word clause in California

2010We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he objective of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]” (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 , 115 P.3d 1233 ].) To ascertain that intent, “we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 , 92 P.3d 350 ].) The statute’s every word and clause should be giv

2010We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he objective of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]” (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 , 115 P.3d 1233 ].) To ascertain that intent, “we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 , 92 P.3d 350 ].) The statute’s every word and clause should be giv

2010We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he objective of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]” (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 , 115 P.3d 1233 ].) To ascertain that intent, “we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 , 92 P.3d 350 ].) The statute’s every word and clause should be giv

2010We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he objective of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]” (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 , 115 P.3d 1233 ].) To ascertain that intent, “we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.]” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 , 92 P.3d 350 ].) The statute’s every word and clause should be giv

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) Effect also should be given to the statute’s every word and clause, thereby leaving no part or provision useless, deprived of meaning, or contradictory.

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387-388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) Effect also should be given to the statute’s every word and clause, thereby leaving no part or provision useless, deprived of meaning, or contradictory.

1996In People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ], the Supreme Court held that a criminal appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.” The court again followed this standard in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].

1996In People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ], the Supreme Court held that a criminal appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.” The court again followed this standard in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].

1996In People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ], the Supreme Court held that a criminal appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.” The court again followed this standard in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].

1996In People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ], the Supreme Court held that a criminal appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates.” The court again followed this standard in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].

2020(See, e.g., Hoag v. Howard (1880) 55 Cal. 564, 565 [“a word or clause . . . will be presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute”].) This is not an absolute rule of interpretation, however, and the presumption of consistent usage is rebuttable if the statute displays contrary indications of legislative intent.

1957Pitte v. Shipley (1873), 46 Cal. 154 ; Hoag v. Howard (1880), 55 Cal. 564 .

2024(See Foster v. McFadden (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 943, 947 [letter, which was neither labeled a claim nor contained the word claim, accomplished the purposes of a sufficient claim, and therefore should be treated as a claim].) Nevertheless, the Letter “ ‘ “disclose[d] the existence of a ‘claim’ which, if not satisfactorily resolved, [would] result in a lawsuit against” ’ ” the District.

2024(Westcon, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 202 , quoting Alliance Financial, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 643-644; accord, Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 709 .) According to our Supreme Court, that is what is required to establish a “ ‘claim as presented.’ ” ( Phillips, supra, at p. 709 .) The District asserts that if plaintiffs’ Letter was a “claim as presented,” the judgment nonetheless must be affirmed because plaintiffs filed their complaint one day before the District’s time to act had expired.

2024(Westcon, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 202 , quoting Alliance Financial, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 643-644; accord, Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 709 .) According to our Supreme Court, that is what is required to establish a “ ‘claim as presented.’ ” ( Phillips, supra, at p. 709 .) The District asserts that if plaintiffs’ Letter was a “claim as presented,” the judgment nonetheless must be affirmed because plaintiffs filed their complaint one day before the District’s time to act had expired.

2020(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 692 [presumption of consistent usage of “ ‘term’ ” rebutted where the statute under interpretation uses “ ‘term’ ” and “ ‘sentence’ ” interchangeably]; see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, supra, at pp. 170-173 [presumption of consistent usage “assumes a perfection of drafting that, as an empirical matter, is not often achieved”].) The Rules, however, do not display any contrary indications that its drafters intended “actual service” to have more than one meaning.

2009Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 , 895 P.2d 56 ]; DuBois v. Workers' Comp.

2009Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 , 895 P.2d 56 ]; DuBois v. Workers' Comp.

1996Third, we reject the contention that in the absence of conflicting evidence, the court may not rely on the word of the defense lawyer alone. “[M]ost courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted.” (Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 485 [ 55 L.Ed.2d at p. 435 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explains: “In so holding, the courts have acknowledged and given effect to several interrelated considerations.

1996Third, we reject the contention that in the absence of conflicting evidence, the court may not rely on the word of the defense lawyer alone. “[M]ost courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted.” (Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 485 [ 55 L.Ed.2d at p. 435 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explains: “In so holding, the courts have acknowledged and given effect to several interrelated considerations.

1990The word claim imports “ ‘ “the assertion of a liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of money . . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 269, quoting San Pedro Properties, Inc. v. Sayre & Toso, Inc. (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 750, 755 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 844 ].) In response to an interrogatory as to when she first made a claim against Steinway, Hill stated she believed Steinway knew from the time she awoke in the recovery room that the result achieved was unexpected and below the standard of care; she believed Steinway knew immediately that she was dissatisfied with the result and wanted the mat

1990The word claim imports “ ‘ “the assertion of a liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of money . . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 269, quoting San Pedro Properties, Inc. v. Sayre & Toso, Inc. (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 750, 755 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 844 ].) In response to an interrogatory as to when she first made a claim against Steinway, Hill stated she believed Steinway knew from the time she awoke in the recovery room that the result achieved was unexpected and below the standard of care; she believed Steinway knew immediately that she was dissatisfied with the result and wanted the mat

1977When discussing the necessity of a proper record of a waiver of counsel in pre-Faretta days, our Supreme Court said “... we will not accept a mere superficial inquiry.” (People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 673 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ].) The other issue raised, violation of the plea bargain, does not require extensive discussion.

1977When discussing the necessity of a proper record of a waiver of counsel in pre-Faretta days, our Supreme Court said “... we will not accept a mere superficial inquiry.” (People v. Carter, 66 Cal.2d 666, 673 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ].) The other issue raised, violation of the plea bargain, does not require extensive discussion.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1970(In re Bandmann (1958) 51 Cal.2d 388, 392 [ 333 P.2d 339 ]; Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510-511 [ 289 P. 160 ]; Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Odell (1927) 200 Cal. 637, 641 [ 254 P. 570 ]; Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 853 ].) At common law only the wilful and malicious burning of another’s dwelling house or outbuildings that were a parcel thereof constituted the offense of arson.

1948The requirement of section 476 of the Vehicle Code is that vehicular traffic “yield the right of way . . . to pedestrians.” The term “right of way” is defined in section 87 of the Vehicle Code as “the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.” A privilege is “an advantage; an option; ... a peculiar benefit, favor, or advantage.” (50 C.J. 400.) It is “ ‘a right . . . not enjoyed by all, a special right or power conferred or possessed by one or more individuals, ’ ” and when used with reference to an official power it “imports a discretionary power.” (Cope v. Flannery (1925), 70 Cal.App. 73

1948The requirement of section 476 of the Vehicle Code is that vehicular traffic “yield the right of way . . . to pedestrians.” The term “right of way” is defined in section 87 of the Vehicle Code as “the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.” A privilege is “an advantage; an option; ... a peculiar benefit, favor, or advantage.” (50 C.J. 400.) It is “ ‘a right . . . not enjoyed by all, a special right or power conferred or possessed by one or more individuals, ’ ” and when used with reference to an official power it “imports a discretionary power.” (Cope v. Flannery (1925), 70 Cal.App. 73