defendant challenged instruction in California

2009The defendant challenged this requirement on appeal, arguing that it denied him equal protection because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under section 261.5 under the same circumstances would not be subject to the mandatory registration requirements. ( Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1198 .) The Supreme Court agreed. ( Id. at pp. 1206-1207.) (1) As with any equal protection challenge, the threshold question was whether the state had adopted a classification that affected two or more similarly situated groups differently. ( Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 12

2009The defendant challenged this requirement on appeal, arguing that it denied him equal protection because a person convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under section 261.5 under the same circumstances would not be subject to the mandatory registration requirements. ( Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1198 .) The Supreme Court agreed. ( Id. at pp. 1206-1207.) (1) As with any equal protection challenge, the threshold question was whether the state had adopted a classification that affected two or more similarly situated groups differently. ( Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 12

2020A vehicle that smells, lurches, clanks, and emits smoke over an extended period of time is not fit for its intended purpose.” (Isip, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 27 .) The court further pointed out the plaintiff had presented evidence the car would not “ ‘pass without objection in the trade,’ ” adducing evidence “that malodorous air-conditioning, a leaking transmission, transmission hesitation, and [the plaintiff’s] clanking brake problem were not normal for a car.” (Ibid.) 15 This case is nothing like Isip.

2020Isip involved the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s jury instruction that “ ‘[f]itness for the ordinary purpose of a vehicle means that the vehicle should be in safe condition and substantially free of defects.’ ” (Isip, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 23 .) The defendant challenged that instruction, saying the trial court should have instructed that the implied warranty for a vehicle can be breached “only if [the vehicle] does not provide transportation.” (Id. at p. 27, italics added.) Isip rejected that contention, finding that a car in a “ ‘safe condition and substantially free of def

2014(Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1156, 1159, 1162 .) The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction based on People v. Wilson (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1034 , a recent decision upholding an instruction on charged offenses as propensity evidence similar to the instructions given in Villatoro and this case.

2014In Villatoro, the defendant challenged the instruction in the Court of Appeal based on People v. Quintanilla (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 572 , which held that charged offenses could not be considered as propensity evidence.

2014The final test is not in the [relative] number of witnesses, but in the 12 convincing force of the evidence.” In People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 714 , the defendant challenged the instruction on the basis that its use of “convincing force” replaces the beyond a reasonable doubt standard with a preponderance of the evidence standard.

2008There, the defendant challenged an instruction that permitted the jury to infer that he drove recklessly, solely from evidence that he drove in excess of the speed limit. ( Id. at p. 316.) [13] Schwendeman found the challenged instruction constitutionally deficient because it told the jury, "in effect, that it could ignore all the other evidence, consider only the evidence of Schwendeman's speed, and if it found Schwendeman was exceeding the speed limit, that was enough to convict him—not of speeding, but of reckless driving." ( 971 F.2d at p. 316 .) In stark contrast, the instruction here exp

2008(Id. at p. 316.) 13 Schwendeman found the challenged instruction constitutionally deficient because it told the jury, “in effect, that it could ignore all the other evidence, consider only the evidence of Schwendeman’s speed, and if it found Schwendeman was exceeding the speed limit, that was enough to convict him—not of speeding, but of reckless driving.” ( 971 F.2d at p. 316 .) In stark contrast, the instruction here expressly told the jury that conscious possession of recently stolen property “is not by itself sufficient to permit an inference that the Defendant is guilty” of the charged cr

2007The defendant challenged the instruction on second degree felony murder based upon the predicate felony of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. ( Id. at p. 169.) Focusing on the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule, the court found application of second degree felony murder "was appropriate when the *Page 191 purpose of the predicate felony was independent of or collateral to an intent to cause injury that would result in death." ( Robertson, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 171 .) Although one who decides to assault another would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule, a def

2007The defendant challenged the instruction on second degree felony murder based upon the predicate felony of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. ( Id. at p. 169.) Focusing on the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule, the court found application of second degree felony murder "was appropriate when the *Page 191 purpose of the predicate felony was independent of or collateral to an intent to cause injury that would result in death." ( Robertson, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 171 .) Although one who decides to assault another would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule, a def

2007The defendant challenged the instruction on second degree felony murder based upon the predicate felony of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. ( Id. at p. 169.) Focusing on the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule, the court found application of second degree felony murder "was appropriate when the *Page 191 purpose of the predicate felony was independent of or collateral to an intent to cause injury that would result in death." ( Robertson, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 171 .) Although one who decides to assault another would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule, a def

2007The defendant challenged the instruction on second degree felony murder based upon the predicate felony of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. ( Id. at p. 169.) Focusing on the deterrent purpose of the felony-murder rule, the court found application of second degree felony murder "was appropriate when the *Page 191 purpose of the predicate felony was independent of or collateral to an intent to cause injury that would result in death." ( Robertson, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 171 .) Although one who decides to assault another would not be deterred by the felony-murder rule, a def