exclusion of other factors in Pennsylvania

2006Our Court, in Burcik v. Caplen, 805 A.2d 21, 26 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (rejecting a “policy-based per se rule focusing on the fact and method of incorporation, to the exclusion of other factors”), vacated, 577 Pa. 521 , 847 A.2d 56 (2004) (remanding to trial court for consideration of the governmental immunity issue in light of its decision in Sphere Drake), utilized the Sphere Drake “pragmatic approach” to determine that the Board of Directors of City Trusts, which oversaw charitable trusts of a city, was a local agency entitled to immunity under the Tort Claims Act.

2003Notably, however, we have rejected a per se rule that focuses on the fact of the entity’s incorporation, to the exclusion of other factors, to determine whether that entity is a “local agency.” Burcik v. Caplen, 805 A.2d 21, 26 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). 7 Further, an examination of these “other factors,” leads to the conclusion that the WCIDC is a “local agency” entitled to governmental immunity.

2013See Craftmaster, 903 A.2d at 633 . (“[The trial court cannot ignore] the [property's current reality and the existing negative impacts associated with it, including negative stigma, environmental impacts and statutory and regulatory clean-up costs.”) (Emphasis added).

1989See Commonwealth v. Fava, 503 Pa. 365 , 469 A.2d 597 (1983).

1989See Commonwealth v. Fava, 503 Pa. 365 , 469 A.2d 597 (1983).

1989These cases, and the federal cases previously cited, indicate that review of several if not all of the factors noted above will ordinarily be required (rather than focusing on factors such as the time or location of the detention to the exclusion of other factors). [7] See also United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 , 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177-78 (1978) (subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional); 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(b) "Unexecuted Intent to Act Unlawfully" at 83-85 (2d Ed. 1987). [8] As appellee had not indi

1989These cases, and the federal cases previously cited, indicate that review of several if not all of the factors noted above will ordinarily be required (rather than focusing on factors such as the time or location of the detention to the exclusion of other factors). [7] See also United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 , 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177-78 (1978) (subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional); 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(b) "Unexecuted Intent to Act Unlawfully" at 83-85 (2d Ed. 1987). [8] As appellee had not indi

1978In Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184, 196 , 281 A.2d 179, 186 (1971), we quoted with approval the following language from a Commission opinion in another case as properly descriptive of the principles applicable to the fixing of reasonable rate schedules: ‘There is no requirement that rates for different classes of service must be either uniform or equal or that they must be equally profitable.

1978In Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184, 196 , 281 A.2d 179, 186 (1971), we quoted with approval the following language from a Commission opinion in another case as properly descriptive of the principles applicable to the fixing of reasonable rate schedules: ‘There is no requirement that rates for different classes of service must be either uniform or equal or that they must be equally profitable.