firmly rooted hearsay exception in Virginia

2011In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894-95 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), the United States Supreme Court clarified what it meant in Roberts when it held that *492 the hearsay statements had to fall within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception." The Supreme Court stated, "a hearsay exception [is] `firmly rooted' if, in light of `longstanding judicial and legislative experience,' it `rests [on] such [a] solid foundation that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the `substance of the constitutional protection.'" Id. at 126 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (alterations

2011In Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125 , 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1894-95 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), the United States Supreme Court clarified what it meant in Roberts when it held that *492 the hearsay statements had to fall within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception." The Supreme Court stated, "a hearsay exception [is] `firmly rooted' if, in light of `longstanding judicial and legislative experience,' it `rests [on] such [a] solid foundation that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the `substance of the constitutional protection.'" Id. at 126 , 119 S.Ct. at 1895 (alterations

2005Ed. 2d 597 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), which allowed the admission of statements by an unavailable witness in a criminal trial if the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore adequate indicia of reliability.

1999Generally, "[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id.

1999The Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause evidence possessing `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, ... we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability." Id. at 821 , 110 S.Ct. at 3149 (emphasis added).

1999The Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause evidence possessing `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, ... we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability." Id. at 821 , 110 S.Ct. at 3149 (emphasis added).

2003"The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). . . . [T]he veracity of hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such statements against an accused when (1) "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) it contains "particularized guarantees of - 5 - trustworthiness" such that adversarial testing would be expe

2003“A statement that is against the penal interest of the declarant at the time it is made is admissible as a declaration against interest exception to the hearsay prohibition.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 5, 8 , 441 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1994).

2003“A statement that is against the penal interest of the declarant at the time it is made is admissible as a declaration against interest exception to the hearsay prohibition.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 5, 8 , 441 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1994).

2001Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 , 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2062 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). *13 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable witness may only be introduced if (1) the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; or (2) the evidence contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

2001Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 , 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2062 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). *13 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable witness may only be introduced if (1) the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; or (2) the evidence contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

1999The prior trial testimony of a witness who was unavailable to testify at a subsequent trial has been held to be sufficiently reliable if "there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness] at the first trial, and counsel for [the - 9 - defendant] availed himself of that opportunity." Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972).