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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Brickgreen2 sentences1956And we find nothing in the challenged instruction which limited or restrained them in the exercise of that power.” In People v. Brick (1885), 68 Cal. 190, 191 [ 8 P. 858 ], on the authority of People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174 , the court approved the following instruction: “If the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and they also find the further fact that there is some extenuating fact or circumstance in the case, it is within their discretion to pronounce such a sentence as will relieve the defendant from the extreme penalty of the law. 1956And we find nothing in the challenged instruction which limited or restrained them in the exercise of that power.” In People v. Brick (1885), 68 Cal. 190, 191 [ 8 P. 858 ], on the authority of People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174 , the court approved the following instruction: “If the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and they also find the further fact that there is some extenuating fact or circumstance in the case, it is within their discretion to pronounce such a sentence as will relieve the defendant from the extreme penalty of the law. | 2 | 2 |
Hicks v. Drewgreen2 sentences1962Appellant relies upon Hicks v. Drew (1897) 117 Cal. 305, 314-315 [ 49 P. 189 ], where the court approved the following instruction: “ ‘If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff has sustained any damage by the act of defendant, as she has complained against him, and that by the same act she has received benefit, then, in estimating such damage, such benefit should be deducted. ’ ” In view of the trial court’s findings, the rule is of no moment here. 1962Appellant relies upon Hicks v. Drew (1897) 117 Cal. 305, 314-315 [ 49 P. 189 ], where the court approved the following instruction: “ ‘If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff has sustained any damage by the act of defendant, as she has complained against him, and that by the same act she has received benefit, then, in estimating such damage, such benefit should be deducted. ’ ” In view of the trial court’s findings, the rule is of no moment here. | 1 | 1 |
Tyson v. Burtongreen2 sentences1935This presumption is in itself a species of evidence and it shall prevail and control your deliberations until and unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence.” In Tyson v. Burton, 110 Cal. App. 428, 434 [ 294 Pac. 750 ], the reason and authority for an instruction on this subject was considered at length, and the court said: “Just how this instruction can be considered proper, where each party to an automobile collision charges the other with the sole negligence which resulted in the collision, and the circumstances attending the collision are fully testified to by the respective parties an 1935This presumption is in itself a species of evidence and it shall prevail and control your deliberations until and unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence.” In Tyson v. Burton, 110 Cal. App. 428, 434 [ 294 Pac. 750 ], the reason and authority for an instruction on this subject was considered at length, and the court said: “Just how this instruction can be considered proper, where each party to an automobile collision charges the other with the sole negligence which resulted in the collision, and the circumstances attending the collision are fully testified to by the respective parties an | 1 | 1 |
Olsen v. Standard Oil Co.green2 sentences1935In the case of Olsen v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal. 20, 25 [ 204 Pac. 393 ], the court approved the following instruction: “The presumption is that every man obeys the law and the presumption in this case is that the plaintiff was traveling at a lawful rate of speed and on the proper side of the highway at all times. 1935In the case of Olsen v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal. 20, 25 [ 204 Pac. 393 ], the court approved the following instruction: “The presumption is that every man obeys the law and the presumption in this case is that the plaintiff was traveling at a lawful rate of speed and on the proper side of the highway at all times. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Coddington
red
2 sentences2013Code,] § 25, subd. (b); [citation].)” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 671 .) “In [People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 (Coddington)], the court approved the following instruction, based on Penal Code section 25, subdivision (b), and People v. Skinner [(1985)] 39 Cal.3d 765 : ‘ “ . . . [¶] A person is legally insane when, by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. 2005The Court of Appeal reversed, noting that “[i]t appealed] the trial court believed that in the context of [Penal Code] section 25, subdivision (b) [defining insanity defense], the term ‘wrong’ meant legal and not moral wrong.” (Stress, supra, at p. 1273 .) Rather, “the proper question is whether a defendant can distinguish, not the legal rightness or wrongness of his act, but its moral rightness or wrongness.” (Id. at p. 1272.) The Supreme Court explained the difference between legal wrong and moral wrong in People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d *1402 528, 2 P.3d 1081 ]. 5 | 2 | 2005–2013 |
People v. Skinner
green
2 sentences2013Code,] § 25, subd. (b); [citation].)” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 671 .) “In [People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 (Coddington)], the court approved the following instruction, based on Penal Code section 25, subdivision (b), and People v. Skinner [(1985)] 39 Cal.3d 765 : ‘ “ . . . [¶] A person is legally insane when, by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. 2005The Court of Appeal reversed, noting that “[i]t appealed] the trial court believed that in the context of [Penal Code] section 25, subdivision (b) [defining insanity defense], the term ‘wrong’ meant legal and not moral wrong.” (Stress, supra, at p. 1273 .) Rather, “the proper question is whether a defendant can distinguish, not the legal rightness or wrongness of his act, but its moral rightness or wrongness.” (Id. at p. 1272.) The Supreme Court explained the difference between legal wrong and moral wrong in People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d *1402 528, 2 P.3d 1081 ]. 5 | 2 | 2005–2013 |
People v. Welch
green
2 sentences1956And we find nothing in the challenged instruction which limited or restrained them in the exercise of that power.” In People v. Brick (1885), 68 Cal. 190, 191 [ 8 P. 858 ], on the authority of People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174 , the court approved the following instruction: “If the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and they also find the further fact that there is some extenuating fact or circumstance in the case, it is within their discretion to pronounce such a sentence as will relieve the defendant from the extreme penalty of the law. 1956And we find nothing in the challenged instruction which limited or restrained them in the exercise of that power." In People v. Brick (1885), 68 Cal. 190, 191 [ 8 P. 858 ], on the authority of People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174 , the court approved the following instruction: "If the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and they also find the further fact that there is some extenuating fact or circumstance in the case, it is within their discretion to pronounce such a sentence as will relieve the defendant from the extreme penalty of the law. | 2 | 1956–1956 |
People v. Mills
green
1 sentence2013Code,] § 25, subd. (b); [citation].)” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 671 .) “In [People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 (Coddington)], the court approved the following instruction, based on Penal Code section 25, subdivision (b), and People v. Skinner [(1985)] 39 Cal.3d 765 : ‘ “ . . . [¶] A person is legally insane when, by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Fuller
green
1 sentence1970(In re Fuller, supra, 15 Cal.2d 425, 434 .) Where such a fee is charged the appli *1029 cable law is stated in Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38 Cal.2d 770 , at pages 787-788 [ 242 P.2d 873 ], where the court approved the following instruction as a correct statement of the law: “ ‘A lender is not prohibited from charging an extra and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or risk additional to the lawful interest, other than for the loan of money. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Klett v. Security Acceptance Co.
green
2 sentences1970(In re Fuller, supra, 15 Cal.2d 425, 434 .) Where such a fee is charged the appli *1029 cable law is stated in Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38 Cal.2d 770 , at pages 787-788 [ 242 P.2d 873 ], where the court approved the following instruction as a correct statement of the law: “ ‘A lender is not prohibited from charging an extra and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or risk additional to the lawful interest, other than for the loan of money. 1970(In re Fuller, supra, 15 Cal.2d 425, 434 .) Where such a fee is charged the appli *1029 cable law is stated in Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38 Cal.2d 770 , at pages 787-788 [ 242 P.2d 873 ], where the court approved the following instruction as a correct statement of the law: “ ‘A lender is not prohibited from charging an extra and reasonable amount for incidental services, expenses or risk additional to the lawful interest, other than for the loan of money. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Henslee v. Fox
green
1 sentence1939The same ease was before the court again (Henslee v. Fox, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 286 [ 77 Pac. (2d) 307 ]), where the court approved the following instruction defining the duty which one invitee on the road owed another: “ ‘However, in either event, the defendants are not absolved from the duty of exercising ordinary care for the safety of others. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.