Belton rule in Arizona

2007Id. at 617, 622 n. 2, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (declining to address question on which Court did not grant review), 624 n. 4 (plurality declining to address questions other than “whether the [Belton rule] is confined to situations in which the police initiate contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle”).

2007We agree with Justice Scalia’s statement that applying the Belton doctrine to justify a search of the car of a person handcuffed and confined in a police car “stretches [the doctrine] beyond its breaking point.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). .

2007Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 . ¶ 12 The State and our dissenting colleagues seek to bring Gant’s case within the Belton rule.

2007Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-60 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 . ¶ 12 The State and our dissenting colleagues seek to bring Gant’s case within the Belton rule.

2003Conversely, if the defendant voluntarily left the automobile and began walking away before the police officer initiated contact, “the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary.” Id. ¶ 21 Under this approach, which views a defendant as a “recent occupant” of a vehicle for purposes of the Belton rule only when the police initiated contact when the arrestee was still in the vehicle, state and federal courts have found Belton inapplicable when the defendant left the vehicle before such contact,

2003Conversely, if the defendant voluntarily left the automobile and began walking away before the police officer initiated contact, “the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary.” Id. ¶ 21 Under this approach, which views a defendant as a “recent occupant” of a vehicle for purposes of the Belton rule only when the police initiated contact when the arrestee was still in the vehicle, state and federal courts have found Belton inapplicable when the defendant left the vehicle before such contact,

2003In upholding a vehicle search as incident to a lawful arrest, the Virginia court stated that a defendant is “a recent occupant of a vehicle within the limits of the Belton rule” when he is arrested “in close proximity to the vehicle immediately after the [defendant] exits the automobile.” Glaseo, 513 S.E.2d at 142 .

2002As Justice Lacy noted in her concurring opinion in Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433 , 513 S.E.2d 137, 142 (1999) (Lacy, J., concurring): [N]othing in Belton specifically defined what circumstances qualified an arrestee as a "recent occupant." Consequently, from its inception, application of the so-called "bright line" Belton rule has not provided clear resolution of search issues in cases with facts that do not mirror the facts in Belton or the precise words of the rule. ¶ 20 The Belton rule was premised, at least theoretically, on concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.

2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 ; Dean, 206 Ariz. at 166, ¶ 30 , 76 P.3d at 437 . [4] Other courts have followed this approach as well.

2007See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 ; Dean, 206 Ariz. at 166, ¶ 30 , 76 P.3d at 437 . [4] Other courts have followed this approach as well.

2007See, e.g., State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523 , 888 A.2d 1266, 1275-77 (2006) (rejecting Belton rule under state constitution); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38 , 46 ¶ 19 (Vt.2007) (describing state court decisions rejecting Belton rule under state constitutions).

2007See, e.g., State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523 , 888 A.2d 1266, 1275-77 (2006) (rejecting Belton rule under state constitution); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38 , 46 ¶ 19 (Vt.2007) (describing state court decisions rejecting Belton rule under state constitutions).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2002See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 , 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 773 (1981); State v. Hanna, 173 Ariz. 30, 32 , 839 P.2d 450, 452 (App.1992).

2002See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 , 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 773 (1981); State v. Hanna, 173 Ariz. 30, 32 , 839 P.2d 450, 452 (App.1992).

2002A decision from Division Two of this Court has determined that the Belton rule “applies only when ‘the officer initiates contact with the defendant ... while the defendant is still in the automobile, and the officer subsequently arrests the defendant (regardless of whether the defendant has- been removed from or has exited the automobile).’” Id. at 244, ¶ 11, 43 P.3d at 192 (quoting United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir.1995)). ¶ 10 Gant noted, however, that the suspect may not evade a search by leaving the vehicle before the officers arrest him. 202 Ariz. at 244-45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.

2002A decision from Division Two of this Court has determined that the Belton rule “applies only when ‘the officer initiates contact with the defendant ... while the defendant is still in the automobile, and the officer subsequently arrests the defendant (regardless of whether the defendant has- been removed from or has exited the automobile).’” Id. at 244, ¶ 11, 43 P.3d at 192 (quoting United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir.1995)). ¶ 10 Gant noted, however, that the suspect may not evade a search by leaving the vehicle before the officers arrest him. 202 Ariz. at 244-45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.