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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1999(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 17 Cal.4th 38, 57, fn. 10 , quoting with approval Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1, 105 .) The Aerojet opinion went on to reiterate the Montrose analysis to the effect that successive insurers on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage first manifests itself are separately and independently obligated to indemnify the insured. 1999(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 17 Cal.4th 38, 57, fn. 10 , quoting with approval Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1, 105 .) The Aerojet opinion went on to reiterate the Montrose analysis to the effect that successive insurers on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage first manifests itself are separately and independently obligated to indemnify the insured. | 2 | 2 |
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court of Stategreen1 sentence2020(Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1306, 1321, 1338 (Montrose II).) The court concluded that the plain language of many of the excess policies purchased by Montrose provide that they “attach not upon exhaustion of lower layer policies within the same policy period, but rather upon exhaustion of all available insurance.” (Id. at p. 1327.) Shortly after the Court of Appeal published its opinion in this case, another Court of Appeal disagreed with its reasoning in State of California v. Continental Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Districtgreen2 sentences1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra 1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra | 1 | 1 |
Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra 1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra | 1 | 1 |
National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlichgreen2 sentences1991(See National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 524, fn. 12 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 506 ] [a request for sanctions made in a respondent’s brief is “fair warning that such sanctions would be considered by the court”].) First, International has had notice and an opportunity to respond by reason of Montrose’s request in its respondent’s brief. 1991(See National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 524, fn. 12 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 506 ] [a request for sanctions made in a respondent’s brief is “fair warning that such sanctions would be considered by the court”].) First, International has had notice and an opportunity to respond by reason of Montrose’s request in its respondent’s brief. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences1999(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 17 Cal.4th 38, 57, fn. 10 , quoting with approval Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1, 105 .) The Aerojet opinion went on to reiterate the Montrose analysis to the effect that successive insurers on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage first manifests itself are separately and independently obligated to indemnify the insured. 1999(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 17 Cal.4th 38, 57, fn. 10 , quoting with approval Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1, 105 .) The Aerojet opinion went on to reiterate the Montrose analysis to the effect that successive insurers on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage first manifests itself are separately and independently obligated to indemnify the insured. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Connell v. Bowes
green
2 sentences1998(Compare Connell v. Bowes (1942) 19 Cal.2d 870 [ 123 P.2d 456 ] [in an action for specific performance, defendant’s cross-complaint for damages gave rise to a right to a jury trial].) As we explained in 1993, where (as here) a trial court grants a motion for summary adjudication establishing the existence of a duty to defend and orders the immediate payment of defense costs, the carrier must pay as ordered and all issues concerning the carriers’ right to reimbursement of all or some part of the fees and costs thus paid are deferred until such time as that issue is ripe. 1998(Compare Connell v. Bowes (1942) 19 Cal.2d 870 [ 123 P.2d 456 ] [in an action for specific performance, defendant’s cross-complaint for damages gave rise to a right to a jury trial].) As we explained in 1993, where (as here) a trial court grants a motion for summary adjudication establishing the existence of a duty to defend and orders the immediate payment of defense costs, the carrier must pay as ordered and all issues concerning the carriers’ right to reimbursement of all or some part of the fees and costs thus paid are deferred until such time as that issue is ripe. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance
green
1 sentence1996Inherent in Montrose's conclusion that in cases such as the one at bar a “continuing injury” trigger of coverage applies is the principle that damage was occurring throughout the period in question and that all carriers issuing primary policies for dates within that period are fully liable to the insured for the entire loss. 17 Once an injury triggers coverage, according to the language of the policies in the case at bar (and the standard CGL (comprehensive general libility) policy), the insurer must indemnify the insured for “all sums” which the insured becomes obligated to pay, whether durin | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1995The insurers countered that Montrose had failed to establish it was entitled to summary adjudication, and that extrinsic evidence revealed a triable issue of fact regarding whether a potential for coverage existed, undercutting the basis for Montrose's motion. ( Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 293 .) The trial court denied Montrose's motion, concluding it had failed to make a prima facie showing that the CERCLA action created a potential for coverage because the allegations of the third party's complaint, upon which Montrose was relying, were "neutral" regardi 1995(Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 293 .) The trial court denied Montrose’s motion, concluding it had failed to make a prima facie showing that the CERCLA action created a potential for coverage because the allegations of the third party’s complaint, upon which Montrose was relying, were “neutral” regarding whether the alleged contamination was caused by an “occurrence” within the meaning of the policies, or by Montrose’s regular business practices (which the trial court evidently viewed as outside the concept of “occurrence”). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder
green
2 sentences1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra 1993(E.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1127 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] [“It is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.”]; Consolidated Dock & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 949, 952 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 254 ] [“It is immaterial that one of the parties [to a contract] had an undisclosed intention or belief as to what it meant.”].) A corollary to our first reason for rejecting the drafting history argument is that it contra | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.