permission requirement in California

8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultantsgreen calctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 2 sentences 2024(See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409, fn. 14 [separate statement rule “does not limit a trial 6 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 23 court’s discretion to compel further answers notwithstanding the absence of a separate statement”].) The contention is rejected. 4. 2024(See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409, fn. 14 [separate statement rule “does not limit a trial 6 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 23 court’s discretion to compel further answers notwithstanding the absence of a separate statement”].) The contention is rejected. 4.	2	2
Raul Gonzales v. The City of Peoriagreen ca9 · 1983 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	2	2
People v. Arcigagreen calctapp · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	2	2
Gates v. Superior Courtgreen calctapp · 1987 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	1	2
De Canas v. Bicared scotus · 1976 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	1	2
Chiesur v. Superior Courtgreen calctapp · 1946 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989(Chiesur v. Superior Court (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 198, 202-203 [ 172 P.2d 763 ].) Since the underlying purpose of the rule is simply to accommodate all claims, if possible, in the receivership action under the supervision of the appointing court, it follows that the permission requirement is not a jurisdictional one, and the leading California case has so held. 1989(Chiesur v. Superior Court (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 198, 202-203 [ 172 P.2d 763 ].) Since the underlying purpose of the rule is simply to accommodate all claims, if possible, in the receivership action under the supervision of the appointing court, it follows that the permission requirement is not a jurisdictional one, and the leading California case has so held.	1	1
Copeland v. Salomongreen ny · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989(Ostrowski v. Miller, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 82 ; see also Copeland v. Salomon (1982) 56 N.Y.2d 222 [ 451 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 , 436 N.E.2d 1284 ].) “[F]ailure to obtain leave to sue ‘is not jurisdictional, and failure to obtain is an irregularity which may be cured at any stage of the proceedings. . . . 1989(Ostrowski v. Miller, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 82 ; see also Copeland v. Salomon (1982) 56 N.Y.2d 222 [ 451 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 , 436 N.E.2d 1284 ].) “[F]ailure to obtain leave to sue ‘is not jurisdictional, and failure to obtain is an irregularity which may be cured at any stage of the proceedings. . . .	1	1
Miller v. Superior Courtgreen calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 455; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-514 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Miller v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 393 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 589 ] [psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evid. 1983Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 455; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-514 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Miller v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 393 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 589 ] [psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evid.	1	1
People v. Linesgreen cal · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 455; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-514 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Miller v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 393 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 589 ] [psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evid. 1983Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 455; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 511-514 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Miller v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 390, 393 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 589 ] [psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evid.	1	1
Rosenblatt v. California State Board of Pharmacygreen calctapp · 1945 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983Bd. of Pharmacy (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 69, 74 [ 158 P.2d 199 ] which stated that, “A license has none of the elements of a contract and does not confer an absolute right but a personal privilege . . . .” (Ibid.) There is a clear distinction between a license and a contract, although respondent City correctly states the frequent misuse of words such as “license,” “permit,” and “franchise.” Nevertheless, a license, defined “as a permission or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful . . .,” is most typically “. . . employed to designate official municipal authorization of a continuing busi 1983Bd. of Pharmacy (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 69, 74 [ 158 P.2d 199 ] which stated that, “A license has none of the elements of a contract and does not confer an absolute right but a personal privilege . . . .” (Ibid.) There is a clear distinction between a license and a contract, although respondent City correctly states the frequent misuse of words such as “license,” “permit,” and “franchise.” Nevertheless, a license, defined “as a permission or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful . . .,” is most typically “. . . employed to designate official municipal authorization of a continuing busi	1	1
San Francisco Unified School District v. Superior Courtgreen cal · 1961 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983Dist. v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 451, 454-455 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 373 , 359 P.2d 925 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1156 ]; Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co., supra, 35 Cal.App. at p. 757 [“ ‘[I]n actions for personal injury the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and justice.’ (4 Wigmore, sec. 2389, p. 3359)].”) It has been expressly held that “[t]he patient-litigant exception applies only to the physician-patient privilege . . . and there is no corresponding client-litigant exception . . . .” (City & County of S. F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 238 ; accord S. F. Unif 1983Dist. v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 451, 454-455 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 373 , 359 P.2d 925 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1156 ]; Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co., supra, 35 Cal.App. at p. 757 [“ ‘[I]n actions for personal injury the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and justice.’ (4 Wigmore, sec. 2389, p. 3359)].”) It has been expressly held that “[t]he patient-litigant exception applies only to the physician-patient privilege . . . and there is no corresponding client-litigant exception . . . .” (City & County of S. F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 238 ; accord S. F. Unif	1	1
Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co.green · 1917 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983Dist. v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 451, 454-455 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 373 , 359 P.2d 925 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1156 ]; Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co., supra, 35 Cal.App. at p. 757 [“ ‘[I]n actions for personal injury the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and justice.’ (4 Wigmore, sec. 2389, p. 3359)].”) It has been expressly held that “[t]he patient-litigant exception applies only to the physician-patient privilege . . . and there is no corresponding client-litigant exception . . . .” (City & County of S. F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 238 ; accord S. F. Unif	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Hernandez v. State green texcrimapp · 1981 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997(DeCanas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 354-357 [47 L.Ed.2d at pp. 48-50]; In re Manuel P., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 61-63; Hernandez v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) 613 S.W.2d 287, 290 .) Indeed, `"[t]he Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the Untied States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.	2	1997–1997
People v. Manuel P. green calctapp · 1989 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	2	1997–1997
People v. Adolfo M. green calctapp · 1990 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	2	1997–1997
Lopez v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service green ca10 · 1985 2 sentences 1997In re Adolfo M . (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738 , and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." ( Id ., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is 1997In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225 , a juvenile court determined that a minor was a legal resident of Mexico, ordered him to be transferred to Mexican juvenile authorities under the terms of section 738, and prohibited his return to the United States without "written permission from the juvenile court." (Id., at p. 1227.) The Court of Appeal found unconstitutional the court permission requirement for reentry into the United States: "Regarding the juvenile court order Adolfo not return to the United States without . . . the court's permission, the `[p]ower to regulate immigration is unq	2	1997–1997
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission green scotus · 1948 2 sentences 1997Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.'" ( Toll v. Moreno (1982) 458 U.S. 1 , 11 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 563 , 572 , 102 S.Ct. 2977 ], quoting Takahashi v. Fish Game Comm'n (1948) 334 U.S. 410 , 419 [ 92 L.Ed. 1478 , 1487 , 68 S.Ct. 1138 ].) ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . [A] state court may not condition reentry into the United Sta 1997Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.'" ( Toll v. Moreno (1982) 458 U.S. 1 , 11 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 563 , 572 , 102 S.Ct. 2977 ], quoting Takahashi v. Fish Game Comm'n (1948) 334 U.S. 410 , 419 [ 92 L.Ed. 1478 , 1487 , 68 S.Ct. 1138 ].) ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . [A] state court may not condition reentry into the United Sta	1	1997–1997
Toll v. Moreno green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 1997Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.'" ( Toll v. Moreno (1982) 458 U.S. 1 , 11 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 563 , 572 , 102 S.Ct. 2977 ], quoting Takahashi v. Fish Game Comm'n (1948) 334 U.S. 410 , 419 [ 92 L.Ed. 1478 , 1487 , 68 S.Ct. 1138 ].) ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . [A] state court may not condition reentry into the United Sta 1997Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.'" ( Toll v. Moreno (1982) 458 U.S. 1 , 11 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 563 , 572 , 102 S.Ct. 2977 ], quoting Takahashi v. Fish Game Comm'n (1948) 334 U.S. 410 , 419 [ 92 L.Ed. 1478 , 1487 , 68 S.Ct. 1138 ].) ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . [A] state court may not condition reentry into the United Sta	1	1997–1997
Ostrowski v. Miller green calctapp · 1964 1 sentence 1989(Ostrowski v. Miller, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 82 ; see also Copeland v. Salomon (1982) 56 N.Y.2d 222 [ 451 N.Y.S.2d 682, 685 , 436 N.E.2d 1284 ].) “[F]ailure to obtain leave to sue ‘is not jurisdictional, and failure to obtain is an irregularity which may be cured at any stage of the proceedings. . . .	1	1989–1989
City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court green cal · 1951 1 sentence 1983Dist. v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 451, 454-455 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 373 , 359 P.2d 925 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1156 ]; Moreno v. New Guadalupe Mining Co., supra, 35 Cal.App. at p. 757 [“ ‘[I]n actions for personal injury the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and justice.’ (4 Wigmore, sec. 2389, p. 3359)].”) It has been expressly held that “[t]he patient-litigant exception applies only to the physician-patient privilege . . . and there is no corresponding client-litigant exception . . . .” (City & County of S. F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 238 ; accord S. F. Unif	1	1983–1983
Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance green nj · 1960 1 sentence 1976Co., supra, 166 A.2d 345 ], we adopted the initial permission rule.	1	1976–1976
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Travelers Insurance green nj · 1970 2 sentences 1976Co. (1970) 57 N.J. 174 [ 270 A.2d 625, 627 ].) Explaining the “initial permission” rule, the court in Konrad stated: “When the named insured has initially once given permission to another person to use his motor vehicle but that person deviates from the permission granted, Illinois follows the so-called initial permission rule to the effect that the user need only to have received permission to take the vehicle in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is with ‘permission’, under the omnibus clause, though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the named 1976Co. (1970) 57 N.J. 174 [ 270 A.2d 625, 627 ].) Explaining the “initial permission” rule, the court in Konrad stated: “When the named insured has initially once given permission to another person to use his motor vehicle but that person deviates from the permission granted, Illinois follows the so-called initial permission rule to the effect that the user need only to have received permission to take the vehicle in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is with ‘permission’, under the omnibus clause, though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the named	1	1976–1976
Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. green illappct · 1956 1 sentence 1976Co. (1970) 57 N.J. 174 [ 270 A.2d 625, 627 ].) Explaining the “initial permission” rule, the court in Konrad stated: “When the named insured has initially once given permission to another person to use his motor vehicle but that person deviates from the permission granted, Illinois follows the so-called initial permission rule to the effect that the user need only to have received permission to take the vehicle in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is with ‘permission’, under the omnibus clause, though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the named	1	1976–1976
Baesler v. Globe Indemnity Co. green nj · 1960 2 sentences 1976It was our view that the minor deviation and conversion rules, which made coverage turn on the scope of permission given in the first instance, rendered coverage uncertain, fostered unnecessary litigation, and did not comport with New Jersey’s legislative policy of assuring an available fund for the innocent victims of automobile accidents. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, we held that if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of an unlawful taking while it remains in his possession, is a permissive use within the standard omnibus c 1976It was our view that the minor deviation and conversion rules, which made coverage turn on the scope of permission given in the first instance, rendered coverage uncertain, fostered unnecessary litigation, and did not comport with New Jersey’s legislative policy of assuring an available fund for the innocent victims of automobile accidents. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, we held that if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of an unlawful taking while it remains in his possession, is a permissive use within the standard omnibus c	1	1976–1976

Where else courts name it

NJ 21 (1960–2019) IL 19 (1915–2023) NY 16 (1916–2025) LA 11 (1939–2000) CA 8 (1976–2024) OH 6 (1986–2007) MO 6 (1970–2003) WI 5 (1961–2010) MN 5 (1983–2003) CO 5 (1995–1999) MS 4 (1968–1999) NE 4 (1971–2001) TX 4 (2003–2021) MT 2 (1987–2008) MI 2 (1910–2023) MD 2 (1991–2004) VT 2 (1964–2000) CT 2 (2000–2024) WA 2 (2008–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check