successiveness bar in California

2022(Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 731, fn. 5 .) In reaching this conclusion, we bear in mind the presumptions of correctness and competent assistance, including the recognition that “[w]hen counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that [counsel] did so for tactical reasons 29 rather than through sheer neglect.” (Yarborough, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 8 .) We are also mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonishment, germane to the determination we make here, that it is only “[i]n the rare instance in which the petitioner is able to adequately justify not ha

2022(Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 731, fn. 5 .) In reaching this conclusion, we bear in mind the presumptions of correctness and competent assistance, including the recognition that “[w]hen counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that [counsel] did so for tactical reasons 29 rather than through sheer neglect.” (Yarborough, supra, 540 U.S. at p. 8 .) We are also mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonishment, germane to the determination we make here, that it is only “[i]n the rare instance in which the petitioner is able to adequately justify not ha

2021“Clark serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we shall apply the successiveness rule when we are faced with a petitioner whose prior petition was filed after the date of finality of Clark.” (Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 788, fn. 9 .) Our analysis here does not apply to a case where the prior petition was filed before Clark and the subsequent one after Proposition 66. 33 In re FRIEND Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. legislative intent — is a judgment guided by “considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” (Landgraf, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 270 .) “In

2020(See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 788, fn. 9 [“Clark serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we shall apply the successiveness rule when we are faced with a petitioner whose prior petition was filed after the date of finality of Clark”].) 14 In re GAY Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. “2.

2024(Ibid.) The traditional successiveness bar prevented a habeas corpus petitioner from “abusing the writ process by presenting claims in a repetitive or piecemeal manner.” (Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 730 .) The purpose of the rule was to ensure that legitimate claims were raised early in the legal process, and it operated to preclude “consideration of claims that were unjustifiably omitted from earlier petitions” while providing “ ‘a “safety valve” for those rare or unusual claims that could not reasonably have been raised at an earlier time.’ ” (Id. at p. 728.) Thus, the rules governing st

2024As for the remaining 11 claims, we found Maury had failed to make a substantial showing that they were not successive or that the requirements set forth in subdivision (d) of section 1509 had been satisfied; namely, Maury failed to show (by a preponderance of all available evidence whether or not admissible at trial) that he is actually innocent of any of the crimes in which he was convicted or is ineligible for the death penalty. 5 A petitioner seeking to avoid the successiveness bar on grounds of ineffective assistance of prior counsel must “ ‘allege with specificity the facts underlying the

2022As directly relevant here, the Supreme Court reiterated in Friend that a petitioner seeking to avoid the successiveness bar on grounds of ineffective assistance of prior counsel must “ ‘allege with specificity the facts underlying the claim that the inadequate presentation of an issue or omission of any issue reflects incompetence of counsel.’ ” (Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 731, fn. 5 .) Conclusory allegations are inadequate to satisfy a petitioner’s pleading burden (Reno, at p. 500; Duvall, at p. 474), and 11 “normally the justification for raising a claim must be stated in the petition i

2021Like other procedural bars developed in the case law, the successiveness bar was “designed to ensure legitimate claims are pressed early in the legal process.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 452 (Reno).) The bar therefore limits consideration of claims that were unjustifiably omitted from earlier petitions.

2024(Ibid.) Similar reasoning applies to the scenario Wilson presents: Where the scope of appointed counsel’s representation is limited to RJA claims, the need to present other claims in a subsequent petition, following the appointment of capital habeas counsel, arises “through no fault of the prisoner.” (Id. at p. 721; see also People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 533 [“our inability to timely appoint habeas corpus counsel in capital cases should not operate to deprive condemned inmates of a right otherwise available to them”].) Because the subsequent non-RJA claims in those c

2021(Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 836, fn. 14 .) In Clark, for example, we used the term “successive petitions” as a shorthand for subsequent petitions “seeking relief on the basis of the same set of facts” or “raising claims that could have been raised in a prior petition.” (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 770 .) We explained that “[e]ntertaining the merits of successive petitions is inconsistent with our recognition that delayed and repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the writ” (id. at p. 769), and that the consideration of such petitions “unreasonably delays execution of judgment”

2021(Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 836, fn. 14 .) This means that a claim will not be barred as successive, even though it may be presented in a second or subsequent habeas petition, if the petitioner offers adequate justification for the failure to present a particular claim in an earlier petition.