rightful fee claim in California

2026In Serrano, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 632 , the court stated, “The private-attorney-general theory rests on the policy of encouraging private actions to vindicate important rights affecting the public interest, without regard to material gain. [Citation.] A central function is ‘to call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law . . . .’ [Citation.] Implicit is the recognition that ‘without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce . . . important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’ [Citation.] [¶]

2021In Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621 , the California Supreme Court held that the private attorney general doctrine “will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.

2021The rule . . . is that, absent facts rendering the award unjust, parties who qualify for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent, including those on fee-related matters.” (Id. at pp. 632-633, fn. omitted; see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580 .) The court in Serrano observed that, “[i]n cases where entitlement is vigorously contested . . . the hours demanded could dwarf those spent to establish the claim on the merits.” (Serrano, at pp. 634-635, fn. omitted.) Early complains that Becerra’s attorneys spent 39 hours on the fee motion versus 120 hours on

2005If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.'" ( Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 , 17 P.3d 735 .) Turning to the question of compensation for fee-related litigation, we first note it is well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may recover attorney fees for fee-related matters. ( Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633, 639, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754 , 652 P.2d 985 .) As we stated: "the [private attorney general] doctrine will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by length

2005(Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633, 639.) As we stated: “the [private attorney general] doctrine will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.” (Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 632; see also Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141 .) While DaimlerChrysler does not dispute that fees for fee-related litigation may be awarded, it asks this court to hold that there should be no multiplier for fees on fees.

2001(Id. at p. 639, fn. 28.) Subsequently, in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 ], we underscored the importance of the “proper determination and use of the lodestar figure” in calculating awards of statutory attorney fees.

2001(Id. at p. 639, fn. 28.) Subsequently, in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 ], we underscored the importance of the “proper determination and use of the lodestar figure” in calculating awards of statutory attorney fees.

1982(Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 44 ; Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) A central function is “to call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law . . . .” (Alyeska, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 267 [ 44 L.Ed.2d at p. 159 ].) 13 Implicit is the recognition that “without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce . . . important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.” (Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) Thus the doctrine will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards ar

1982(Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 44 ; Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) A central function is “to call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law . . . .” (Alyeska, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 267 [ 44 L.Ed.2d at p. 159 ].) 13 Implicit is the recognition that “without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce . . . important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.” (Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) Thus the doctrine will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards ar