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17 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1872–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marlin v. Kellygreen2 sentences1992See Marlin , 678 S.W.2d at 578 (a court should ignore a word or clause in a will only when it is clearly contrary to the general intention of the testator). 1992See Marlin, 678 S.W.2d at 587 (a court should ignore a word or clause in a will only when it is clearly contrary to the general intention of the testator). | 2 | 2 |
Zuliani v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Generally, if the defendant produces some evidence to support his claim of self-defense, the State has “the burden of persuasion to disprove the raised defense.” Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, Inc.green1 sentence2021See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280 (internal quotations omitted) (“[T]he words in a covenant may not be enlarged, extended, stretched or changed by construction.”). - 17 - The only word in the clause that could conceivably be construed as a restriction is “exclusive.” However, we do not read the word “exclusive” as excluding the party in possession from exercising all rights except hunting and grazing, i.e., to the exclusion of other rights. | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Zappgreen2 sentences1991Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491 , 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912); Skidmore v. Glenn, 781 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1989, no writ). 1991Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491 , 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912); Skidmore v. Glenn, 781 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1989, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Skidmore v. Glenngreen1 sentence1991Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491 , 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912); Skidmore v. Glenn, 781 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1989, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2005In Wichita Falls State Hospital, the supreme court considered that reading waiver into the patient’s bill of rights, a statute that never mentioned the word waiver, would expose the State to unprecedented liability by subjecting it to exemplary damage awards, contrary to the legislature’s “interest in protecting the State’s financial resources.” Id. at 701 . 2005In Wichita Falls State Hospital, the supreme court considered that reading waiver into the patient’s bill of rights, a statute that never mentioned the word waiver, would expose the State to unprecedented liability by subjecting it to exemplary damage awards, contrary to the legislature’s “interest in protecting the State’s financial resources.” Id. at 701 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Clements v. Withers
green
2 sentences2001"There is no magic about the word 'malicious'--either for judges or for jurors, but the addition of such a word in the instruction would have pointed the jury to the requirement that they must find motive or purpose on the part of the defendants." Clements , 437 S.W.2d at 822 . 2001"There is no magic about the word 'malicious'--either for judges or for jurors, but the addition of such a word in the instruction would have pointed the jury to the requirement that they must find motive or purpose on the part of the defendants." Clements , 437 S.W.2d at 822 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Ratcliff v. State
green
2 sentences1984Ratcliff v. State, 289 S.W. 1072 (Tex.Crim.App. 1926); Winder v. King, 297 S.W. 689 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1928). 1984Ratcliff v. State, 289 S.W. 1072 (Tex. Grim. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Getty Oil Company v. Jones
green
1 sentence2018Gety, 470 S.W.2d at 622 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Newman v. Obersteller Ex Rel. Obersteller
green
1 sentence2006The Court also noted that its reasoning was consistent with the purpose of the statutory provision allowing governmental employees an interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling on a claim of immunity, which is to A protect[] public officials asserting an immunity defense from the litigation process. @ Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Winder v. King
green
1 sentence1984Ratcliff v. State, 289 S.W. 1072 (Tex.Crim.App. 1926); Winder v. King, 297 S.W. 689 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1928). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Winder v. King
neutral
1 sentence1984Ratcliff v. State, 289 S.W. 1072 (Tex.Crim.App. 1926); Winder v. King, 297 S.W. 689 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1928). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gibbs v. Barkley
green
1 sentence1944Gibbs v. Barkley, Tex.Com.App., 242 S.W. 462 ; Janes v. Gulf Production Co., Tex.Civ.App., 15 S.W.2d 1102 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Janes v. Gulf Production Co.
green
1 sentence1944Gibbs v. Barkley, Tex.Com.App., 242 S.W. 462 ; Janes v. Gulf Production Co., Tex.Civ.App., 15 S.W.2d 1102 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge
green
1 sentence1943But there can hardly be any difference of opinion that the word presumption, in the sense as discussed in the Muegge case [ 135 Tex. 520 , 143 S.W.2d 767 ], that is, "a rule of procedure or an `administrative assumption' which `vanishes' or is `put to flight' when positive evidence to the contrary is introduced," means something very different from that of the word inference. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Fraser v. Bentel
green
2 sentences1938“The word ‘includes’ is not, ordinarily, a word of limitation, but rather of enlargement.” Fraser v. Bentel, 161 Cal. 390 , 119 P. 509, 511 , Ann.Cas.1913B, 1062. 1938“The word ‘includes’ is not, ordinarily, a word of limitation, but rather of enlargement.” Fraser v. Bentel, 161 Cal. 390 , 119 P. 509, 511 , Ann.Cas.1913B, 1062. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
New Jersey v. Wilson
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Fletcher v. Peck
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Planters' Bank v. Sharp
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Woodruff v. Trapnall
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Dodge v. Woolsey
green
1 sentence1872In support of the doctrine that a legislative grant is a contract within the meaning of the 10th Section, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiff refers us to the following authorities; these, and others which might be cited, I have examined: State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard, 369 , 380; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 Howard, 331 ; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518, 650 ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 ; Planters’ Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 Howard, 301 , 327; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, and Cheston | 1 | 1872–1872 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.