general reasonable doubt test in California

2022(Sanchez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196-197.) In Martinez, the court stated that alternative-theory error, “requires reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.” (Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1218 [discussing Chiu error].) But the Aledamat court clarified that the Chiu/Martinez means of determining harmlessness was not exclusive and, “Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5

2022In Martinez, the court stated that alternative-theory error, “requires reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.” (Martinez, at p. 1218, Chiu, at p. 167 [same]) But the Aledamat court clarified that the Chiu/Martinez means of determining harmlessness was not exclusive and, “Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder [Citation] and Merritt [Citation].” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at

2022(Sanchez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196-197.) In Martinez, the court stated that alternative-theory error, “requires reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.” (Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1218 [discussing Chiu error].) But the Aledamat court clarified that the Chiu/Martinez means of determining harmlessness was not exclusive and, “Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2021(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 824 .) Because the general reasonable doubt instruction already informs the jury that it cannot convict the defendant if the evidence, as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to her guilt, it is well settled that a third party culpability instruction is almost always duplicative and hence unnecessary.

2019But Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder , supra , 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , and Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th 819 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 .

2019But Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder , supra , 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , and Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th 819 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 .

2019The test stated in Chiu and Martinez was taken from Chun , supra , 45 Cal.4th at pages 1203 to 1205, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 .

2019The test stated in Chiu and Martinez was taken from Chun , supra , 45 Cal.4th at pages 1203 to 1205, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 .

2019But Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder , supra , 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , and Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th 819 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 .

2019But Chiu and Martinez were only a specific application of the more general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder , supra , 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , and Merritt , supra , 2 Cal.5th 819 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 392 P.3d 421 .

2014(People v. Stone (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 323, 331 .) Where reasonably possible, we interpret the instructions " 'to support the judgment rather than to defeat it.' " (Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088 .) Before deliberations began, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220, on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden of proving every element 15 of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and the definition of the term "reasonable doubt." The Wilson instruction reiterated the general reasonable doubt instruction (CALCRIM No. 220) and told jurors that the

2014(People v. Stone (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 323, 331 .) Where reasonably possible, we interpret the instructions " 'to support the judgment rather than to defeat it.' " (Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088 .) Before deliberations began, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220, on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden of proving every element 15 of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and the definition of the term "reasonable doubt." The Wilson instruction reiterated the general reasonable doubt instruction (CALCRIM No. 220) and told jurors that the

2012As a result, the members of the panel could well have viewed the court’s remarks as hypothetical and thus have failed to give the instruction the same focused attention they would have had they been impaneled and sworn.” (Ibid.) “[B]ecause the [trial] court made no reference to . . . the general reasonable doubt standard with its charge to the jury after presentation of the evidence, any intellectual awareness the jurors had that the reasonable doubt standard applied may not have been accompanied by the sense of centrality and importance the instruction should carry.” (Ibid.) In People v. Flor

2012As a result, the members of the panel could well have viewed the court’s remarks as hypothetical and thus have failed to give the instruction the same focused attention they would have had they been impaneled and sworn.” (Ibid.) “[B]ecause the [trial] court made no reference to . . . the general reasonable doubt standard with its charge to the jury after presentation of the evidence, any intellectual awareness the jurors had that the reasonable doubt standard applied may not have been accompanied by the sense of centrality and importance the instruction should carry.” (Ibid.) In People v. Flor