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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2009In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court embraced the proposition that hearsay evidence with adequate "indicia of reliability” — evidence falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” — is exempt from the defendant's constitutional right to confront the unavailable declarant. 2009In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Court embraced the proposition that hearsay evidence with adequate "indicia of reliability” — evidence falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” — is exempt from the defendant's constitutional right to confront the unavailable declarant. | 1 | 7 |
United States v. James Saget, Also Known as Heshgreen2 sentences2006In so arguing, the appellant relies solely on Crawford, supra, a seminal case holding that “testimonial statements” may no longer “be introduced against a defendant unless he or she had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, regardless of whether that statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 805 (D.C.2005) (quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.2004)). 3 Because counsel objected at trial to the admission of the statement on purely evidentiary grounds and did 2005The change effected by Crawford was concisely summarized in United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.2004): Crawford abrogates Roberts with respect to prior testimonial statements by holding that such statements may never be introduced against the defendant unless he or she had an opportunity to *806 cross-examine the declarant, regardless of whether that statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. | 1 | 2 |
Carey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2006See Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56 , 58 n. 2 (D.C.1994); (Michael) Johnson v. United, States, 616 A.2d 1216 , 1232 n. 25 (D.C.1992). 5 On a plain error review, an appellant must show that the objectionable action was (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Stancil v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2006In so arguing, the appellant relies solely on Crawford, supra, a seminal case holding that “testimonial statements” may no longer “be introduced against a defendant unless he or she had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, regardless of whether that statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 805 (D.C.2005) (quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.2004)). 3 Because counsel objected at trial to the admission of the statement on purely evidentiary grounds and did | 1 | 1 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1991The Supreme Court has held that, in general, statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule will satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause if two conditions are met: (1) the prosecution must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify, and (2) the statement must have adequate indicia of reliability, which may be inferred either from its falling “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or from some other “showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 ; see Idaho v. Wright, — U.S. -, 1 1991The Supreme Court has held that, in general, statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule will satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause if two conditions are met: (1) the prosecution must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify, and (2) the statement must have adequate indicia of reliability, which may be inferred either from its falling “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or from some other “showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 ; see Idaho v. Wright, — U.S. -, 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence2006See Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56 , 58 n. 2 (D.C.1994); (Michael) Johnson v. United, States, 616 A.2d 1216 , 1232 n. 25 (D.C.1992). 5 On a plain error review, an appellant must show that the objectionable action was (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2005In Crawford , the Court rejected the Roberts test, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , and held that, under the Confrontation Clause, the only constitutionally permissible indicia of the reliability of prior testimonial statements is the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 2005In Crawford , the Court rejected the Roberts test, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , and held that, under the Confrontation Clause, the only constitutionally permissible indicia of the reliability of prior testimonial statements is the defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2000This court’s approach to the admissibility of declarations against penal interest, under evidentiary hearsay law, is consistent with that of the Supreme Court, recently reiterated in Lilly, supra: “[T]he veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ 15 or (2) it contains ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability.” Lilly, supra, plura 2000This court’s approach to the admissibility of declarations against penal interest, under evidentiary hearsay law, is consistent with that of the Supreme Court, recently reiterated in Lilly, supra: “[T]he veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ 15 or (2) it contains ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability.” Lilly, supra, plura | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Mattox v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. [Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 .] The Court also stated: [C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the “substance of the constitutional protection.” [Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 , 15 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).] We now apply the Supreme Court 1981Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. [Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 .] The Court also stated: [C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the “substance of the constitutional protection.” [Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 , 15 S.Ct. 337, 340 , 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).] We now apply the Supreme Court | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.