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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haun v. Hymangreen2 sentences2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. 8 Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. 9 (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] [“a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel ha 2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. 8 Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. 9 (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] [“a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel ha | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Consolidated Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. 8 Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. 9 (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] [“a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel ha 2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. 8 Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. 9 (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] [“a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel ha | 1 | 1 |
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Olikergreen2 sentences2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
Zamos v. Stroudgreen2 sentences2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
Bertero v. National General Corp.green2 sentences2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
Crowley v. Katlemangreen2 sentences2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scrippsgreen2 sentences2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. [8] Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. [9] (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] ["a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppe 2010Co. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 26, 45 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 446 ].) Although Franklin Mint made references to the collateral estoppel effect of the district court rulings, it did not identify the elements of collateral estoppel, let alone attempt to apply the facts of the case to those elements. [8] Indeed, Franklin Mint never attempted in the trial court to submit evidence from the underlying proceedings to prove that the same issues were tried and determined in that action. [9] (See Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 615, 619 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 84 ] ["a party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppe | 1 | 1 |
Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co.green2 sentences2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 2010Probable Cause in a Malicious Prosecution Case (3) To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying action was (1) terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) prosecuted without probable cause, and (3) initiated with malice. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 966, 973 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) A claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may, as in this case, be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. ( Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d | 1 | 1 |
Babcock v. Babcockgreen2 sentences1963(Babcock v. Babcock (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97-98 [ 146 P.2d 279 ].) It is accordingly the rule that the entire proceedings in the first suit may be admitted for the purpose of determining whether the issue in question was in fact, decided by the prior judgment. 1963(Babcock v. Babcock (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97-98 [ 146 P.2d 279 ].) It is accordingly the rule that the entire proceedings in the first suit may be admitted for the purpose of determining whether the issue in question was in fact, decided by the prior judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Burkegreen2 sentences1959(Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388, 394-395 [ 247 P.2d 313 ].) Evidence of an opposing party called under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2055, does not dispel the presumption. 1959(Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388, 394-395 [ 247 P.2d 313 ].) Evidence of an opposing party called under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2055, does not dispel the presumption. | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co.green2 sentences1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. 1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP
green
1 sentence2015(Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313, 332 .) A party relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that a particular issue was actually tried and determined in the prior action. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Boggs v. Merced Mining Co.
green
1 sentence1960(Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 368 ; American Nat. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co.
green
2 sentences1959Co., 212 Cal. 540 [ 299 P. 529 ].) This presumption can be dispelled only by uncontradicted “irreconcilable” evidence produced by the party relying upon the presumption. 1959Co., 212 Cal. 540 [ 299 P. 529 ].) This presumption can be dispelled only by uncontradicted “irreconcilable” evidence produced by the party relying upon the presumption. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.
green
2 sentences1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. 1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Speck v. Sarver
green
2 sentences1957This issue was squarely met and decided in Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal.App.2d 666 [ 295 P.2d 438 ] [Hearing denied] ; and Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], where it was stated that it was error to give such an instruction when the party relying upon the presumption testified at the trial as to the circumstances of the collision and also produced witnesses who gave evidence of his acts and conduct just before and after the time of the collision. 1957This issue was squarely met and decided in Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal.App.2d 666 [ 295 P.2d 438 ] [Hearing denied] ; and Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], where it was stated that it was error to give such an instruction when the party relying upon the presumption testified at the trial as to the circumstances of the collision and also produced witnesses who gave evidence of his acts and conduct just before and after the time of the collision. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Nunnemaker v. Headlee
green
2 sentences1957This issue was squarely met and decided in Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal.App.2d 666 [ 295 P.2d 438 ] [Hearing denied] ; and Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], where it was stated that it was error to give such an instruction when the party relying upon the presumption testified at the trial as to the circumstances of the collision and also produced witnesses who gave evidence of his acts and conduct just before and after the time of the collision. 1957This issue was squarely met and decided in Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal.App.2d 666 [ 295 P.2d 438 ] [Hearing denied] ; and Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], where it was stated that it was error to give such an instruction when the party relying upon the presumption testified at the trial as to the circumstances of the collision and also produced witnesses who gave evidence of his acts and conduct just before and after the time of the collision. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc.
green
2 sentences1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. 1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Rozzen v. Blumenfeld
green
2 sentences1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. 1957(See also Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192 [ 160 P.2d 554 ]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36, 38 [ 297 P. 884 ]; Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 255 P.2d 850 ]; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ]; Stout v. Southern Pac. *495 R. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co.
green
2 sentences1948(Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220 [ 176 P. 42 ] ; Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 294 [ 84 P.2d 204 ].) This defendants did not do. 1948(Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220 [ 176 P. 42 ] ; Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 294 [ 84 P.2d 204 ].) This defendants did not do. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Wienke v. Smith
green
2 sentences1948(Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220 [ 176 P. 42 ] ; Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 294 [ 84 P.2d 204 ].) This defendants did not do. 1948(Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220 [ 176 P. 42 ] ; Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 294 [ 84 P.2d 204 ].) This defendants did not do. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Green v. Soule
green
2 sentences1931(Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565 ; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173 [ 38 Pac. 715 ]; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96 -103 [ 78 Pac. 337 ].) While it is true that appellant may be entitled to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, if the evidence supports the finding of an injury received arising out of the employment, this however, is not a conclusive presumption but disappears when contradicted or controverted by the evidence of the party relying upon the presumption if the circumstances are such as to afford no indication that the testimony was the product of mistake or inadvertenc 1931(Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565 ; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173 [ 38 Pac. 715 ]; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96 -103 [ 78 Pac. 337 ].) While it is true that appellant may be entitled to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, if the evidence supports the finding of an injury received arising out of the employment, this however, is not a conclusive presumption but disappears when contradicted or controverted by the evidence of the party relying upon the presumption if the circumstances are such as to afford no indication that the testimony was the product of mistake or inadvertenc | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Dickey v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence1931(Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565 ; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173 [ 38 Pac. 715 ]; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96 -103 [ 78 Pac. 337 ].) While it is true that appellant may be entitled to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, if the evidence supports the finding of an injury received arising out of the employment, this however, is not a conclusive presumption but disappears when contradicted or controverted by the evidence of the party relying upon the presumption if the circumstances are such as to afford no indication that the testimony was the product of mistake or inadvertenc | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Bates v. Howard
green
2 sentences1931(Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565 ; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173 [ 38 Pac. 715 ]; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96 -103 [ 78 Pac. 337 ].) While it is true that appellant may be entitled to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, if the evidence supports the finding of an injury received arising out of the employment, this however, is not a conclusive presumption but disappears when contradicted or controverted by the evidence of the party relying upon the presumption if the circumstances are such as to afford no indication that the testimony was the product of mistake or inadvertenc 1931(Dickey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565 ; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173 [ 38 Pac. 715 ]; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96 -103 [ 78 Pac. 337 ].) While it is true that appellant may be entitled to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, if the evidence supports the finding of an injury received arising out of the employment, this however, is not a conclusive presumption but disappears when contradicted or controverted by the evidence of the party relying upon the presumption if the circumstances are such as to afford no indication that the testimony was the product of mistake or inadvertenc | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.