Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 New York opinions name it 9 courts 1916–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstielgreen2 sentences2025"Dismissal under CPLR 321 l(a)(7) is warranted only if [Petitioner] "fails to assert facts in suppo11 of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" " (Audthan LLC v Nick & Duke, LLC, 42 NY3d 292 , 303 [2024] [quoting Connaughton supra]). "[A] licensee is one who enters upon or occupies lands by permission, express or implied, of the owner, or under a personal, revocable non-assignable privilege from the owner, without possessing any interest in the property and who becomes a trespasser thereon u 2024However, caselaw defines a licensee as "one who enters upon or occupies lands by permission, express or implied, of the owner, or under a personal, revocable, non-assignable privilege from the owner, without possessing any interest in the property, and who becomes a trespasser thereon upon revocation of the permission or privilege." Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel , 20 AD2d 71, 76 (1st Dept. 1963). | 5 | 8 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024Williams v. Williams , 13 Misc 3d 395, 397 (Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Haberman v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2011Further, plaintiffs’ claim that certain other default notices were based on mere “technical” violations is also unsupported as “[t]he violation of an express covenant not to make any alterations without the landlord’s permission is a violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy” (Haberman v Hawkins, 170 AD2d 377, 377-378 [1991] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Freehold Investments v. Richstonegreen1 sentence1991(Rumiche Corp. v Eisenreich, 40 NY2d 174, 178 [1976]; Freehold Invs. v Richstone, 34 NY2d 612 [1974], reinstating 72 Misc 2d 624, 625-626 [App Term, 1st Dept 1973].) Nevertheless, we find that the tenant presented sufficient evidence to support the affirmative defense of estoppel and waiver based upon the landlord’s having given his prior consent to the replacement of the windows. | 1 | 1 |
Rumiche Corp. v. Eisenreichgreen1 sentence1991(Rumiche Corp. v Eisenreich, 40 NY2d 174, 178 [1976]; Freehold Invs. v Richstone, 34 NY2d 612 [1974], reinstating 72 Misc 2d 624, 625-626 [App Term, 1st Dept 1973].) Nevertheless, we find that the tenant presented sufficient evidence to support the affirmative defense of estoppel and waiver based upon the landlord’s having given his prior consent to the replacement of the windows. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City Enterprises, Ltd. v. Posemsky
green
2 sentences2024"A licensee has been defined as a person to whom an owner has granted a mere right to occupancy." City Enterprises, LTD. v. Posemsky , 184 Misc 2d 287 (2nd Dept. 2000). 2024"A licensee has been defined as a person to whom an owner has granted a mere right to occupancy." City Enterprises, LTD. v. Posemsky , 184 Misc 2d 287 (2nd Dept. 2000). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Mumford v. Whitney
green
2 sentences2013(See Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380, 393 ; Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. 1963(See Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380, 393 ; Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. | 2 | 1963–2013 |
City of New York v. . Rice
green
2 sentences1917Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 . 1916(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 .) This right exists as to the owner of the land contiguous to the land of the street, irrespective of the ownership of the fee of the latter, because it is an element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the street. | 2 | 1916–1917 |
Jorgensen v. . Squires
green
2 sentences1917Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 . 1916(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 .) This right exists as to the owner of the land contiguous to the land of the street, irrespective of the ownership of the fee of the latter, because it is an element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the street. | 2 | 1916–1917 |
Deshong v. . City of New York
green
2 sentences1917Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 . 1916(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 .) This right exists as to the owner of the land contiguous to the land of the street, irrespective of the ownership of the fee of the latter, because it is an element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the street. | 2 | 1916–1917 |
City of Buffalo v. . Stevenson
green
2 sentences1917Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 . 1916(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 .) This right exists as to the owner of the land contiguous to the land of the street, irrespective of the ownership of the fee of the latter, because it is an element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the street. | 2 | 1916–1917 |
Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York
green
2 sentences1917Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 . 1916(Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280 ; City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258 ; Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475 ; Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34 ; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124 .) This right exists as to the owner of the land contiguous to the land of the street, irrespective of the ownership of the fee of the latter, because it is an element in the authorized regulation and supervision of the street. | 2 | 1916–1917 |
Tabares v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Sys., 197 AD2d 571 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Headley v. Tessler
green
1 sentence2001There is a presumption that the vehicle is operated with the owner’s permission and this presumption continues unless and until there is “substantial evidence” to the contrary (Headley v Tessler, 267 AD2d 428 ; Tabares v Colin Serv. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Freehold Investments v. Richstone
green
1 sentence1991(Rumiche Corp. v Eisenreich, 40 NY2d 174, 178 [1976]; Freehold Invs. v Richstone, 34 NY2d 612 [1974], reinstating 72 Misc 2d 624, 625-626 [App Term, 1st Dept 1973].) Nevertheless, we find that the tenant presented sufficient evidence to support the affirmative defense of estoppel and waiver based upon the landlord’s having given his prior consent to the replacement of the windows. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kaswan v. Aponte
neutral
1 sentence1990(Rosenstiel v Rosenstiel, 20 AD2d 71, 76 .) Kaswan v Aponte ( 160 AD2d 324 ), brought to the court’s attention by the respondent, has no application to the present case. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.