id. at fn. 3, quoting California v. Greenwood (1988), 486 U.S. 35, 43 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 . 2002The Brown opinion then included a footnote to the effect that if the two cases were not distinguishable, the decision to decline to adopt Belton’s rule was based on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 2 : “ ‘Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.’ ” Id. at fn. 3, quoting California v. Greenwood (1988), 486 U.S. 35, 43 , 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630 , 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. DePew
green
2 sentences2016However, the trial court did not analyze whether a prosecutor may state that nature and circumstances are a factor to consider in the mitigation phase if the defense has not offered them as mitigating evidence. 5 As we explained in State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 289 , 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988): R.C. 2929.04(B) and (C) deal with mitigation and were designed to enable the defendant to raise issues in mitigation and to facilitate his presentation thereof. 2016However, the trial court did not analyze whether a prosecutor may state that nature and circumstances are a factor to consider in the mitigation phase if the defense has not offered them as mitigating evidence. 5 As we explained in State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 289 , 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988): R.C. 2929.04(B) and (C) deal with mitigation and were designed to enable the defendant to raise issues in mitigation and to facilitate his presentation thereof. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Muncie
green
2 sentences2011Under this provision, “for an order to qualify as a final appealable order, the following conditions must be met: (a) the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy, as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), (b) the order must determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy so as to prevent judgment in favor of the party prosecuting the appeal, and (c) a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 , 2006-Ohio-4253 , 852 N.E.2d 711 , ¶ 15. {¶ 32} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines 2011Under this provision, “for an order to qualify as a final appealable order, the following conditions must be met: (a) the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy, as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), (b) the order must determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy so as to prevent judgment in favor of the party prosecuting the appeal, and (c) a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 , 2006-Ohio-4253 , 852 N.E.2d 711 , ¶ 15. {¶ 32} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Upshaw
green
1 sentence2011Under this provision, “for an order to qualify as a final appealable order, the following conditions must be met: (a) the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy, as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), (b) the order must determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy so as to prevent judgment in favor of the party prosecuting the appeal, and (c) a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 , 2006-Ohio-4253 , 852 N.E.2d 711 , ¶ 15. {¶ 32} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bishop v. Dresser Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Under this provision, “for an order to qualify as a final appealable order, the following conditions must be met: (a) the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy, as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), (b) the order must determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy so as to prevent judgment in favor of the party prosecuting the appeal, and (c) a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 , 2006-Ohio-4253 , 852 N.E.2d 711 , ¶ 15. {¶ 32} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines 2011Under this provision, “for an order to qualify as a final appealable order, the following conditions must be met: (a) the order must grant or deny a provisional remedy, as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), (b) the order must determine the action with respect to the provisional remedy so as to prevent judgment in favor of the party prosecuting the appeal, and (c) a delay in review of the order until after final judgment would deprive the appellant of any meaningful or effective relief.” State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189 , 2006-Ohio-4253 , 852 N.E.2d 711 , ¶ 15. {¶ 32} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Murrell
green
2 sentences2009State v. Murrell , 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , overruling Brown . {¶ 22} The Belton rule has been applied expansively. 2009State v. Murrell , 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , overruling Brown . {¶ 22} The Belton rule has been applied expansively. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Murrell
green
2 sentences2009State v. Murrell , 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , overruling Brown . {¶ 22} The Belton rule has been applied expansively. 2009State v. Murrell , 94 Ohio St.3d 489 , 2002-Ohio-1483 , overruling Brown . {¶ 22} The Belton rule has been applied expansively. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Thornton v. United States
green
2 sentences2007In Thornton v. United States (2004), 541 U.S. 615 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Court extended the Belton rule to allow a search of the interior compartment of an automobile even though the occupant of the vehicle was outside the car when the police first made contact with him. 2007In Thornton v. United States (2004), 541 U.S. 615 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 , 158 L.Ed.2d 905 , the Court extended the Belton rule to allow a search of the interior compartment of an automobile even though the occupant of the vehicle was outside the car when the police first made contact with him. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2005When the police have no fear of weapons, there are no furtive gestures, and the original pretext stop is based on a hunch, can such a search still be `reasonable?' Given the course set by the Court of Criminal Appeals and even this court, precedent requires we respectfully decline appellant's invitation to revisit the issue in this case." Id. {¶ 22} Thus, considering all the above, the Belton rule does not limit the vehicular search just because there are passengers in the car. 2005When the police have no fear of weapons, there are no furtive gestures, and the original pretext stop is based on a hunch, can such a search still be `reasonable?' Given the course set by the Court of Criminal Appeals and even this court, precedent requires we respectfully decline appellant's invitation to revisit the issue in this case." Id. {¶ 22} Thus, considering all the above, the Belton rule does not limit the vehicular search just because there are passengers in the car. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.