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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 1950–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nakash v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997Once that opportunity has been afforded, the Restatement Second asserts, fairness dictates that the controversy in question be put to rest.’ (Italics added.) (Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59, 68 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 ].)” (Schultz v. Harney (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1619-1620 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) 13 The relevant question reduces to a determination whether the causes of action resolved in Weikel I, and those matters as to which Weikel then had an opportunity to litigate, embrace the claims sought to be asserted in Weikel II. 1997Once that opportunity has been afforded, the Restatement Second asserts, fairness dictates that the controversy in question be put to rest.’ (Italics added.) (Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59, 68 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 ].)” (Schultz v. Harney (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1619-1620 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) 13 The relevant question reduces to a determination whether the causes of action resolved in Weikel I, and those matters as to which Weikel then had an opportunity to litigate, embrace the claims sought to be asserted in Weikel II. | 3 | 3 |
Schultz v. Harneygreen2 sentences1997Once that opportunity has been afforded, the Restatement Second asserts, fairness dictates that the controversy in question be put to rest.’ (Italics added.) (Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59, 68 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 ].)” (Schultz v. Harney (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1619-1620 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) 13 The relevant question reduces to a determination whether the causes of action resolved in Weikel I, and those matters as to which Weikel then had an opportunity to litigate, embrace the claims sought to be asserted in Weikel II. 1997Once that opportunity has been afforded, the Restatement Second asserts, fairness dictates that the controversy in question be put to rest.’ (Italics added.) (Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59, 68 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 ].)” (Schultz v. Harney (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1619-1620 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 ].) 13 The relevant question reduces to a determination whether the causes of action resolved in Weikel I, and those matters as to which Weikel then had an opportunity to litigate, embrace the claims sought to be asserted in Weikel II. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Strunkgreen1 sentence2002"Moreover, because the trial judge is the only person who is in the position to properly review and weigh the claimed mitigating circumstances in this case, which are so dependent upon the facts adduced at trial, the matter must be *150 remanded to him." (Id. at p. 275, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 868 , italics added.) In balancing concerns about trial court bias with the need for familiarity in order to afford a defendant a fair and full hearing upon a remand for resentencing, I find it highly significant that a trial court's actions upon a remand for resentencing are strictly limited in ways which simply | 1 | 1 |
People v. Isbygreen2 sentences1977(See People v. Williams, 10 Cal.App.3d 745, 751 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 364 ], relying on People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 894 [ 186 P.2d 405 ].) Finally, defendant was not denied the ability to contact, interview and subpoena Leñares. 1977(See People v. Williams, 10 Cal.App.3d 745, 751 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 364 ], relying on People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 894 [ 186 P.2d 405 ].) Finally, defendant was not denied the ability to contact, interview and subpoena Leñares. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1977(See People v. Williams, 10 Cal.App.3d 745, 751 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 364 ], relying on People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 894 [ 186 P.2d 405 ].) Finally, defendant was not denied the ability to contact, interview and subpoena Leñares. 1977(See People v. Williams, 10 Cal.App.3d 745, 751 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 364 ], relying on People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879, 894 [ 186 P.2d 405 ].) Finally, defendant was not denied the ability to contact, interview and subpoena Leñares. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2002"When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. [Citation.]" ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357 , 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) Thus, while a trial court resentencing a defendant after reversal on appeal may have discretion to increase or decrease elements of the sentence ( People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1756, 1769 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ), absent imposition of an unauthorized sentence in the first instance, it has no discretion 2002"When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. [Citation.]" ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357 , 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) Thus, while a trial court resentencing a defendant after reversal on appeal may have discretion to increase or decrease elements of the sentence ( People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1756, 1769 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ), absent imposition of an unauthorized sentence in the first instance, it has no discretion | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2002"When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. [Citation.]" ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357 , 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) Thus, while a trial court resentencing a defendant after reversal on appeal may have discretion to increase or decrease elements of the sentence ( People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1756, 1769 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ), absent imposition of an unauthorized sentence in the first instance, it has no discretion 2002"When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. [Citation.]" ( People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357 , 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 58 , 1 P.3d 650 .) Thus, while a trial court resentencing a defendant after reversal on appeal may have discretion to increase or decrease elements of the sentence ( People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1756, 1769 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ), absent imposition of an unauthorized sentence in the first instance, it has no discretion | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Leeds v. Gray
green
1 sentence1975By Stats. 1971, ch. 653, § 1, p. 1299 the words “or another” were deleted, and “in” was substituted for “by” in subd. (c).) 9 The court further stated, “A fair and full hearing is given where the fact finder fully reviews the record and an opportunity is given the parties to argue their contentions as to the credibility of the witnesses and the other matters involved in the proceeding.” ( 109 Cal.App.2d at p. 884 .) 10 Government Code section 54950 provides: “In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agenc | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Arnold v. Howell
green
1 sentence1966In Arnold v. Howell, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 202 , the court said: “ A consent which is required before a court can act, and which is based upon misrepresentation or given by a person who is unable to comprehend its meaning, prevents a fair and full hearing of the issues which the court is required to determine. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Matter of Cozza
red
2 sentences1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili 1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Pico v. Cohn
green
2 sentences1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili 1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.