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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2022 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. AMERICAN HORTICULTURE SUPPLY, INC.green2 sentences2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t 2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t | 2 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) Moreover, “Ortega . . . has not been followed by any published cases,” whereas “courts since Montoya have continued to apply the rule excluding | 1 | 1 |
People v. Banksred1 sentence2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) Moreover, “Ortega . . . has not been followed by any published cases,” whereas “courts since Montoya have continued to apply the rule excluding | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chaneygreen1 sentence2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) Moreover, “Ortega . . . has not been followed by any published cases,” whereas “courts since Montoya have continued to apply the rule excluding | 1 | 1 |
Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2004As we previously held, “the Cartwright Act fees provision is the kind of ‘other statutory provision’ that will override a general litigation costs entitlement . . . .” (Carver, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) The court in Reynolds did not address the public policy concern that fee awards not deter enforcement of important statutory rights. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Munoz
green
2 sentences2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) We similarly reject Cantor’s argument that the language in Montoya, limiting application of the accusatory pleading test to the actual pleadings 2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) We similarly reject Cantor’s argument that the language in Montoya, limiting application of the accusatory pleading test to the actual pleadings | 4 | 2019–2021 |
People v. Alvarez
green
2 sentences2022The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. ([People v.] Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.)” (Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 .) Here too, defendant seeks to distinguish Montoya as a multiple conviction case. 2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) We similarly reject Cantor’s argument that the language in Montoya, limiting application of the accusatory pleading test to the actual pleadings | 3 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Montoya
green
2 sentences2022The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. ([People v.] Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.)” (Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 .) Here too, defendant seeks to distinguish Montoya as a multiple conviction case. 2019The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. ( Montoya , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 , 94 P.3d 1098 .) 6 "Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a *789 lesser offense were warranted." ( Munoz , supra , 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 , 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 314 .) Indeed, Macias and Munoz , both single-conviction cases, undermine Alvarez's claim. | 3 | 2019–2022 |
Prichard v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t 2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Spencer v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t 2021(Prichard, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 901 ; Baker, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. 5 .) In Beavers, the court articulated the general rule, discussed above, “that a partial new trial order vacates and holds in abeyance the entire judgment.” (Beavers, at p. 330.) It then recognized an exception to the general rule, stating that “ ‘when an appeal is taken from [a new trial] order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment remains effective for the 13 purpose of an appeal from the judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Spencer v. Nelson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 162, 164 .) Baker and Prichard cite t | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Macias
green
1 sentence2021The court articulated the general standard for the accusatory pleading test before considering its application in a multiple conviction case. [Citation.] ‘Thus, Montoya intended its rule not only to apply in the context of multiple convictions, but also in the context of determining whether instructions on a lesser offense were warranted.’ ” ( Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted, quoting Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 158 .) Moreover, “Ortega . . . has not been followed by any published cases,” whereas “courts since Montoya have continued to apply the rule excluding | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.