66 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2021In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 23 (2008). - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180229 “Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). 2020“Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). | 5 | 39 |
People v. McClanahangreen2 sentences2006McClanahan also held that, in compelling the defendant to make a demand for live testimony, the statute “impermissibly requires the defendant to take affirmative action to secure a right that he has already been constitutionally guaranteed or be deemed to have waived that right.” McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 136 . 2006McClanahan also held that, in compelling the defendant to make a demand for live testimony, the statute Aimpermissibly requires the defendant to take affirmative action to secure a right that he has already been constitutionally guaranteed or be deemed to have waived that right.@ McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 136 . -9- McClanahan is distinguishable from the case at bar. | 4 | 8 |
People v. Peckgreen2 sentences2000App. 3d 14, 26 , 674 N.E.2d 440, 449 (1996) (Cook, J., specially concurring) (“In my view, the confrontation clause permits hearsay evidence that does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception only when use of that evidence is necessary, only when the declarant is unavailable to testify in court,” citing Wright). 2000App. 3d 14, 26 , 674 N.E.2d 440, 449 (1996) (Cook, J., specially concurring) ("In my view, the confrontation clause permits hearsay evidence that does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception only when use of that evidence is necessary, only when the declarant is unavailable to testify in court," citing Wright ). | 2 | 3 |
In Re KLMgreen2 sentences2002In re K.L.M. , 146 Ill. 2002In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Marchgreen2 sentences2000See People v. March, 250 Ill.App.3d 1062, 1073 , 189 Ill.Dec. 456 , 620 N.E.2d 424 (1993). 2000See People v. March, 250 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2000A hearsay statement possesses sufficient “indicia of reliability” (1) if the hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) if there is a showing of “ ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 111 L. 2000A hearsay statement possesses sufficient “indicia of reliability” (1) if the hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) if there is a showing of “ ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 , 111 L. | 1 | 14 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences1997App. 3d 567, 583 , 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1020 (1990) (because the section 115 — 10 hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception, "the statement must show a particular guarantee of trustworthiness to be admissible”). 1991“Since the hearsay exception contained in section 115 — 10 is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception [citations], the statement must show a particular guarantee of trustworthiness to be admissible.” (Coleman, 205 Ill. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Rolandis G.green2 sentences2021In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 23 (2008). - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180229 “Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). 2020“Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Buenogreen2 sentences2006See People v. Bueno, 358 Ill. 2006See People v. Bueno, 358 Ill.App.3d 143, 152 , 293 Ill.Dec. 819 , 829 N.E.2d 402, 409 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Zaragoza v. Ebenrothgreen2 sentences2006App. 3d 139, 142 , 770 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (2002) (reliability is inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception). 1 Because of their inherent reliability and trustworthiness, we hold that diagnoses and opinions contained in medical records should be admissible and published to the jury as a proper part of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 2006See Zaragoza v. Ebenroth, 331 Ill.App.3d 139, 142 , 264 Ill.Dec. 542 , 770 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (2002) (reliability is inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception). [1] *974 Because of their inherent reliability and trustworthiness, we hold that diagnoses and opinions contained in medical records should be admissible and published to the jury as a proper part of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bargergreen1 sentence1997In determining reliability, the court must focus on the time, content and circumstances that surround the making of the statement. 735 ILCS 5/8 — 2601 (West 1996); see People v. Barger, 251 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 177 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which was controlling at the time, this court concluded that section 115 — 15 violated the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions because the laboratory-report evidence neither fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception nor contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 2006Ed. 2d 177 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which was controlling at the time, this court concluded that section 115B15 violated the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions because the laboratory-report evidence neither fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception nor contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. | 7 | 2004–2021 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences1999The Court stated: "[T]he veracity of hearsay statements is suffi ciently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) 'the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception' or (2) it contains 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability . " Lilly , 527 U.S. at ___ , 144 L. 1999The Court stated: “[T]he veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or (2) it contains ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability.” Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25 , 144 L. | 4 | 1999–1999 |
People v. White
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 641 , 555 N.E.2d 1241 .) The indicia of reliability standard can be met in two ways; where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or where the statement is supported by a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 1991(People v. White (1990), 198 Ill. | 3 | 1990–1993 |
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2001People v. McClanahan , 191 Ill. 2d 127, 132 , 729 N.E.2d 470, 474 (2000); People v. Thomas , 313 Ill. 2001People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 132 , 729 N.E.2d 470, 474 (2000); People v. Thomas, 313 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Lee v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d 514, 527-28 , 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 , the United States Supreme Court indicated that even where the hearsay evidence does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the confrontation clause would not be violated by an unavailable codefendant’s confession that has an “independent indicia of reliability” to overcome the presumption of unreliability placed upon an accomplice’s incriminating confession. 1990Ed. 2d 514, 527-28 , 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 , the Court further indicated that, even where the hearsay evidence does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the confrontation clause would not be violated by an unavailable codefendant’s confession that has an “independent indicia of reliability” to overcome the presumption of unreliability placed upon an accomplice’s incriminating confession. | 2 | 1990–1992 |
People v. Busch
green
2 sentences2021In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 23 (2008). - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180229 “Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). 2021In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 23 (2008). - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180229 “Under Roberts, it was not a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause to admit out-of-court hearsay statements into evidence as long as the statements were found to be reliable, either because the evidence fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or because there were other ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mattox v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Ed. 2d at 608 , 100 S. Ct. at 2539 , quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 , 39 L. 1997Ed. 2d at 608 , 100 S. Ct. at 2539 , quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 , 39 L. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Bridgewater
green
1 sentence1995Bridgewater, 259 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bourjaily v. United States
green
2 sentences1994Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , the Court opined: "no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.’ [Citation.] We think that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 , 97 L. 1994Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , the Court opined: "no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.’ [Citation.] We think that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 , 97 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Roy
green
1 sentence1990App. 3d at 541 , 547 N.E.2d at 1342 ; Roy, 201 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Rocha
green
2 sentences1990This takes us to the second prong of the Roberts analysis, and that is whether the statement contained sufficient “indicia of reliability.” Since the hearsay exception contained in section 115 — 10 is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception (Rocha, 191 Ill. 1990App. 3d at 541 , 547 N.E.2d at 1342 ; Roy, 201 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Ingram
neutral
1 sentence1990Nor does counsel cite or discuss People v. Ingram (1987), 162 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Inadi
green
2 sentences1990Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , defendant argues as follows: “[E]ven where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the prosecution still must either produce the declarant for cross-examination or demonstrate that he is unavailable. *** Since the prosecution neither produced the declarant [S.G.] for cross-examination nor established that she was unavailable, Randall White was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.” In making this argument, defendant’s counsel on appeal inexplicably fails to cite or discuss United States v. Inadi (1986), 475 U 1990Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , defendant argues as follows: “[E]ven where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the prosecution still must either produce the declarant for cross-examination or demonstrate that he is unavailable. *** Since the prosecution neither produced the declarant [S.G.] for cross-examination nor established that she was unavailable, Randall White was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.” In making this argument, defendant’s counsel on appeal inexplicably fails to cite or discuss United States v. Inadi (1986), 475 U | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.