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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 1988–1991 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ghentgreen2 sentences1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the "presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly." ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) (44) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant's prejudice, the assertedly "inapplicable" statutory factors because he used a chalkboard to outline each factor and essentially "checked off, 1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the “presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly.” ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant’s prejudice, the assertedly “inapplicable” statutory factors because he used a chálkboard to outline each factor and essentially “checked off,” und | 1 | 2 |
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVred2 sentences1991(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159-1160 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 50 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 114 , 801 P.2d 357 ]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1390-1391.) Section 190.3 contains a statutory list of factors relevant to the penalty decision in a capital case. 1991(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159-1160 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 50 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 114 , 801 P.2d 357 ]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1390-1391.) Section 190.3 contains a statutory list of factors relevant to the penalty decision in a capital case. | 1 | 1 |
Peralta Community College District v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences1991(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159-1160 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 50 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 114 , 801 P.2d 357 ]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1390-1391.) Section 190.3 contains a statutory list of factors relevant to the penalty decision in a capital case. 1991(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159-1160 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 50 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 114 , 801 P.2d 357 ]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1390-1391.) Section 190.3 contains a statutory list of factors relevant to the penalty decision in a capital case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1989As we explained in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ], “the purpose of ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ factors is to assess the seriousness of a capital crime in relation to others of the same general character. 1989As we explained in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ], “the purpose of ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ factors is to assess the seriousness of a capital crime in relation to others of the same general character. | 1 | 1 |
Furman v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1989This statutory list of factors serves a constitutionally imposed function, that of establishing “a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” (Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ], quoting Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 313 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 ] (White, J., cone.).) To treat absence of a factor which is virtually never present as grounds for imposing the death penalty would defeat that function. 1989This statutory list of factors serves a constitutionally imposed function, that of establishing “a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” (Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ], quoting Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 313 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 ] (White, J., cone.).) To treat absence of a factor which is virtually never present as grounds for imposing the death penalty would defeat that function. | 1 | 1 |
Godfrey v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1989This statutory list of factors serves a constitutionally imposed function, that of establishing “a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” (Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ], quoting Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 313 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 ] (White, J., cone.).) To treat absence of a factor which is virtually never present as grounds for imposing the death penalty would defeat that function. 1989This statutory list of factors serves a constitutionally imposed function, that of establishing “a ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” (Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ], quoting Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 313 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 ] (White, J., cone.).) To treat absence of a factor which is virtually never present as grounds for imposing the death penalty would defeat that function. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mirandared2 sentences1988Again, we have addressed and rejected that claim in recent opinions. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) As explained in those cases, presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly. 3. 1988Again, we have addressed and rejected that claim in recent opinions. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) As explained in those cases, presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly. 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murtishawred2 sentences1988As we pointed out in People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pages 772-776, while the 1978 death penalty law requires the jury’s penalty determination to be based on a weighing of the specific statutory factors, the 1977 law (under which defendant herein was tried) appears to permit consideration of a broader range of evidence, including aggravating evidence of the defendant’s character and mental condition “even if it did not relate to any specific aggravating or mitigating factor. [Citation.]” (Id., at p.772; see People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Thus, defendant’s proposed instru 1988As we pointed out in People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pages 772-776, while the 1978 death penalty law requires the jury's penalty determination to be based on a weighing of the specific statutory factors, the 1977 law (under which defendant herein was tried) appears to permit consideration of a broader range of evidence, including aggravating evidence of the defendant's character and mental condition "even if it did not relate to any specific aggravating or mitigating factor. [Citation.]" ( Id., at p. 772; see People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773 .) Thus, defendant's proposed ins | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rogers
yellow
2 sentences1991Under the principle of construction mentioned above, each factor should “take color” from the others (Armenia v. Churchill, supra, 42 Cal.2d 448, 454 ), and the scope of each should be “enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms” (People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 ). 1991Under the principle of construction mentioned *263 above, each factor should "take color" from the others ( Armenta v. Churchill, supra, 42 Cal.2d 448, 454 ), and the scope of each should be "enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms" ( People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Armenta v. Churchill
green
2 sentences1991Under the principle of construction mentioned above, each factor should “take color” from the others (Armenia v. Churchill, supra, 42 Cal.2d 448, 454 ), and the scope of each should be “enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms” (People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 ). 1991Under the principle of construction mentioned *263 above, each factor should "take color" from the others ( Armenta v. Churchill, supra, 42 Cal.2d 448, 454 ), and the scope of each should be "enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms" ( People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Robbins
red
1 sentence1990For the same reason the court has no obligation to “edit” the statutory list of factors to delete those that defendant asserts are “inapplicable.” (See People v. Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, 890 .) *199 12. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Guzman
red
2 sentences1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the "presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly." ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) (44) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant's prejudice, the assertedly "inapplicable" statutory factors because he used a chalkboard to outline each factor and essentially "checked off, 1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the “presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly.” ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant’s prejudice, the assertedly “inapplicable” statutory factors because he used a chálkboard to outline each factor and essentially “checked off,” und | 1 | 1990–1990 |
California v. Brown
green
1 sentence1988For example, he agreed that defendant's lack of any prior felony convictions was a mitigating factor, and he placed "in the middle" (i.e., inapplicable) the presence of any extreme mental disturbance at the time of the offense, reasoning that the evidence failed to establish any such disturbance. ( Ibid. ) As for defendant's age (25), the prosecutor left to the jury the question whether it was a mitigating or aggravating factor, observing, however, that defendant was old enough to be responsible for his actions. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.