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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newark Publishers' Ass'n v. Newark Typographical Union No. 103green2 sentences2005Moreover, “[disproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or single provision does not serve the purpose of interpretation.” Newark Publishers’ Ass’n v. Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 426 , 126 A.2d 348 (1956). 2005Moreover, “[disproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or single provision does not serve the purpose of interpretation.” Newark Publishers’ Ass’n v. Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 426 , 126 A.2d 348 (1956). | 2 | 5 |
Hardy Ex Rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matingreen2 sentences2025Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009); then quoting Republic Bus. 2024Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009), mindful that “[d]isproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or single provision does not serve the purpose of interpretation,” Republic Business Credit Corp. v. Camhe-Marcille, 381 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Republic Business Credit Corp. v. Camhe-Marcillegreen1 sentence2024Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009), mindful that “[d]isproportionate emphasis upon a word or clause or single provision does not serve the purpose of interpretation,” Republic Business Credit Corp. v. Camhe-Marcille, 381 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bankgreen2 sentences1981See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank , 293 U.S. 84 , 93-94 (1934) , where the Supreme Court stated -- The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does in the construction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and viewing it apart, but by considering it in connection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it is found, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the legislative will. 1981See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1934), where the Supreme Court stated— The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does in the construction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and viewing it apart, but by considering it in connection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it is found, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the legislative will. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lamberton v. Travelers Indemnity Company
green
1 sentence1979It is the collapsing of the form which caused injury and which gave birth to certain claims of those injured — in no sense can the collapsing of the forms be called a claim. [ 325 A. 2d at 107 ; emphasis supplied] Accordingly, the court concluded that the deductible provision applied to each of the injured parties' claims, a decision affirmed on appeal. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Grenada Bank v. Lester
green
1 sentence1957The plaintiff cites Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373, 376 ( Sup. Ct. 1956) for the statement: "It thus becomes evident that the meaning given to the unqualified word `insured' in the omnibus clause does not necessarily apply in, and can hardly extend to, the exclusion clause, and that any attempt to construe the use of the word in one clause by reference to the other clause obscures and confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of both the word and the clause." In effect, the plaintiff contends that the word "insured" in paragraphs (d) and (e) is | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1957However, in Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581 , 276 N.W. 725 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), a similar exclusion provision was construed as not protecting a driver using an automobile with the owner's permission, where the owner's employee was injured and the employee sued the driver; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67 , 154 So. 279 ( Sup. Ct. 1934); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2 d 659, 99 P. 2 d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531 ( Sup. Ct. 1940). 1957However, in Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581 , 276 N.W. 725 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), a similar exclusion provision was construed as not protecting a driver using an automobile with the owner's permission, where the owner's employee was injured and the employee sued the driver; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67 , 154 So. 279 ( Sup. Ct. 1934); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2 d 659, 99 P. 2 d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531 ( Sup. Ct. 1940). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.
green
1 sentence1957The plaintiff cites Pullen v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867 , 89 So. 2 d 373, 376 ( Sup. Ct. 1956) for the statement: "It thus becomes evident that the meaning given to the unqualified word `insured' in the omnibus clause does not necessarily apply in, and can hardly extend to, the exclusion clause, and that any attempt to construe the use of the word in one clause by reference to the other clause obscures and confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of both the word and the clause." In effect, the plaintiff contends that the word "insured" in paragraphs (d) and (e) is | 1 | 1957–1957 |
McCormick v. Tappendorf
neutral
1 sentence1957However, in Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581 , 276 N.W. 725 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), a similar exclusion provision was construed as not protecting a driver using an automobile with the owner's permission, where the owner's employee was injured and the employee sued the driver; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67 , 154 So. 279 ( Sup. Ct. 1934); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2 d 659, 99 P. 2 d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531 ( Sup. Ct. 1940). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Birrenkott v. Mc Manamay
green
2 sentences1957However, in Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581 , 276 N.W. 725 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), a similar exclusion provision was construed as not protecting a driver using an automobile with the owner's permission, where the owner's employee was injured and the employee sued the driver; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67 , 154 So. 279 ( Sup. Ct. 1934); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2 d 659, 99 P. 2 d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531 ( Sup. Ct. 1940). 1957However, in Birrenkott v. McManamay, 65 S.D. 581 , 276 N.W. 725 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), a similar exclusion provision was construed as not protecting a driver using an automobile with the owner's permission, where the owner's employee was injured and the employee sued the driver; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67 , 154 So. 279 ( Sup. Ct. 1934); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2 d 659, 99 P. 2 d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531 ( Sup. Ct. 1940). | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.