Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.green2 sentences2013(Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting 4 Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257 (Zamora).) The policy of the law favors a hearing on the merits. 2010(Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 47 P.3d 1056 ].) The policy of the law favors a hearing on the merits. | 2 | 2 |
Shamblin v. Brattaingreen2 sentences2013(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 .) A default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. 2010(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 749 P.2d 339 ].) Therefore, when a party in default moves promptly to request relief, “very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court’s order setting aside a default. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Appellant contends that there was no evidence to support the order here because the court had sustained objections to Holmes’s declaration and had found that Holmes was not credible. | 1 | 2 |
Slusher v. Durrergreen2 sentences1990(Slusher v. Durrer (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 747, 753 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 265 ].) However, when defendant fails to answer, demur, or give notice of certain other motions not applicable here, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment. 1990(Slusher v. Durrer (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 747, 753 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 265 ].) However, when defendant fails to answer, demur, or give notice of certain other motions not applicable here, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment. | 1 | 1 |
County of Santa Clara v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1987(County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 552 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 483 P.2d 774 ].) In our view, where, as here, the only issue before the trial court is whether the public entity would be “prejudiced” within the meaning of section 946.6, subdivision (c)(1), an abuse of discretion will exist if the finding of the trial court is not supported by substantial evidence. 1987(County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 552 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 483 P.2d 774 ].) In our view, where, as here, the only issue before the trial court is whether the public entity would be “prejudiced” within the meaning of section 946.6, subdivision (c)(1), an abuse of discretion will exist if the finding of the trial court is not supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Ebersol v. Cowangreen2 sentences1987(Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 673 P.2d 271 ].) However, the appellate standard of review in examining cases where the trial court has denied a petition for relief under the Tort Claims Act is more rigorous because the law favors the hearing of matters on their merits, rather than upholding a strict adherence to procedural doctrine. 1987(Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 673 P.2d 271 ].) However, the appellate standard of review in examining cases where the trial court has denied a petition for relief under the Tort Claims Act is more rigorous because the law favors the hearing of matters on their merits, rather than upholding a strict adherence to procedural doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manning v. Gavin
green
2 sentences1950The policy of the law favors the hearing of appeals on their merits.” On this same point is mentioned Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal.2d 44 [ 92 P.2d 795 ], and other cases, indicating that “in eases of doubt the court ought to resolve the doubt in favor of the application so that the full merits of the litigation might be presented.” The policy of liberality as set forth in the cases cited, should be applied in the instant controversy. 1950The policy of the law favors the hearing of appeals on their merits.” On this same point is mentioned Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal.2d 44 [ 92 P.2d 795 ], and other cases, indicating that “in eases of doubt the court ought to resolve the doubt in favor of the application so that the full merits of the litigation might be presented.” The policy of liberality as set forth in the cases cited, should be applied in the instant controversy. | 2 | 1939–1950 |
Labarthe v. McRae
green
1 sentence2022Notwithstanding this conclusion, because we are able to decide this controversy and because “[t]he policy of the law favors the hearing of appeals on their merits [citations]” (Labarthe v. McRae (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 734, 738 ), we will deny the motion to dismiss, and we will exercise our discretion to reach the merits of appellants’ challenge to the order of the trial court. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Arias
green
2 sentences2019(See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92 , 190, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 .) viii. 2019(See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92 , 190, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 , 913 P.2d 980 .) viii. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lewith v. Rehmke
green
2 sentences1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. 1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Wood v. Peterson Farms Co.
green
2 sentences1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. 1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Banta v. Siller
green
2 sentences1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. 1939(Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal. (2d) 44 [ 92 Pac. (2d) 795 ] ; Lewith v. Rehmke, 217 Cal. 563 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 687 ]; Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 922 ] ; Banta v. Siller, 121 Cal. 414 [ 53 Pac. 935 ].) In the fourth place, the history of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure demonstrates that the legislature, *739 by the use of the words “after receiving”, in that section must have intended that the time for filing the notice of intention to move for a new trial should not start to run until after physical delivery of notice of entry of judgment. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.