Bloom defendant in California

2022(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 .) But even if Bloom’s claims of error were all preserved for appeal, we conclude that neither the prosecutor’s questioning nor her argument constituted improper vouching.

2022(People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 .) But even if Bloom’s claims of error were all preserved for appeal, we conclude that neither the prosecutor’s questioning nor her argument constituted improper vouching.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671 .) By contrast, counsel’s decision to concede Bloom’s criminal responsibility for the deaths of Josephine and Sandra over Bloom’s objection is error of the sort that, as McCoy instructs, defies harmlessness review.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671 .) By contrast, counsel’s decision to concede Bloom’s criminal responsibility for the deaths of Josephine and Sandra over Bloom’s objection is error of the sort that, as McCoy instructs, defies harmlessness review.

2023(Id. at p. 619.) On appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded that “[t]hese two courses of conduct are more than ‘merely a reference to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove their claims,’ ” and instead constituted the “conduct by which plaintiffs claim to have been injured in their intentional interference claims.” (Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 629 .) Rand emphasized that the Bloom defendants’ secret communications with the city “are the interference now complained of” in the plaintiffs’ complaint.

2023(Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 617 .) According to the complaint, the city breached that agreement by allowing a different company, the Bloom defendants, to represent it in negotiations with the NFL.

2019(See City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 , 426, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 [distinguishing between activities of the municipal government and those of individuals, who happened to be officials of the municipality]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581 , 599-600, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 [agreeing that " Vasquez ... 'emphasizes that each person's conduct is to be analyzed separately' "].) 4 The Court of Appeal noted that the City was not paying Rand Resources at all for its work as an agent. ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 109

2019(See City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 , 426, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 [distinguishing between activities of the municipal government and those of individuals, who happened to be officials of the municipality]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581 , 599-600, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 [agreeing that " Vasquez ... 'emphasizes that each person's conduct is to be analyzed separately' "].) 4 The Court of Appeal noted that the City was not paying Rand Resources at all for its work as an agent. ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 109

2019ASHMANN-GERST, J. * 1 All further references to section 425.16 are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 We have established a "general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract breach," except to the extent the claim is simply a fraud claim by another name. ( Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85 , 102, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 , 900 P.2d 669 .) Plaintiffs' tortious breach claim (count two) does appear to be a fraud claim by another name, and we thus refer to it as among plaintiffs' fraud-based claims. 3 Mayor Dear's and Wynder's statements, not directly or indirec

2019ASHMANN-GERST, J. * 1 All further references to section 425.16 are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 We have established a "general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract breach," except to the extent the claim is simply a fraud claim by another name. ( Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85 , 102, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 , 900 P.2d 669 .) Plaintiffs' tortious breach claim (count two) does appear to be a fraud claim by another name, and we thus refer to it as among plaintiffs' fraud-based claims. 3 Mayor Dear's and Wynder's statements, not directly or indirec

2019(See City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 , 426, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 [distinguishing between activities of the municipal government and those of individuals, who happened to be officials of the municipality]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581 , 599-600, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 [agreeing that " Vasquez ... 'emphasizes that each person's conduct is to be analyzed separately' "].) 4 The Court of Appeal noted that the City was not paying Rand Resources at all for its work as an agent. ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 109

2019(See City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 , 426, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 [distinguishing between activities of the municipal government and those of individuals, who happened to be officials of the municipality]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581 , 599-600, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 [agreeing that " Vasquez ... 'emphasizes that each person's conduct is to be analyzed separately' "].) 4 The Court of Appeal noted that the City was not paying Rand Resources at all for its work as an agent. ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 109

2019The two intentional interference claims share many elements-principally, an intentional act by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. ( Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937 , 944, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 , 189 P.3d 285 [stating that an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim requires, among other *629 things, "an intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship"]; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 , 55, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 [laying out the

2019The two intentional interference claims share many elements-principally, an intentional act by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. ( Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937 , 944, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 , 189 P.3d 285 [stating that an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim requires, among other *629 things, "an intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship"]; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 , 55, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 [laying out the

2019The two intentional interference claims share many elements-principally, an intentional act by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. ( Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937 , 944, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 , 189 P.3d 285 [stating that an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim requires, among other *629 things, "an intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship"]; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 , 55, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 [laying out the

2019The two intentional interference claims share many elements-principally, an intentional act by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. ( Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937 , 944, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 , 189 P.3d 285 [stating that an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim requires, among other *629 things, "an intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship"]; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 , 55, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 [laying out the

2019Second, plaintiffs claim that "[a]fter Rand provided the City with its [EAA] extension request but before the City voted on the extension," the Bloom defendants met with Mayor Dear and a *17 councilmember to "conspire about how to breach the EAA and not extend it." These two courses of conduct are more than "merely a reference to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove their claims." ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096 , 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 .) The Bloom defendants' communications with the NFL served only as evidence of plaintiffs' fraud-based claims.

2019Second, plaintiffs claim that "[a]fter Rand provided the City with its [EAA] extension request but before the City voted on the extension," the Bloom defendants met with Mayor Dear and a *17 councilmember to "conspire about how to breach the EAA and not extend it." These two courses of conduct are more than "merely a reference to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove their claims." ( Rand Resources , supra , 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096 , 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 .) The Bloom defendants' communications with the NFL served only as evidence of plaintiffs' fraud-based claims.

2016Citing Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 ] (Tuchscher), the trial court concluded that section 425.16 was applicable to plaintiffs’ case because “communications involving the proposed development of such commercial property fall into the ‘matter of public interest’ portion of the statute [section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)] and, as such, they need not be made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body.” The court nevertheless went on to conclude th

2016Citing Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 ] (Tuchscher), the trial court concluded that section 425.16 was applicable to plaintiffs’ case because “communications involving the proposed development of such commercial property fall into the ‘matter of public interest’ portion of the statute [section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)] and, as such, they need not be made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body.” The court nevertheless went on to conclude th

1995The court first noted that we must construe surety contracts using the same rules that apply to the interpretation of other contracts. ( 48 Cal.2d at p. 803 ; §§ 2837, 3268.) In particular, the Bloom court relied on section 3268, which provides that the statutory rules regarding contracts, including those which apply specifically to surety contracts, “ ‘are subordinate to the intention of the parties, when ascertained in the manner prescribed [for] the interpretation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be waived by any party entitled thereto, unless such waiver would be against public po

1995The court first noted that we must construe surety contracts using the same rules that apply to the interpretation of other contracts. ( 48 Cal.2d at p. 803 ; §§ 2837, 3268.) In particular, the Bloom court relied on section 3268, which provides that the statutory rules regarding contracts, including those which apply specifically to surety contracts, “ ‘are subordinate to the intention of the parties, when ascertained in the manner prescribed [for] the interpretation of contracts; and the benefit thereof may be waived by any party entitled thereto, unless such waiver would be against public po

1990Such a holding goes beyond the Bloom exception (supra, 783 F.2d 1356 ) and is inconsistent with the cases which permit union leaders to discharge incumbent administrators.

1990Such a holding goes beyond the Bloom exception (supra, 783 F.2d 1356 ) and is inconsistent with the cases which permit union leaders to discharge incumbent administrators.