firmly rooted hearsay exception in California

2022In Lilly, however, the United States Supreme Court followed the standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , which conditioned the admission of hearsay evidence on whether it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66; 6. see Lilly v. Virginia, supra, at pp. 124-125 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Roberts in turn was abrogated by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 60-62 , thereby rendering Lilly “a dead letter” (U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 773 ).

2021Because out-of-court statements that fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception are, by definition, reliable (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 (Roberts), overruled on other grounds by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 ), the fact that a statement falls within such an exception is enough by itself to achieve the purpose and function of the due process guarantees applicable to probation revocation hearings.

2015“Prior to Crawford, the admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant was governed by the well-settled rule of Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , 66 .… Roberts held such statements could be admitted at trial only when (1) ‘the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or (2) the statements contain ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would add little to the statements’ reliability. [Citation.]” (People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162 , 171–172, questioned on other grounds in People v. Taulton (2005)

2006(See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 .) Under Roberts , admission of a hearsay statement does not violate the confrontation clause if the statement "bears adequate `indicia of reliability'"; that is, if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or is cloaked with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 .) The spontaneous statement hearsay exception is firmly rooted. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8

2022(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 59–60, fn. 9.) Under previous United States Supreme Court precedent, the admission of hearsay did not violate the right to confrontation if it bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” Reliability was inferred without more in a case where the evidence fell within “a firmly-rooted hearsay exception.

2022(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 59–60, fn. 9.) Under previous United States Supreme Court precedent, the admission of hearsay did not violate the right to confrontation if it bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” Reliability was inferred without more in a case where the evidence fell within “a firmly-rooted hearsay exception.

2022In Lilly, however, the United States Supreme Court followed the standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , which conditioned the admission of hearsay evidence on whether it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66; 6. see Lilly v. Virginia, supra, at pp. 124-125 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Roberts in turn was abrogated by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 60-62 , thereby rendering Lilly “a dead letter” (U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 773 ).

2016In Lilly, however, the United States Supreme Court followed the standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , which conditioned the admission of hearsay evidence on whether it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66; see Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 124-125 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Roberts in turn was abrogated by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pages 60-62, thereby rendering Lilly “a dead letter” (U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 773 ).

2014The Wright decision relied on the holding in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 (Roberts) [overruled by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 60-69], which provided general guidelines for determining “when incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.” (Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 814 .) Under the Roberts approach, the prosecution must either produce the witness or demonstrate the unavailability of the witness. “[O]nce a witness is shown to be unavailable, ‘his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “i

2014In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, 11. at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” (Id. at pp. 814-815.) The issue in Wright was whether the statements of an unavailable child witness “bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the [Confrontation] Clause.” (Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 816 .) Since the statements were not admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, but rather under Idaho’s residual hearsay exception, the court considered whether there were “‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’” to be found in

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2006(See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 .) Under Roberts , admission of a hearsay statement does not violate the confrontation clause if the statement "bears adequate `indicia of reliability'"; that is, if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or is cloaked with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 .) The spontaneous statement hearsay exception is firmly rooted. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8

2006(See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 .) Under Roberts , admission of a hearsay statement does not violate the confrontation clause if the statement "bears adequate `indicia of reliability'"; that is, if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or is cloaked with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 .) The spontaneous statement hearsay exception is firmly rooted. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8

2006(See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 .) Under Roberts , admission of a hearsay statement does not violate the confrontation clause if the statement "bears adequate `indicia of reliability'"; that is, if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or is cloaked with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 .) The spontaneous statement hearsay exception is firmly rooted. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8

2006(See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also People v. Corella (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 467 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 .) Under Roberts , admission of a hearsay statement does not violate the confrontation clause if the statement "bears adequate `indicia of reliability'"; that is, if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or is cloaked with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 .) The spontaneous statement hearsay exception is firmly rooted. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2022In Lilly, however, the United States Supreme Court followed the standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , which conditioned the admission of hearsay evidence on whether it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66; 6. see Lilly v. Virginia, supra, at pp. 124-125 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Roberts in turn was abrogated by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 60-62 , thereby rendering Lilly “a dead letter” (U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 773 ).

2016In Lilly, however, the United States Supreme Court followed the standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , which conditioned the admission of hearsay evidence on whether it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” (Id. at p. 66; see Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 124-125 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Roberts in turn was abrogated by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pages 60-62, thereby rendering Lilly “a dead letter” (U.S. v. Smalls (10th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 765, 773 ).

2020(People v. Eccleston (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 436, 443 (Eccleston).) Section 1360 is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception.

2001(Id. at pp. 821, 823 [110 S.Ct. at pp. 3149-3150, 3150-3151].) Evidence Code section 1360 is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for purposes of confrontation clause analysis (People v. Eccleston, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 445 ), and in any event, the prerequisites of section 1360 were not satisfied.

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2017Under this test, 'reliability [could] be inferred without more in a case where the evidence [fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' " ( People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 975, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ( Cage ).) In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , however, the Court "announced *711 a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth *66 Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence." ( Cage , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 969 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 .) The Court conducted a "historical analysis to ascertain the common underst

2005(White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 848 , 112 S.Ct. 736 ]; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 664 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 289 ].) Moore acknowledges this fact, conceding the portions of the 911 tape with Autumn’s “excited” voice on it did not violate his right to confrontation because it fell within such established exception to the hearsay rule, and noting further she testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.

2005(White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 848 , 112 S.Ct. 736 ]; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 664 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 289 ].) Moore acknowledges this fact, conceding the portions of the 911 tape with Autumn’s “excited” voice on it did not violate his right to confrontation because it fell within such established exception to the hearsay rule, and noting further she testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.

1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s

1990In a number of cases the high court has made clear that the focus of its concern “has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” (Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 213 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 301 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 ].) Later, in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ], the court held this reliability “can be inferred without more . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” We agree with our Court of Appeal that “the s

1992(See also People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 806 ] to the same effect.) This exception as provided in Evidence Code section 1240 is a firmly rooted hearsay exception surrounded by indicia of reliability.

1992(See also People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 806 ] to the same effect.) This exception as provided in Evidence Code section 1240 is a firmly rooted hearsay exception surrounded by indicia of reliability.

2023(E.g., Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 352 , 362 [“good cause” in discovery turns on “‘factual justification’”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 721 [“good cause” in probate action “‘“calls for a factual exposition”’”]; People v. Gatlin 5 (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 40 [“good cause” for continuances in criminal cases is a factual question to be determined by the trial court].) Because, until Gray, “good cause” was not relevant to the admission of a hearsay statement falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the parties also had no incentive to in

2023(E.g., Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 352 , 362 [“good cause” in discovery turns on “‘factual justification’”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 721 [“good cause” in probate action “‘“calls for a factual exposition”’”]; People v. Gatlin 5 (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 40 [“good cause” for continuances in criminal cases is a factual question to be determined by the trial court].) Because, until Gray, “good cause” was not relevant to the admission of a hearsay statement falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the parties also had no incentive to in

2021Second, a rule that the applicability of a firmly rooted hearsay exception is sufficient to satisfy due process is also most 9 consonant with California precedent.3 The cases that hinge admissibility of out-of-court statements upon the existence of good cause and the balancing of that cause against the defendant’s interest in confrontation each involved statements that were inadmissible under the rules of evidence. ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1160-1161 [preliminary hearing testimony did not fall under former testimony exception to hearsay rule because declarant was never shown to be leg

2021Second, a rule that the applicability of a firmly rooted hearsay exception is sufficient to satisfy due process is also most 9 consonant with California precedent.3 The cases that hinge admissibility of out-of-court statements upon the existence of good cause and the balancing of that cause against the defendant’s interest in confrontation each involved statements that were inadmissible under the rules of evidence. ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1160-1161 [preliminary hearing testimony did not fall under former testimony exception to hearsay rule because declarant was never shown to be leg

2021Second, a rule that the applicability of a firmly rooted hearsay exception is sufficient to satisfy due process is also most 9 consonant with California precedent.3 The cases that hinge admissibility of out-of-court statements upon the existence of good cause and the balancing of that cause against the defendant’s interest in confrontation each involved statements that were inadmissible under the rules of evidence. ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1160-1161 [preliminary hearing testimony did not fall under former testimony exception to hearsay rule because declarant was never shown to be leg

2021Second, a rule that the applicability of a firmly rooted hearsay exception is sufficient to satisfy due process is also most 9 consonant with California precedent.3 The cases that hinge admissibility of out-of-court statements upon the existence of good cause and the balancing of that cause against the defendant’s interest in confrontation each involved statements that were inadmissible under the rules of evidence. ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1160-1161 [preliminary hearing testimony did not fall under former testimony exception to hearsay rule because declarant was never shown to be leg

2021(Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66 ; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 400 [Clause does not require showing of “unavailability” for coconspirator exception to hearsay rule]; White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 358 (White) [same, for excited utterance exception].) If, as defendant suggests, Arreola and its kin held that admissibility under a hearsay exception was not enough by itself to satisfy due process, then the standard for admitting hearsay in probation revocation hearings would be more onerous than the standard for admitting hearsay at trial.