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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Quernergreen1 sentence2015(See Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Querner (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 190, 193 (Pacific) [“a collision between a moving automobile and . . . one momentarily at a standstill, calls for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor”].) However, application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor merely provides the same inference of negligence discussed in the case law. | 1 | 1 |
Beck v. Kesslergreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., Beck v. Kessler, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 337 [“where the rear car has collided with a stopped or stationary vehicle, the courts have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and have held that an inference arises that the collision was caused by some negligent conduct on the part of the driver of the rear car”].) 11 from the rear-end collision was rebutted by respondent’s testimony, which was based on his observations and constituted substantial evidence. 2015(See, e.g., Beck v. Kessler, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 337 [“where the rear car has collided with a stopped or stationary vehicle, the courts have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and have held that an inference arises that the collision was caused by some negligent conduct on the part of the driver of the rear car”].) 11 from the rear-end collision was rebutted by respondent’s testimony, which was based on his observations and constituted substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Ybarra v. Spangardgreen1 sentence2003Code, § 646, subd. (b).)” (Ibid.; see Ybarra v. Spangard, supra, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 , quoting Prosser on Torts.) Thus, though the plaintiff has no access to the information concerning the cause of his or her injury other than through judicial discovery, the res ipsa loquitor doctrine provides a presumption of negligence, but the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial. | 1 | 1 |
Kilgore v. Browngreen2 sentences2003(See Kilgore v. Brown (1928) 90 Cal.App. 555, 558 [ 266 P. 297 ].) Courts have refused to shift the burden of proof in other cases where plaintiffs lacked access to information, even though the information was more readily available to the defendant. 2003(See Kilgore v. Brown (1928) 90 Cal.App. 555, 558 [ 266 P. 297 ].) Courts have refused to shift the burden of proof in other cases where plaintiffs lacked access to information, even though the information was more readily available to the defendant. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Poway Unified School District
green
2 sentences2024(Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 827 .) Doe seems to recognize this, by speculating that the sencils could have been implanted intentionally by someone using other technology that was generally known to exist (i.e., the CIA’s undetectable darts). 2021Under this doctrine, “certain kinds of accidents are so likely to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence that one may fairly say ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ ” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 825 .) “In California, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is defined by statute as ‘a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.’ [Citation.] The presumption arises when the evidence satisfies three conditions: ‘ “(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the 3 absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency o | 2 | 2021–2024 |
Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp.
green
1 sentence2025We agree. “ ‘Whenever the plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the plaintiff and that the breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 .) “A narrow exception to this rule exists where ‘ “ ‘the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] This exception is, however, a limited one. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Frantz v. San Luis Medical Clinic
green
1 sentence2022Nevertheless, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Barbers have established these elements and the res ipsa loquitor doctrine applies, “the res ipsa loquitur presumption disappears” when, as here, “the defendant produces evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that . . . any negligence on [the defendant’s] part was not a proximate cause of plaintiff ’ s injury.” (Frantz v. San Luis Medical Clinic (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 34, 44 .) SCE offered precisely such evidence in moving for summary judgment, as set forth above. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hardin v. San Jose City Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013We agreed, holding that, under long-standing Supreme Court authority (see Hardin v. San Jose City Lines, Inc. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 432 ), when a passenger on a common carrier, through no fault of his or her own, is injured in connection with the operation of the carrier‟s vehicle, the plaintiff is entitled to a res ipsa loquitor instruction that creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence and initially shifts the burden to the common carrier to demonstrate the absence of negligence. 2013We agreed, holding that, under long-standing Supreme Court authority (see Hardin v. San Jose City Lines, Inc. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 432 ), when a passenger on a common carrier, through no fault of his or her own, is injured in connection with the operation of the carrier‟s vehicle, the plaintiff is entitled to a res ipsa loquitor instruction that creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence and initially shifts the burden to the common carrier to demonstrate the absence of negligence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center
green
1 sentence2013In professional negligence cases, the Supreme Court has articulated a “common knowledge exception” to the expert testimony requirement. “ ‘ “The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony [citations], unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] The ‘common knowledge’ exception is principally limited to situations in which the p | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.