notification requirement in California

2015(Ibid.) The placement of commas confirms our reading, as they “are used to separate items in a list.” (Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 928, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Further, whether a diversion is substantial cannot be answered in the abstract, but depends on the innumerable factual variations as stated by the 1973 Attorney General opinion.

2015Similarly, a third activity, one that will “deposit or dispose of 15 debris, waste, or other material” into a stream may trigger a notification requirement. (§ 1602, subd. (a).) The placement of commas confirms our reading, as they “are used to separate items in a list.” (Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 927, fn. 4 .) Further, whether a diversion is substantial cannot be answered in the abstract, but depends on the innumerable factual variations as stated by the 1973 Attorney General opinion.

2009Father contends that the "use of the term `the parent' when considered with the notification requirement to the non-custodial parent implies that the custodial parent can waive his/her reunification services and that the court can proceed with a guardianship without the appearance or express waiver of the non-custodial parent if that person has been properly noticed." We agree. (6) "In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose for the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and o

2009Father contends that the "use of the term `the parent' when considered with the notification requirement to the non-custodial parent implies that the custodial parent can waive his/her reunification services and that the court can proceed with a guardianship without the appearance or express waiver of the non-custodial parent if that person has been properly noticed." We agree. (6) "In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose for the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and o

2020(Id. at pp. 1124, 1126 [distinguishing the electronics search condition from a notification requirement in People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 (Olguin)].) The court reasoned that the “sweeping” (Ricardo P., at p. 1122) electronics search condition imposed on the juvenile significantly burdened his “privacy interests” (id. at p. 1123) and thus “requires a correspondingly substantial and particularized justification.” (Id. at p. 1126.) It stated “a juvenile court imposing such a condition must consider whether, in light of ‘the facts and circumstances in each case’ [citation], the burdens imp

2019But they would not be reasonable because the burden on the probationer would be disproportionate to the legitimate interest in effective supervision. **756 Contrary to the Attorney General's reading of Olguin , the defendant in that case did not challenge the residence search condition itself; he objected only to the requirement that he notify the probation officer about any pets at his residence. ( Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 380, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 198 P.3d 1 .) This notification requirement was reasonable, we said, because it "facilitat[ed] unannounced searches of [Olguin's] residen

2015(Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 656, 665 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 ].) If the McDaniels did not think the stipulated judgment was substantially related to Gold Coast’s construction activities, such as would trigger the notification requirement, they were obligated to provide the Board with support for their position (Cal. Contractors License Law & Reference Book, supra, § 1, ch. 2, p. 34), not merely to ignore the statute.

2015(Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 656, 665 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 ].) If the McDaniels did not think the stipulated judgment was substantially related to Gold Coast’s construction activities, such as would trigger the notification requirement, they were obligated to provide the Board with support for their position (Cal. Contractors License Law & Reference Book, supra, § 1, ch. 2, p. 34), not merely to ignore the statute.

2013“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, where a statute does not prescribe the method of notice, personal service is contemplated.” (Hoschler, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 266 .) Accordingly, “the notification requirement of section 44929.21, subdivision (b) contemplates personal service or some other method equivalent to imparting actual notice.” (Id. at p. 269; see Grace v. Beaumont Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ] [“[T]he receipt of actual notice of nonretention trumps any requirement of personal service.

2011If the governing school board does not meet the statutory deadline, a second year probationary teacher, like Sullivan, attains tenure. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b).) Since the statute is silent as to the method to serve notice, Hoschler v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 258, 269 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 ] (Hoschler) held the notification requirement of section 44929.21, subdivision (b) “contemplates personal service or some other method equivalent to imparting actual notice.” Hoschler , however, did not discuss whether an exception applies for willful evasion of service.

2025As the Supreme Court has observed, according to many cases, “a time limitation is deemed merely directory ‘unless a consequence or penalty is provided for failure to do the act within the time commanded.’ ” (Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410 ; see also Woods v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271 [“the statute imposes no penalty on the Department for failure to meet the statute’s time requirements, lending yet further weight to the nonmandatory nature of the 30-day time period”].) 8 Consequently, the absence of any penalty or adverse consequence for failure to satis

2025As the Supreme Court has observed, according to many cases, “a time limitation is deemed merely directory ‘unless a consequence or penalty is provided for failure to do the act within the time commanded.’ ” (Edwards, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 410 ; see also Woods v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271 [“the statute imposes no penalty on the Department for failure to meet the statute’s time requirements, lending yet further weight to the nonmandatory nature of the 30-day time period”].) 8 Consequently, the absence of any penalty or adverse consequence for failure to satis

2024Second, while the warning language of section 913, subdivision (b), advising the claimant of the six months the claimant has to file an action in court and that the claimant may seek the advice of an attorney, is mandatory, the language of section 913, subdivision (a), addressed to the notification that the claim has been rejected is permissive: “The notice may be in substantially the following form . . . .” (§ 913, subd. (a); see Chalmers v. County of Los Angeles et al. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 461, 465 [discussing the permissive language of § 913, subd. (a) and mandatory language of subd. (b)].

2015“Generally, a substantial change in the language of a statute or constitutional provision by an amendment indicates an intention to change its meaning.” (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 601 P.2d 1030 ].) “Changes in wording and phraseology are presumed to have been deliberately made . . . .” (Estate of Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 594, 600 [ 275 P.2d 467 ].) In 2007, the Legislature substituted section 290.017’s unlimited language describing the notification requirement for former section 290, subdivision (b)’s limited language describing the notification req

2015“Generally, a substantial change in the language of a statute or constitutional provision by an amendment indicates an intention to change its meaning.” (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 601 P.2d 1030 ].) “Changes in wording and phraseology are presumed to have been deliberately made . . . .” (Estate of Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 594, 600 [ 275 P.2d 467 ].) In 2007, the Legislature substituted section 290.017’s unlimited language describing the notification requirement for former section 290, subdivision (b)’s limited language describing the notification req

2015“Generally, a substantial change in the language of a statute or constitutional provision by an amendment indicates an intention to change its meaning.” (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 601 P.2d 1030 ].) “Changes in wording and phraseology are presumed to have been deliberately made . . . .” (Estate of Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 594, 600 [ 275 P.2d 467 ].) In 2007, the Legislature substituted section 290.017’s unlimited language describing the notification requirement for former section 290, subdivision (b)’s limited language describing the notification req

2015“Generally, a substantial change in the language of a statute or constitutional provision by an amendment indicates an intention to change its meaning.” (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 601 P.2d 1030 ].) “Changes in wording and phraseology are presumed to have been deliberately made . . . .” (Estate of Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 594, 600 [ 275 P.2d 467 ].) In 2007, the Legislature substituted section 290.017’s unlimited language describing the notification requirement for former section 290, subdivision (b)’s limited language describing the notification req

2013“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, where a statute does not prescribe the method of notice, personal service is contemplated.” (Hoschler, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 266 .) Accordingly, “the notification requirement of section 44929.21, subdivision (b) contemplates personal service or some other method equivalent to imparting actual notice.” (Id. at p. 269; see Grace v. Beaumont Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ] [“[T]he receipt of actual notice of nonretention trumps any requirement of personal service.

2013“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, where a statute does not prescribe the method of notice, personal service is contemplated.” (Hoschler, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 266 .) Accordingly, “the notification requirement of section 44929.21, subdivision (b) contemplates personal service or some other method equivalent to imparting actual notice.” (Id. at p. 269; see Grace v. Beaumont Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ] [“[T]he receipt of actual notice of nonretention trumps any requirement of personal service.

2009An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided [citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in light of the statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation].' [Citations.]" ( People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-68 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750 , 130 P.3d 519 ].) (7) Reading section 360, subdivision (a), as a whole, we find that the Legislature intended to authorize the juvenile court to order a legal guardianship at the disposition h

2009An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided [citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in light of the statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed [citation].' [Citations.]" ( People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67-68 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750 , 130 P.3d 519 ].) (7) Reading section 360, subdivision (a), as a whole, we find that the Legislature intended to authorize the juvenile court to order a legal guardianship at the disposition h

2008(Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1123 .) The court stated: “When, as here, the ‘constitutional weakness’ lies primarily in ‘what the statute[] [has] omitted, not [in its] express terms,’ the statute may properly be invoked so long as due process requirements are met.” (Ibid., quoting Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 403 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 ].) Sandoval argues that the final sentence of section 5.12.030 “says in essence that there is no need to comply with the notification requirement” of procedural due process before the employee is terminated.

2008(Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1123 .) The court stated: “When, as here, the ‘constitutional weakness’ lies primarily in ‘what the statute[] [has] omitted, not [in its] express terms,’ the statute may properly be invoked so long as due process requirements are met.” (Ibid., quoting Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 403 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 556 P.2d 306 ].) Sandoval argues that the final sentence of section 5.12.030 “says in essence that there is no need to comply with the notification requirement” of procedural due process before the employee is terminated.

2001Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 305 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 , 926 P.2d 1042 ], citations omitted.) “Courts will not favor a defendant’s interpretation if it would lead to results ‘that are contrary to legislative intent or that fail to prevent the harm that is identified in the statute or that override common sense and create palpable absurdities.’ . . .” (People v. Townsend (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-1397 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ], citation omitted.) The purpose of the notification requirement was unambiguously to inform a person of his or her registration obligation at the t

2001Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 305 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 , 926 P.2d 1042 ], citations omitted.) “Courts will not favor a defendant’s interpretation if it would lead to results ‘that are contrary to legislative intent or that fail to prevent the harm that is identified in the statute or that override common sense and create palpable absurdities.’ . . .” (People v. Townsend (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-1397 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ], citation omitted.) The purpose of the notification requirement was unambiguously to inform a person of his or her registration obligation at the t

2001Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 305 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 , 926 P.2d 1042 ], citations omitted.) “Courts will not favor a defendant’s interpretation if it would lead to results ‘that are contrary to legislative intent or that fail to prevent the harm that is identified in the statute or that override common sense and create palpable absurdities.’ . . .” (People v. Townsend (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-1397 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ], citation omitted.) The purpose of the notification requirement was unambiguously to inform a person of his or her registration obligation at the t

2001Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 305 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 , 926 P.2d 1042 ], citations omitted.) “Courts will not favor a defendant’s interpretation if it would lead to results ‘that are contrary to legislative intent or that fail to prevent the harm that is identified in the statute or that override common sense and create palpable absurdities.’ . . .” (People v. Townsend (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-1397 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 438 ], citation omitted.) The purpose of the notification requirement was unambiguously to inform a person of his or her registration obligation at the t

1992(See Harvey v. Boysen, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 760 , and the cases cited therein.) As we stated in a similar context in Carden v. Otto (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 887, 897 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]: “Proper and orderly procedure dictates that the notice be a formal one and not left to informal communication between counsel.” 12 The court went on to conclude that section 3858 does not impose a similar duty of notification on the third party tortfeasor.

1992(See Harvey v. Boysen, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 760 , and the cases cited therein.) As we stated in a similar context in Carden v. Otto (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 887, 897 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 749 ]: “Proper and orderly procedure dictates that the notice be a formal one and not left to informal communication between counsel.” 12 The court went on to conclude that section 3858 does not impose a similar duty of notification on the third party tortfeasor.

1986Bank v. Hurst (Utah 1977) 570 P.2d 1031, 1033 ; Adams v. B & D Builders & Developers (1984) 144 Vt. 353 [ 477 A.2d 628, 630 ]; Rhoten v. United Virginia Bank (1980) 221 Va. 222 [ 269 S.E.2d 781, 785 ].) In so holding, these courts generally have reasoned that the purpose of the notification requirement is to provide “the debtor an opportunity to bid at the sale, safeguard his right of redemption and permit him to reduce his potential liability by utilizing all practicable means of doing so.” (Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, supra, 401 N.Y.S.2d at p. 412 ; accord Buran Equipment Co. v.

1986Bank v. Hurst (Utah 1977) 570 P.2d 1031, 1033 ; Adams v. B & D Builders & Developers (1984) 144 Vt. 353 [ 477 A.2d 628, 630 ]; Rhoten v. United Virginia Bank (1980) 221 Va. 222 [ 269 S.E.2d 781, 785 ].) In so holding, these courts generally have reasoned that the purpose of the notification requirement is to provide “the debtor an opportunity to bid at the sale, safeguard his right of redemption and permit him to reduce his potential liability by utilizing all practicable means of doing so.” (Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Natarelli, supra, 401 N.Y.S.2d at p. 412 ; accord Buran Equipment Co. v.