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9 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pierce v. Norwickgreen2 sentences2024Id. at 596 (emphasis added). 2022Pierce, 202 Wis. 2d at 596 . ¶30 We fail to see how the situation in Pierce, and not Moonlight, should control in the case at hand. | 1 | 2 |
Cholvin v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Servicesgreen1 sentence2024In those provisions, the agency speaks with an official voice intended to have the effect of law.’” Cholvin, 313 Wis. 2d 749, ¶29 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lang v. Kurtzgreen1 sentence2012See Lang, 100 Wis. 2d at 45 . ¶ 2. | 1 | 1 |
Bartus v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1998Bartus, 176 Wis. 2d at 1076 , 501 N.W.2d at 425-26 (emphasis added). 1998Bartus, 176 Wis. 2d at 1076 , 501 N.W.2d at 425-26 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen2 sentences1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). 1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). [8] Because Yoder has not established that he has a constitutionally protected int | 1 | 1 |
Shango v. Jurichgreen2 sentences1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). 1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). [8] Because Yoder has not established that he has a constitutionally protected int | 1 | 1 |
Arnett v. Kennedygreen2 sentences1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). 1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). [8] Because Yoder has not established that he has a constitutionally protected int | 1 | 1 |
Olim v. Wakinekonagreen2 sentences1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). 1993See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985) (rejecting the plurality's suggestion to the contrary in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), with respect to property interests); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (liberty interests do not arise from state-created procedural devices); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982) (argument that procedures established in prison regulations can themselves be considered a liberty interest held "analytically indefensible"). [8] Because Yoder has not established that he has a constitutionally protected int | 1 | 1 |
cluster 263736green1 sentence1982See Boeing Airplane Co. v. O’Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. *525 1964); Recent Decision, Sales: What Constitutes Sufficient Notification for Breach of Warranty, 47 Marq. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2005State v. Brown, 2003 WI App 34, ¶ 12 , 260 Wis. 2d 125 , 659 N.W.2d 110 . 2005State v. Brown, 2003 WI App 34, ¶ 12 , 260 Wis. 2d 125 , 659 N.W.2d 110 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Claypool v. Levin
green
2 sentences1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce 1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kurtz v. City of Waukesha
green
2 sentences1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce 1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce | 1 | 1998–1998 |
William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of Fessler
green
2 sentences1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce 1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce 1998Therefore, any jurisdictional defect caused by the Tomczaks' failure to comply with the notification requirement during the circuit court proceedings, see Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 116-17 , 280 N.W.2d 757 (1979), "was cured by virtue of the subsequent invitation to the attorney general to participate in the court of appeals' proceedings." In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 444 , 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981). [3] For recent discussions of the Hansen discovery rule and its application, see Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 294-97 , 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdioce | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.