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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Winslowgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205-1206 .) “An information is admissible to show that a prior conviction is a ‘serious felony.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 689 [in course of Nevada plea, the defendant was asked if he shot the victim with a firearm, to which he responded “guilty”].) A conviction for attempted robbery under California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant specifically intends to take property from a victim by force or fear and committed a direct act toward that goal. 2015(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205-1206 .) “An information is admissible to show that a prior conviction is a ‘serious felony.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 689 [in course of Nevada plea, the defendant was asked if he shot the victim with a firearm, to which he responded “guilty”].) A conviction for attempted robbery under California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant specifically intends to take property from a victim by force or fear and committed a direct act toward that goal. | 2 | 2 |
Lona v. Citibank, N.A.green2 sentences2015They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ].) Federal district courts interpreting this cause of action h 2015They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ].) Federal district courts interpreting this cause of action h | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen2 sentences1990“Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 422-423 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 422 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ]. 1990“Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 422-423 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 422 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Riel
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205-1206 .) “An information is admissible to show that a prior conviction is a ‘serious felony.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 689 [in course of Nevada plea, the defendant was asked if he shot the victim with a firearm, to which he responded “guilty”].) A conviction for attempted robbery under California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant specifically intends to take property from a victim by force or fear and committed a direct act toward that goal. 2015(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205-1206 .) “An information is admissible to show that a prior conviction is a ‘serious felony.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Winslow (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 689 [in course of Nevada plea, the defendant was asked if he shot the victim with a firearm, to which he responded “guilty”].) A conviction for attempted robbery under California law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant specifically intends to take property from a victim by force or fear and committed a direct act toward that goal. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Watkins
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 ; CALCRIM Nos. 460, 1600.) Here, the People adduced official government documents from defendant’s prior Texas conviction for aggravated robbery with a firearm, from which the trial court could reasonably infer defendant had committed an offense, at minimum, attempted robbery, in which defendant personally used a firearm, which qualifies as a prior strike and serious felony conviction under California law. 2015(People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 ; CALCRIM Nos. 460, 1600.) Here, the People adduced official government documents from defendant’s prior Texas conviction for aggravated robbery with a firearm, from which the trial court could reasonably infer defendant had committed an offense, at minimum, attempted robbery, in which defendant personally used a firearm, which qualifies as a prior strike and serious felony conviction under California law. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Coulter v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences1990In Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 534 , 577 P.2d 669 ], the court extended Vesely liability to social hosts, finding that both section 25602 and the common law’s general negligence principles support that extension. 1990In Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 534 , 577 P.2d 669 ], the court extended Vesely liability to social hosts, finding that both section 25602 and the common law’s general negligence principles support that extension. | 2 | 1987–1990 |
Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n
green
2 sentences2015They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ].) Federal district courts interpreting this cause of action h 2015They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 ].) Federal district courts interpreting this cause of action h | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Safe-Lab, Inc. v. Weinberger
green
1 sentence2013For example, in Safe-Lab, Inc. v. Weinberger (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1050 , this court concluded that California courts had specific jurisdiction over a Nevada defendant, Weinberger, who entered into a contract to serve as a marketing representative for a California corporation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club
green
2 sentences1987The court later reached beyond the bounds of former section 25602 in Bernhard v. Hurrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 215 , 546 P.2d 719 ], finding there was no bar to civil liability under “modem negligence law” against a Nevada defendant who commercially provided alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person. 1987The court later reached beyond the bounds of former section 25602 in Bernhard v. Hurrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 215 , 546 P.2d 719 ], finding there was no bar to civil liability under “modem negligence law” against a Nevada defendant who commercially provided alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Harper v. Carpenter
neutral
2 sentences1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. 1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Baxter v. Baxter
green
2 sentences1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. 1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Tripp v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. 1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Ex Parte Weiler
green
2 sentences1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. 1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Schnerr v. Schnerr
green
2 sentences1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. 1940(Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 64 [ 214 Pac. 252 ] ; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal. App. 485 [ 289 Pac. 645 ]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363 [ 17 Pac. (2d) 749 ] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 676 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 536 ] ; Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 751 [ 67 Pac. (2d) 762 ].) In Nevada the decree relative to the payment of alimony was valid without reference to the validity and effect of either or both of the agreements. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.