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8 California opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peracchi v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023Our conclusion serves the policies articulated in Peracchi in that it “avoids entangling courts in constitutional questions that are unique to criminal trials and that could arise if a resentencing hearing were to be considered a new trial. . . . [It] avoids the . . . practical difficulties . . . of . . . a mandatory case-by-case analysis of the question whether a particular sentencing hearing on remand will involve the exercise of trial court discretion sufficient to qualify the proceeding as a new trial within the meaning 6 of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.6, and a burdensome require 2023“Our conclusion avoids entangling courts in constitutional questions that are unique to criminal trials and that could arise if a resentencing 15 hearing were to be considered a new trial. [It] avoids the obvious practical difficulties [of] a mandatory case-by-case analysis of the question whether a particular sentencing hearing on remand will involve the exercise of trial court discretion sufficient to qualify the proceeding as a new trial . . . and a burdensome requirement that a new sentencing judge reexamine the factual basis for the verdict in order to perform his or her sentencing functi | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino
green
1 sentence2021Madrid.” But there is no indication in the complaint that the alleged unfair business practices were connected with Merliss’s alleged violations of the 15 California Rules of Professional Conduct, as Martello alleges on appeal. “[S]ummary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings.” (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 .) As the court explained in Bostrom, this is not a burdensome rule: “If either party wishes the trial court to consider a previously unpleaded issue in connection with a motion for summary judgment, it may request leave to | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.
green
1 sentence2016Nor do principles of equitable estoppel apply. "'[I]t is axiomatic that one who seeks equity must be willing to do equity. [Citation.]'" (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 180 .) Ensuring that the HOA understands what it is agreeing to is not a burdensome requirement. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chino MHC v. City of Chino
green
1 sentence2016If the HOA, once fully informed of the survey's significance, negotiates its terms in bad faith or unreasonably withholds its consent, "the statute must be construed to excuse the requirement of an agreement." (Chino MHC, LP v. City of Chino, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079 .) Without construing the statute to require that the HOA understand the agreement, however, the statutory survey of resident support would be meaningless. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Time Warner Cable v. Doyle
green
2 sentences2015(Doyle, supra, 66 F.3d at p. 876 .) The negative option billing provision of section 543 was ambiguous because its language standing alone did not “answer the question of whether the unbundling or the mere relabeling of existing services” was sufficient to require affirmative customer consent. ( 66 F.3d at p. 877 .) The appellate court also observed that a literal interpretation of the “negative option billing” prohibition in section 543(f) would impose the burdensome requirement of cable operators obtaining affirmative customer consent every time a station was substituted, “producing signific 2015(Doyle, supra, 66 F.3d at p. 876 .) The negative option billing provision of section 543 was ambiguous because its language standing alone did not “answer the question of whether the unbundling or the mere relabeling of existing services” was sufficient to require affirmative customer consent. ( 66 F.3d at p. 877 .) The appellate court also observed that a literal interpretation of the “negative option billing” prohibition in section 543(f) would impose the burdensome requirement of cable operators obtaining affirmative customer consent every time a station was substituted, “producing signific | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2003The legislative history of section 1043 reveals that the Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement of personal knowledge." ( City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 88 , 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 .) The reasoning utilized in City of Santa Cruz applies equally here. 2003The legislative history of section 1043 reveals that the Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement of personal knowledge.” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) The reasoning utilized in City of Santa Cruz applies equally here. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
green
2 sentences1996Moreover, Leech dealt with a more burdensome requirement in terms of the space needed for the compelled disclosure and considered several factors later found inapplicable by the court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, supra, 471 U.S. 626 . 1996Moreover, Leech dealt with a more burdensome requirement in terms of the space needed for the compelled disclosure and considered several factors later found inapplicable by the court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, supra, 471 U.S. 626 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lemons v. Regents of University of California
green
1 sentence1987(Cf. LeMons, 21 Cal.3d at p. 877 .) Concerning the first factor listed in LeMons , the parties presented a great deal of conflicting evidence on the crucial issues in this case. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.