dominant purpose test in California

2024(E.g., 2,022 Ranch v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1390-1395, 1401 , disapproved on another ground in Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 112 ; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at pp. 475-476; Watt Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 802, 805 .) Assuming without deciding that the dominant purpose test applies to whether something constitutes work product, the governing question is what was the dominant purpose for counsel’s retention: legal advi

2014If he thinks it necessary, and acts on his opinion, he is not liable because he also acts malevolently." (Rideout, supra, 148 Mass. at p. 373 , 19 N.E. at p. 392 .) Under the dominant purpose test as adopted by Wilson, "the pertinent question is whether the [defendants'] dominant purpose in planting the . . . trees along their property line with plaintiffs was to annoy plaintiffs." (Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 .) "[T]he intent to annoy the neighbor need not be the sole purpose for building or maintaining the fence. . . , but it must at least be the 'dominant' purpose." (Id. at p.

2014If he thinks it necessary, and acts on his opinion, he is not liable because he also acts malevolently." (Rideout, supra, 148 Mass. at p. 373 , 19 N.E. at p. 392 .) Under the dominant purpose test as adopted by Wilson, "the pertinent question is whether the [defendants'] dominant purpose in planting the . . . trees along their property line with plaintiffs was to annoy plaintiffs." (Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 .) "[T]he intent to annoy the neighbor need not be the sole purpose for building or maintaining the fence. . . , but it must at least be the 'dominant' purpose." (Id. at p.

2014If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values, the question is predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed independently." (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 (Crocker).) We review de novo the trial court's selection of the dominant purpose test as the rule for determining malice under Civil Code section 841.4, and review for substantial evidence the court's application of that test in determining the Starrs' intent--an inquiry 22 that "requires app

2014If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values, the question is predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed independently." (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 (Crocker).) We review de novo the trial court's selection of the dominant purpose test as the rule for determining malice under Civil Code section 841.4, and review for substantial evidence the court's application of that test in determining the Starrs' intent--an inquiry 22 that "requires app

2014(See, e.g., Greenlining Institute v. Public Utilities Com. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329, fn. 5 .) First, Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at page 1309 suggests the dominant purpose test relates to subjective intent.

2014(See, e.g., Greenlining Institute v. Public Utilities Com. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329, fn. 5 .) First, Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at page 1309 suggests the dominant purpose test relates to subjective intent.

2014(Karasek v. Peier, supra, 22 Wash. at pp. 431- 432.) 14 The Vanderpols' brief did not quote the "other legitimate evidence" qualification to the Karasek rule they propose. 26 Based on our reading of Wilson and Karasek, we conclude the dominant purpose test relates to the defendant's subjective intent in erecting or maintaining the fence or fence-like structure.

2014On the other hand, if the court finds the Handleys planted the trees primarily to annoy plaintiffs, and other purposes such as aesthetics and privacy, if any, were only subordinate to the dominant purpose of annoyance, then the 'malice' element has been satisfied." (Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 , italics added; see also Rideout, supra, 148 Mass. at p. 373 , 19 N.E. at p. 392 [construing the language " 'maliciously erected, or maintained for the purpose of annoying' adjoining owners or occupiers" as "clearly express[ing] that there must be an actual malevolent motive, as distinguish

2014We conclude the trial court did not err in its "selection of a rule." (Crocker, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 888 .) The Vanderpols argue for the first time in their reply brief that we should "hold that the dominant purpose test requires consideration of objective motivating factors rather than the proffered subjective state of mind of the person erecting and/or maintaining the fence at issue," and that the "case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial with clarification that an objective standard of malice be employed . . . ." Because the Vanderpols "waited until their reply brief to raise

2014The Trial Court Properly Selected the Dominant Purpose Test as the Rule for Determining Malice Under Civil Code Section 841.4 Civil Code section 841.4 declares a private nuisance as "[a]ny fence or other structure in the nature of a fence unnecessarily exceeding 10 feet in height maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property . . . ." In Vanderpol, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 394 , we found persuasive the reasoning of Wilson, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1301 , and "conclude[d] that a row of trees serving as a barrier between adjoining parce

2003In support of this argument, the People cite People v. Cabral, in which the court adopted the “dominant purpose test” applicable to attorney-client communications: “ ‘ “To make the communication privileged the dominant purpose must be for transmittal to an attorney ‘in the course of professional employment.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 820, 828 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 866 ], quoting Montebello Rose Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) The court in People v. Cabral found the dominant purpose test “equally applicable” to a determinati

2003In support of this argument, the People cite People v. Cabral, in which the court adopted the “dominant purpose test” applicable to attorney-client communications: “ ‘ “To make the communication privileged the dominant purpose must be for transmittal to an attorney ‘in the course of professional employment.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 820, 828 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 866 ], quoting Montebello Rose Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) The court in People v. Cabral found the dominant purpose test “equally applicable” to a determinati

1993There we stated, “ ‘To make the communication privileged the dominant purpose must be for transmittal to an attorney “in the course of professional employment” ’ [citations].” (Id. at p. 32, quoting Holm v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 500, 507 [ 267 P.2d 1025 ].) The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications to an attorney that are not of “a legal nature.” ( 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 .) “Whether a particular communication is predominantly in furtherance of the attorney-client relationship is a question of fact.” (Id. at p. 33.) We find the dominant purpose test equally appli

1993There we stated, “ ‘To make the communication privileged the dominant purpose must be for transmittal to an attorney “in the course of professional employment” ’ [citations].” (Id. at p. 32, quoting Holm v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 500, 507 [ 267 P.2d 1025 ].) The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications to an attorney that are not of “a legal nature.” ( 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 .) “Whether a particular communication is predominantly in furtherance of the attorney-client relationship is a question of fact.” (Id. at p. 33.) We find the dominant purpose test equally appli

1977When the corporate employer has more than one purpose in directing such[ 9 ] an employee to make such report or statement, the dominant purpose will control, unless the secondary use is such that confidentiality has been waived.” 10 (Italics added.) (Pp. 736-737.) Or, as had been earlier stated by the court, “the ‘dominant purpose’ doctrine ... is inapplicable to a natural person. . . .” (Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 166, 174 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 373 P.2d 432 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1073 ].) Thus the dominant purpose doctrine, even if otherwise applicable to a case like the instant one, was erro

1977When the corporate employer has more than one purpose in directing such[ 9 ] an employee to make such report or statement, the dominant purpose will control, unless the secondary use is such that confidentiality has been waived.” 10 (Italics added.) (Pp. 736-737.) Or, as had been earlier stated by the court, “the ‘dominant purpose’ doctrine ... is inapplicable to a natural person. . . .” (Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 166, 174 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 373 P.2d 432 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1073 ].) Thus the dominant purpose doctrine, even if otherwise applicable to a case like the instant one, was erro