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9 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marino v. Marinogreen2 sentences2018Although the express wishes of the children are entitled to great weight, the " [c]ourt is . . . not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis' " ( Matter of Marino v Marino , 90 AD3d 1694, 1696 [4th Dept 2011]). [*2]Here, the court did not err in failing to abide by the wishes of the children inasmuch as there is evidence in the record that the mother's animus toward the father had negatively affected the children's relationship with him, and the court-appointed psychologist opined that the children's interests would be best se 2018Although the express wishes of the children are entitled to great weight, the " [c]ourt is . . . not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis' " ( Matter of Marino v Marino , 90 AD3d 1694, 1696 [4th Dept 2011]). [*2]Here, the court did not err in failing to abide by the wishes of the children inasmuch as there is evidence in the record that the mother's animus toward the father had negatively affected the children's relationship with him, and the court-appointed psychologist opined that the children's interests would be best se | 3 | 3 |
Fox v. Foxgreen2 sentences2011Contrary to the contention of the Attorney for the Child, the “[c]ourt is, of course, not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis” (Matter of Rivera v LaSalle, 84 AD3d 1436, 1438 [2011]; see Fox, 177 AD2d at 211-212 ), especially where the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that “to follow [the child’s] wishes would be tantamount to severing her relationship with her father, and [that] result would not be in [the child’s] best interest[s].” We have considered the remaining contentions of the Attorney for the Child and co 2011Contrary to the contention of the Attorney for the Child, the “[c]ourt is, of course, not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis” (Matter of Rivera v LaSalle, 84 AD3d 1436, 1438 ; see Fox, 177 AD2d at 211-212 ), especially where the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that “to follow [the child’s] wishes would be tantamount to severing her relationship with her father, and [that] result would not be in [the child’s] best interest[s].” We have considered the remaining contentions of the Attorney for the Child and conclude | 2 | 2 |
Rivera v. LaSallegreen2 sentences2011Contrary to the contention of the Attorney for the Child, the “[c]ourt is, of course, not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis” (Matter of Rivera v LaSalle, 84 AD3d 1436, 1438 [2011]; see Fox, 177 AD2d at 211-212 ), especially where the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that “to follow [the child’s] wishes would be tantamount to severing her relationship with her father, and [that] result would not be in [the child’s] best interest[s].” We have considered the remaining contentions of the Attorney for the Child and co 2011Contrary to the contention of the Attorney for the Child, the “[c]ourt is, of course, not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis” (Matter of Rivera v LaSalle, 84 AD3d 1436, 1438 ; see Fox, 177 AD2d at 211-212 ), especially where the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that “to follow [the child’s] wishes would be tantamount to severing her relationship with her father, and [that] result would not be in [the child’s] best interest[s].” We have considered the remaining contentions of the Attorney for the Child and conclude | 1 | 2 |
Matter of Brady J.S. v. Darla A.B.green2 sentences2026The evidence in this case establishes that "the child was so profoundly influenced by his mother" that his position on where he would like to reside was "not entitled to great weight" ( Krier , 178 AD3d at 1373; see Matter of Brady J.S. v Darla A.B. , 208 AD3d 1023, 1026 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 904 [2022]; Matter of Marino v Marino , 90 AD3d 1694, 1695-1696 [4th Dept 2011]). 2026The evidence in this case establishes that "the child was so profoundly influenced by his mother" that his position on where he would like to reside was "not entitled to great weight" ( Krier , 178 AD3d at 1373; see Matter of Brady J.S. v Darla A.B. , 208 AD3d 1023, 1026 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 904 [2022]; Matter of Marino v Marino , 90 AD3d 1694, 1695-1696 [4th Dept 2011]). | 1 | 1 |
VanDusen v. Riggsgreen1 sentence2020Although the "[c]ourt is . . . not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis" ( Matter of Biernbaum v Burdick , 162 AD3d 1664 , 1665 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]), we conclude that "the wishes of the [14]-year-old child are . . . entitled to great weight where, as here, the age and maturity [of the child] would make [her] input particularly meaningful" ( Matter of VanDusen v Riggs , 77 AD3d 1355, 1356 [4th Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Aronica v Aronica , 151 AD3d 1605, 1606 [ | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Dunhamgreen1 sentence2020In addition, although the position of the AFC is not determinative, it is a factor to be considered ( see Matter of Linda AA. v Robert AA. , 174 AD3d 1082 , 1083 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 904 [2019]; Matter of Lyons v Sepe , 163 AD3d 567 , 569 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Wright v Dunham , 13 AD3d 1138, 1138 [4th Dept 2004]), and the AFC here has supported the child's wish to live with the father both in Family Court and on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Aronica v. Aronicagreen1 sentence2020Although the "[c]ourt is . . . not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis" ( Matter of Biernbaum v Burdick , 162 AD3d 1664 , 1665 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]), we conclude that "the wishes of the [14]-year-old child are . . . entitled to great weight where, as here, the age and maturity [of the child] would make [her] input particularly meaningful" ( Matter of VanDusen v Riggs , 77 AD3d 1355, 1356 [4th Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Aronica v Aronica , 151 AD3d 1605, 1606 [ | 1 | 1 |
Sheridan v. Sheridangreen1 sentence2018Although the express wishes of the children are entitled to great weight, the " [c]ourt is . . . not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis' " ( Matter of Marino v Marino , 90 AD3d 1694, 1696 [4th Dept 2011]). [*2]Here, the court did not err in failing to abide by the wishes of the children inasmuch as there is evidence in the record that the mother's animus toward the father had negatively affected the children's relationship with him, and the court-appointed psychologist opined that the children's interests would be best se | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Smithgreen1 sentence2011Family Court is, of course, not required to abide by the wishes of a child to the exclusion of other factors in the best interests analysis (see Matter of Smith v Smith, 61 AD3d 1275, 1277-1278 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Cornell v. Cornellgreen1 sentence2011If such were the case, “ ‘then all a court would be required to decide is whether [a child’s] preference of parent is voluntary and untainted and then follow the child’s wish’ ” (Matter of Cornell v Cornell, 8 AD3d 718, 719 [2004], quoting Dintruff v McGreevy, 34 NY2d 887, 888 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
Dintruff v. McGreevygreen1 sentence2011If such were the case, “ ‘then all a court would be required to decide is whether [a child’s] preference of parent is voluntary and untainted and then follow the child’s wish’ ” (Matter of Cornell v Cornell, 8 AD3d 718, 719 [2004], quoting Dintruff v McGreevy, 34 NY2d 887, 888 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
115 Spring Street Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence2018The court implicitly based its ruling on all of the parties' arguments ( see id. ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Loetsch v. New York City Omnibus Corp.
green
1 sentence1992Decedent’s income, habits, and prior relationship to the distributees, their needs, circumstances and history of receiving benefits and all other evidence showing a disposition on the part of a decedent to provide assistance to a distributee (Loetsch v New York City Omnibus Corp., 291 NY 308) will be evaluated. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.