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8 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc.green2 sentences2014See, e.g., Cornerstone, 42 So.3d at 80 ('For purposes of the present case, the Riley defendants do not contend that a “bingo game” must be played only on paper cards, and we, therefore, do not address that issue.’).” As we stated even more recently: "We identified in Cornerstone and we reaffirm today that the game of 'bingo’ as that term is used in local constitutional amendments throughout the State is that game 'commonly or traditionally known as bingo,' 42 So.3d at 86 , and that this game is characterized by at least the six elements we identified in Cornerstone. 2014See, e.g., Cornerstone, 42 So.3d at 80 ('For purposes of the present case, the Riley defendants do not contend that a “bingo game” must be played only on paper cards, and we, therefore, do not address that issue.’).” As we stated even more recently: "We identified in Cornerstone and we reaffirm today that the game of 'bingo’ as that term is used in local constitutional amendments throughout the State is that game 'commonly or traditionally known as bingo,' 42 So.3d at 86 , and that this game is characterized by at least the six elements we identified in Cornerstone. | 2 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2018(Issue III in Riley's brief.) In its order, the circuit court rejected Riley's claims of cumulative effect on two grounds: (1) that Alabama does not recognize cumulative error in the context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and (2) that because Riley had failed to prove any of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "there is no cumulative effect to consider." (C. 238; see also C. 245.) Riley argues that the circuit court's first finding is erroneous because, he says, Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), "requires courts to revie 2018(Issue III in Riley's brief.) In its order, the circuit court rejected Riley's claims of cumulative effect on two grounds: (1) that Alabama does not recognize cumulative error in the context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and (2) that because Riley had failed to prove any of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "there is no cumulative effect to consider." (C. 238; see also C. 245.) Riley argues that the circuit court's first finding is erroneous because, he says, Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), "requires courts to revie | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Weavergreen2 sentences2010Attorney General King subsequently filed a motion with this Court in which he purports to appear “on behalf of the State and each State officer sued in his official capacity in the underlying litigation” and in which he requests dismissal of the mandamus petition based on “his authority outlined in Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 679-80 (Ala.1990).” Attorney General King further requests that “[sjhould this Court deem dismissal unavailable, ... this Court deny the [pjetition on the ground that the [State and the Riley defendants] have no clear legal right to the relief requested.” On March 23, 2010Attorney General King subsequently filed a motion with this Court in which he purports to appear “on behalf of the State and each State officer sued in his official capacity in the underlying litigation” and in which he requests dismissal of the mandamus petition based on “his authority outlined in Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 679-80 (Ala.1990).” Attorney General King further requests that “[sjhould this Court deem dismissal unavailable, ... this Court deny the [pjetition on the ground that the [State and the Riley defendants] have no clear legal right to the relief requested.” On March 23, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Greenetrack, Inc.green1 sentence2014Id." State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So.3d 940, 944 (Ala.2014) (emphasis added). [6] 6. | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2013Specifically, Riley contends that, “[i]n light of the precedent set by Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010),] and Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (2005)], the trial court should have given substantial weight to [his] young age and the evidence of [his] delayed brain development in making its sentencing determination.” (Riley’s brief, at 40.) However, “ ‘[i]n keeping with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the sentencing authority in Alabama, the trial judge, has unlimite 2013Specifically, Riley contends that, “[i]n light of the precedent set by Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010),] and Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (2005)], the trial court should have given substantial weight to [his] young age and the evidence of [his] delayed brain development in making its sentencing determination.” (Riley’s brief, at 40.) However, “ ‘[i]n keeping with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the sentencing authority in Alabama, the trial judge, has unlimite | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2013See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . 2013See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . | 1 | 1 |
Rideau v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2013Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 , 83 S.Ct. 1417 , 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963). 2013Rul.Evid. 404(b), and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 731 (1963).” (C. 257-58; R. 120.) As a result of the highly prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the videos, defense counsel requested that the circuit court “limit how many times that those tapes can be played to the jury.” (R. 120.) The circuit court, however, denied Riley’s motion, stating that it was “not going to at this point say the State can only play it once or twice or not more than three times[,] but if it comes to the point in the trial where it is beyond the bounds, [it] will put a stop to it.” (R. 120.) After reviewing th | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2013“It is well settled that ‘[a]s long as one reason given by the prosecutor for the strike of a potential juror is sufficiently race-neutral, a determination concerning any other reason given need not be made.’ Johnson v. State, 648 So.2d 629, 632 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994).” Martin v. State, 62 So.3d 1050, 1059-60 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stanley Weisz, United States of America v. Eugene Robert Ciuziogreen1 sentence2013P. Riley’s argument regarding the prejudicial effect of the surveillance videos is undoubtedly correct; “however, ‘while such direct evidence of a crime is certainly prejudicial to a defendant’s case, without more, it is not unfairly so.’” Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 519 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (quoting United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 432 (D.C.Cir.1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Wayne Carl Coleman v. Ralph Kemp, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondentgreen1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 54-56, quoting Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Miller v. State, 687 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (“The officers’ testimony in this case was received to show the reasons for the officers’ actions and how their investigation focused on a suspect.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ivery v. Stategreen2 sentences2013P. Riley’s argument regarding the prejudicial effect of the surveillance videos is undoubtedly correct; “however, ‘while such direct evidence of a crime is certainly prejudicial to a defendant’s case, without more, it is not unfairly so.’” Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 519 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (quoting United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 432 (D.C.Cir.1983)). 2013Rul.Evid. 404(b), and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 731 (1963).” (C. 257-58; R. 120.) As a result of the highly prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the videos, defense counsel requested that the circuit court “limit how many times that those tapes can be played to the jury.” (R. 120.) The circuit court, however, denied Riley’s motion, stating that it was “not going to at this point say the State can only play it once or twice or not more than three times[,] but if it comes to the point in the trial where it is beyond the bounds, [it] will put a stop to it.” (R. 120.) After reviewing th | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Bakergreen1 sentence2013Relying on Ex parte Baker, 906 So.2d 277, 288 (Ala.2004), Riley argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to play the surveillance videos during its opening statements before they were admitted into evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen1 sentence2013“It is well settled that ‘[a]s long as one reason given by the prosecutor for the strike of a potential juror is sufficiently race-neutral, a determination concerning any other reason given need not be made.’ Johnson v. State, 648 So.2d 629, 632 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994).” Martin v. State, 62 So.3d 1050, 1059-60 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). | 1 | 1 |
McCain v. City of Montgomerygreen2 sentences2010McCain v. City of Montgomery, 38 Ala.App. 568, 571 , 92 So.2d 678, 680 (1956) (“So long as the conduct of [a] special prosecutor comports to due and orderly procedure a defendant is in no position to complain as to who conducts the prosecution.”) Based on the foregoing, Attorney General King’s motion to dismiss is denied; the State and the Riley defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus is granted; and the trial court’s March 8, 2010, and March 16, 2010, orders are vacated. 2010McCain v. City of Montgomery, 38 Ala.App. 568, 571 , 92 So.2d 678, 680 (1956) (“So long as the conduct of [a] special prosecutor comports to due and orderly procedure a defendant is in no position to complain as to who conducts the prosecution.”) Based on the foregoing, Attorney General King’s motion to dismiss is denied; the State and the Riley defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus is granted; and the trial court’s March 8, 2010, and March 16, 2010, orders are vacated. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Integon Corp.green1 sentence2010See Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala.1995) (‘Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is ... a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought....’). | 1 | 1 |
| Chapman v. Goodengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Alabama State Employees Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2018Relying on Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), Riley argues that states are constitutionally obligated to provide inmates with a "meaningful opportunity" and a "meaningful forum" in which to litigate in a postconviction setting constitutional claims such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, relying on Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 , 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), he argues that "[a] state's failure to provide qualified and competent counsel to represent Rule 32 petitioners forecloses petitioners' one meaningful opportunity 2018Relying on Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), Riley argues that states are constitutionally obligated to provide inmates with a "meaningful opportunity" and a "meaningful forum" in which to litigate in a postconviction setting constitutional claims such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, relying on Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 , 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), he argues that "[a] state's failure to provide qualified and competent counsel to represent Rule 32 petitioners forecloses petitioners' one meaningful opportunity | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2018Relying on Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), Riley argues that states are constitutionally obligated to provide inmates with a "meaningful opportunity" and a "meaningful forum" in which to litigate in a postconviction setting constitutional claims such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, relying on Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 , 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), he argues that "[a] state's failure to provide qualified and competent counsel to represent Rule 32 petitioners forecloses petitioners' one meaningful opportunity 2018Relying on Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), Riley argues that states are constitutionally obligated to provide inmates with a "meaningful opportunity" and a "meaningful forum" in which to litigate in a postconviction setting constitutional claims such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and, relying on Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1 , 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), he argues that "[a] state's failure to provide qualified and competent counsel to represent Rule 32 petitioners forecloses petitioners' one meaningful opportunity | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2018Riley's arguments are meritless because he was not entitled to counsel, much less the effective assistance of counsel, in his Rule 32 proceedings. " '[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the right to counsel itself.' " Jackson v. State , 612 So.2d 1356 , 1357 (Ala. Crim. 2018Riley's arguments are meritless because he was not entitled to counsel, much less the effective assistance of counsel, in his Rule 32 proceedings. " '[T]he right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the right to counsel itself.' " Jackson v. State , 612 So.2d 1356 , 1357 (Ala. Crim. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Roper v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2013Specifically, Riley contends that, “[i]n light of the precedent set by Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010),] and Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (2005)], the trial court should have given substantial weight to [his] young age and the evidence of [his] delayed brain development in making its sentencing determination.” (Riley’s brief, at 40.) However, “ ‘[i]n keeping with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the sentencing authority in Alabama, the trial judge, has unlimite | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ex Parte Holton
green
1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 57-59.) Riley further alleges that this evidence “was critical to a central issue at trial: whether [he] had the specific intent for capital murder,” because “the State relied on the location of the blood stains on -the jeans — below the knee — to argue that the shooting was ‘execution style,’ and therefore, intentional.” (Riley’s brief, at 59; R. 1179.) “ ‘In Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742 , 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the requirements for establishing the chain of custody: ‘““Ex parte H | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Loewe v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 57-59.) Riley further alleges that this evidence “was critical to a central issue at trial: whether [he] had the specific intent for capital murder,” because “the State relied on the location of the blood stains on -the jeans — below the knee — to argue that the shooting was ‘execution style,’ and therefore, intentional.” (Riley’s brief, at 59; R. 1179.) “ ‘In Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742 , 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the requirements for establishing the chain of custody: ‘““Ex parte H | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Peterson v. Chater
green
1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 57-59.) Riley further alleges that this evidence “was critical to a central issue at trial: whether [he] had the specific intent for capital murder,” because “the State relied on the location of the blood stains on -the jeans — below the knee — to argue that the shooting was ‘execution style,’ and therefore, intentional.” (Riley’s brief, at 59; R. 1179.) “ ‘In Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742 , 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the requirements for establishing the chain of custody: ‘““Ex parte H | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2013Specifically, Riley contends that, “[i]n light of the precedent set by Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010),] and Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (2005)], the trial court should have given substantial weight to [his] young age and the evidence of [his] delayed brain development in making its sentencing determination.” (Riley’s brief, at 40.) However, “ ‘[i]n keeping with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the sentencing authority in Alabama, the trial judge, has unlimite 2013Specifically, Riley contends that, “[i]n light of the precedent set by Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 , 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010),] and Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (2005)], the trial court should have given substantial weight to [his] young age and the evidence of [his] delayed brain development in making its sentencing determination.” (Riley’s brief, at 40.) However, “ ‘[i]n keeping with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the sentencing authority in Alabama, the trial judge, has unlimite | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ex Parte Slaton
green
1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 57-59.) Riley further alleges that this evidence “was critical to a central issue at trial: whether [he] had the specific intent for capital murder,” because “the State relied on the location of the blood stains on -the jeans — below the knee — to argue that the shooting was ‘execution style,’ and therefore, intentional.” (Riley’s brief, at 59; R. 1179.) “ ‘In Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079 , 117 S.Ct. 742 , 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the requirements for establishing the chain of custody: ‘““Ex parte H | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Albarran v. State
green
1 sentence2013In Albarran v. State, 96 So.3d 131 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), this Court wrote: “First, the circuit court did not misinform the jury that its penalty phase verdict is a recommendation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ex Parte Waldrop
green
1 sentence2013Specifically, he contends that although the Alabama Supreme Court explicitly held in Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So.2d 1181 (Ala.2002), that Alabama’s death-penalty statute does not violate Ring, Waldrop was wrongly decided and that his death sentence cannot be affirmed pursuant to Ring since the “jury never made the factfindings necessary to support the imposition of the death penalty.” (Riley’s brief, at 76.) Initially, this Court notes that Riley’s arguments with respect to Ring have been addressed and decided adversely to him by this Court and the Alabama Supreme Court. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sharp v. State
green
1 sentence2013(Riley’s brief, at 38) (“Once one of the State’s reasons for striking a potential juror is found to be invalid, the remaining reasons for striking that juror and the reasons for the striking of other jurors become suspect and are subject to greater scrutiny.” (citing Sharp, 151 So.3d at 364 )). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
City of Piedmont v. Evans
green
2 sentences2009In Evans, supra , this Court adopted and set out a trial court's ruling that held that "`"Instant bingo" does not constitute "bingo" as allowed by Amendment No. 508 of the Constitution of Alabama.'" 642 So.2d at 436 . 2009In Evans, supra , this Court adopted and set out a trial court's ruling that held that "`"Instant bingo" does not constitute "bingo" as allowed by Amendment No. 508 of the Constitution of Alabama.'" 642 So.2d at 436 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| City of Erie v. Pap's A. M. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Arthur S. West v. Secretary Of The Department Of Transportation
green
1 sentence2009The question is whether there can be any effective relief .' [ West v. Secretary of Dept. of Transp. (9th Cir.2000) 206 F.3d 920 , 925 (emphasis added; internal quotes omitted)]." William Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima, James Wagstaffe, Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, National Edition, "Mootness" Limitation, CH. 2E-3. [6] The Court summarized the facts in W.T. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ex Parte Barfield green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.