involuntary waiver in California

1984To the extent that it is inconsistent with this conclusion County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 988 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 70 ] is also disapproved.

1984The court said that the interest in preserving familial relationships established by prior judgments, which led the court to reject retroactivity in Salas , “cannot outweigh the defendant’s right to set aside a judgment entered on the basis of an involuntary waiver of the right to any hearing on the question of paternity.” (Ibid.) The court disapproved any contrary ruling in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 988 .

2026He relies on McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. 414 (McCoy), for the proposition that his fundamental right to decide whether to plead guilty and/or persist in a plea of not guilty was violated by counsel’s statement, which was offered with no waiver.

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

2005(Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461 .) In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ], the court added “a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S 171, 176 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 158 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 ]), when it held that, once a suspect has asserted his or her right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease and the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, e

1991The Florida District Court of Appeal rejected the majority view on the ground that "deductions and exemptions ... are not to be extended beyond the clear import of the language used" ( McKenzie v. Kinsey, supra, 532 So.2d at p. 100, fn. 3 ), while the South Dakota Supreme Court in Brandriet v. Larsen concluded that the amendment to section 152(e) "appear[s] to contemplate a `voluntary' waiver." ( 442 N.W.2d at p. 459 .) As pointed out earlier, however, section 152(e) plainly grants the noncustodial parent the right to an exemption if he or she obtains a declaration from the custodial parent; t

1991The Florida District Court of Appeal rejected the majority view on the ground that “deductions and exemptions . . . are not to be extended beyond the clear import of the language used” (McKenzie v. Kinsey, supra, 532 So.2d at p. 100, fn. 3 ), while the South Dakota Supreme Court in Brandriet v. Larsen concluded that the amendment to section 152(e) “appear[s] to contemplate a ‘voluntary’ waiver.” ( 442 N.W.2d at p. 459 .) As pointed out earlier, however, section 152(e) plainly grants the noncustodial parent the right to an exemption if he or she obtains a declaration from the custodial parent;

1985(See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Mosier, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 757 and County of Los Angeles v. Castro (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 15 ].) The action of the Legislature in 1980 amending section 11476.1 has, of course, stemmed the tide of reconsideration somewhat by the inclusion of due process protection to defendants in the amended statute.

1985(See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Mosier, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 757 and County of Los Angeles v. Castro (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 15 ].) The action of the Legislature in 1980 amending section 11476.1 has, of course, stemmed the tide of reconsideration somewhat by the inclusion of due process protection to defendants in the amended statute.

1985(See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Mosier, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 757 and County of Los Angeles v. Castro (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 15 ].) The action of the Legislature in 1980 amending section 11476.1 has, of course, stemmed the tide of reconsideration somewhat by the inclusion of due process protection to defendants in the amended statute.

1985(See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Mosier, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 757 and County of Los Angeles v. Castro (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 15 ].) The action of the Legislature in 1980 amending section 11476.1 has, of course, stemmed the tide of reconsideration somewhat by the inclusion of due process protection to defendants in the amended statute.

1978When the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the same reason that an incriminating statement made under police interrogation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be involuntary.” (People v. Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 150, 160-161 .) Narramore’s talk with Munoz detailing the incriminating statements was a “clever softening up” which resulted in an involuntary waiver of his Miranda rights.