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19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2023App. 2d 503 , 514- 15, 137 N.E.2d 855, 861 (1956)). ¶ 75 The parties disagree, however, on the application of the initial permission doctrine to this case. 2023The Illinois Supreme Court expounded on the initial permission rule and wrote the following: “ ‘When the named insured has initially once given permission to another person to use his motor vehicle but that person deviates from the permission granted, Illinois follows the so-called initial permission rule to the effect that the user need only to have received permission to take the vehicle in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is with ‘permission’, under the omnibus clause, though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the named insured when he parted | 3 | 7 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2006According to Maryland Casualty, the initial permission rule is " 'based on the theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benefit of the public as for the insured, and that it is undesirable to permit litigation as to the details of the permission and use.' " Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 342 , quoting Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 11 Ill. 2006According to Maryland Casualty, the initial permission rule is “ ‘based on the theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benefit of the public as for the insured, and that it is undesirable to permit litigation as to the details of the permission and use.’ ” Maryland Casualty, 54 Ill. 2d at 342 , quoting Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 11 Ill. | 2 | 7 |
Western States Mutual Insurance v. Verucchigreen2 sentences1990In Western States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Verucchi (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 527 , 363 N.E.2d 826 , the court defined a conversion as “ ‘[a]ny unauthorized act by which an owner is deprived of his property permanently or indefinitely, or the exercise of dominion over property inconsistent with the rights of the owner.’ ” ( 66 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting Knight v. Seney (1919), 290 Ill. 11, 15 , 124 N.E. 813 .) In cases involving the initial permission rule, a tortious conversion occurs where there is a substantial interference with or deprivation of an owner’s rights in his automobile. 1990In Western States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Verucchi (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 527 , 363 N.E.2d 826 , the court defined a conversion as “ ‘[a]ny unauthorized act by which an owner is deprived of his property permanently or indefinitely, or the exercise of dominion over property inconsistent with the rights of the owner.’ ” ( 66 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting Knight v. Seney (1919), 290 Ill. 11, 15 , 124 N.E. 813 .) In cases involving the initial permission rule, a tortious conversion occurs where there is a substantial interference with or deprivation of an owner’s rights in his automobile. | 2 | 4 |
Founders Insurance Company v. American Country Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2023(We note that “[u]nder the initial permission rule *** once the named insured of an automobile insurance policy has given permission to another to use the car, any subsequent driver is covered as long as that driver did not engage in theft or tortious conversion to gain access to the car.” Founders Insurance Co. v. American Country Insurance Co., 366 Ill. 2023App. 3d 64, 71 , 851 N.E.2d 120, 126 (2006).) ¶ 31 Ameren also argued that Capp’s rejection of coverage did not void Ameren’s right to seek the proceeds of the policy because (1) Illinois law makes the general public the beneficiaries of liability policies and (2) those rights vest at the time of the occurrence giving rise to injuries. ¶ 32 Ameren attached as exhibits to its response (1) the complaint, (2) Pekin insurance policy No. 00P671154, (3) the order granting Ameren’s motion for summary judgment, (4) the subpoena for deposition of corporate representative, (5) Toft’s answer to the compl | 1 | 1 |
Landfield Finance Co. v. Feinermangreen1 sentence1989See Landfield Finance Co. v. Feinerman (1972), 3 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green1 sentence1987(Western States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Verucchi (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 527, 531 , 363 N.E.2d 826 ; see also Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Minn. 1983), 332 N.W.2d 160 .) The present record indicates that, at the very least, George Gayer had implied permission from his wife to drive the Honda. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Country Insurance v. Wilcoxon
green
2 sentences2006Wilcoxon II, 127 Ill. 2d at 236 , quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 54 Ill. 2d 333, 342 (1973). 1989(Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 239 .) Checker argues that the initial permission doctrine does not apply to the record here. | 5 | 1989–2006 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McManus
green
2 sentences1989In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mc-Manus (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 239 , this court expanded the coverage of the initial permission rule by holding that when the owner’s policy contains an omnibus clause extending coverage to any person using the car with the permission of the insured, and the insured had given a person permission to use the car, “a further grant of permission from the initial permittee need not be shown in order to invoke the coverage.” (McManus, 64 Ill. 2d at 243 .) The court noted that, as suggested in Maryland Casualty, the initial permission rule does not extend cove 1989In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mc-Manus (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 239 , this court expanded the coverage of the initial permission rule by holding that when the owner’s policy contains an omnibus clause extending coverage to any person using the car with the permission of the insured, and the insured had given a person permission to use the car, “a further grant of permission from the initial permittee need not be shown in order to invoke the coverage.” (McManus, 64 Ill. 2d at 243 .) The court noted that, as suggested in Maryland Casualty, the initial permission rule does not extend cove | 4 | 1977–1990 |
Woodall v. Booras
green
2 sentences2023We conclude that the instant case is most similar to Woodall v. Booras, 182 Ill. 1990Verucchi, 66 Ill. 2d at 532 ; Woodall v. Booras (1989), 182 Ill. | 2 | 1990–2023 |
Progressive Universal Insurance v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Therefore, the contract did not conflict with the statutory codification of the initial permission rule and "cannot be said 17 1-05-1869 to be void as against public policy." Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 134 . 2006Therefore, the contract did not conflict with the statutory codification of the initial permission rule and “cannot be said to be void as against public policy.” Progressive Universal, 215 Ill. 2d at 134 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Universal Underwriters Group
green
2 sentences2002The initial permission rule provides that once the named insured of an insurance policy containing an omnibus clause (an omnibus clause extends liability coverage to persons who use the named insured’s vehicle with the insured’s permission (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240 , 695 N.E.2d 848 (1998)) has given permission to another to use the car, any person subsequently given permission to drive the car by that first permittee is covered under the policy. 2002The initial permission rule provides that once the named insured of an insurance policy containing an omnibus clause (an omnibus clause extends liability coverage to persons who use the named insured’s vehicle with the insured’s permission (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240 , 695 N.E.2d 848 (1998)) has given permission to another to use the car, any person subsequently given permission to drive the car by that first permittee is covered under the policy. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1990The initial permission rule provides that “ ‘once the initial permission has been given by the named insured, coverage is fixed, barring theft or the like.’ ” (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 333, 341 , 297 N.E.2d 163 , quoting Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1970), 55 N.J. 542, 549-50 , 264 A.2d 38, 42 .) Once the named insured of a policy, which contains an omnibus clause that extends liability coverage to those driving the covered automobile with the insured’s consent, gives such consent to another, any third person allowed to dr 1990The initial permission rule provides that “ ‘once the initial permission has been given by the named insured, coverage is fixed, barring theft or the like.’ ” (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 333, 341 , 297 N.E.2d 163 , quoting Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1970), 55 N.J. 542, 549-50 , 264 A.2d 38, 42 .) Once the named insured of a policy, which contains an omnibus clause that extends liability coverage to those driving the covered automobile with the insured’s consent, gives such consent to another, any third person allowed to dr | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Knight v. Seney
neutral
2 sentences1990In Western States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Verucchi (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 527 , 363 N.E.2d 826 , the court defined a conversion as “ ‘[a]ny unauthorized act by which an owner is deprived of his property permanently or indefinitely, or the exercise of dominion over property inconsistent with the rights of the owner.’ ” ( 66 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting Knight v. Seney (1919), 290 Ill. 11, 15 , 124 N.E. 813 .) In cases involving the initial permission rule, a tortious conversion occurs where there is a substantial interference with or deprivation of an owner’s rights in his automobile. 1990In Western States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Verucchi (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 527 , 363 N.E.2d 826 , the court defined a conversion as “ ‘[a]ny unauthorized act by which an owner is deprived of his property permanently or indefinitely, or the exercise of dominion over property inconsistent with the rights of the owner.’ ” ( 66 Ill. 2d at 531 , quoting Knight v. Seney (1919), 290 Ill. 11, 15 , 124 N.E. 813 .) In cases involving the initial permission rule, a tortious conversion occurs where there is a substantial interference with or deprivation of an owner’s rights in his automobile. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In Re Marriage of Freeman
green
1 sentence1989The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. ( County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143, 151 ; In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill.2d 290, 297 ; City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 340-41 .) Courts should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. ( County of Du Page, 109 Ill.2d at 151 ; People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill.2d 138, 141 .) We believe that the plain language of the statute mandates omnibus | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Boykin
green
1 sentence1989The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. ( County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143, 151 ; In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill.2d 290, 297 ; City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 340-41 .) Courts should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. ( County of Du Page, 109 Ill.2d at 151 ; People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill.2d 138, 141 .) We believe that the plain language of the statute mandates omnibus | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners of Springfield
green
1 sentence1989The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. ( County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143, 151 ; In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill.2d 290, 297 ; City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 340-41 .) Courts should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. ( County of Du Page, 109 Ill.2d at 151 ; People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill.2d 138, 141 .) We believe that the plain language of the statute mandates omnibus | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kozak v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argues that section 8-104 must be interpreted in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language ( County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143 ), and asserts that the appellate court may not rewrite a statute to *238 make it conform to the court's idea of public policy ( Kozak v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill.2d 211 ). 1989Plaintiff argues that section 8 — 104 must be interpreted in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143 ), and asserts that the appellate court may not rewrite a statute to make it conform to the court’s idea of public policy (Kozak v. Retirement Board of Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiff argues that section 8-104 must be interpreted in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language ( County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 143 ), and asserts that the appellate court may not rewrite a statute to *238 make it conform to the court's idea of public policy ( Kozak v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill.2d 211 ). 1989Plaintiff argues that section 8 — 104 must be interpreted in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143 ), and asserts that the appellate court may not rewrite a statute to make it conform to the court’s idea of public policy (Kozak v. Retirement Board of Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
American Country Insurance v. Wilcoxon
green
2 sentences1989The court found that the initial permission doctrine applied, notwithstanding the lease provision forbidding White to allow anyone else to operate the cab, because the "protection of the public under financial responsibility statutes transcends the private agreement between the parties, where the agreement runs counter to sound public policy." ( 159 Ill. 1989The court found that the initial permission doctrine applied, notwithstanding the lease provision forbidding White to allow anyone else to operate the cab, because the “protection of the public under financial responsibility statutes transcends the private agreement between the parties, where the agreement runs counter to sound public policy.” ( 159 Ill. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wilkie v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence1915Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444 ; Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 246 Ill. 20 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence1915Wilkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444 ; Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 246 Ill. 20 . | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.