assumption clause in Colorado

2004Co., 267 F.Supp.2d 1041 (D.Colo.2003)(insurer’s brief assumption of defense in action against its insured, without notifying insured in writing of its reservation of rights, did not bar, on estoppel grounds, insurer’s later assertion of defense of noncov-erage where insured did not prove prejudice from the assumption of defense because insurer notified insured of intention to withdraw approximately two months after assuming defense and less than four months after underlying litigation commenced); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Guar.

1992The supreme court held that this evidence was properly excluded, citing with approval the following language in Muhlig v. Fiske, 131 Mass. 110 (1881): The defendant, having ... accepted the deed of conveyance, and thereby obtained the estate which he afterwards conveyed to a third person, and so made himself liable to the burden which, by the terms of the deed, he had assumed, could not (no fraud in the execution or delivery of the deed being suggested) impair the legal effect of his own act by oral evidence that he had never agreed to assume and pay the mortgage, nor authorized nor knew of th

1992As the court noted in Neves v. Potter, supra: “This exception to the parol evidence rule accurately reflects Colorado’s unsympathetic position toward parties who seek to take gratuitous advantage of an agreement when they are not parties to the agreement.” The purchasers do not claim that the assumption clause was inserted without their knowledge or that they were unaware of its existence when they accepted the deed from the seller.

1941To sustain its contention concerning the effect of an assumption clause, plaintiff urges that there is a legal presumption arising from' a deed containing such a clause, that the amount assumed and agreed to be paid was a part of the purchase price, that delivery of the deed established this presumption, and it cites in support of its contention, Cobb v. Fishel, 15 Colo. App. 384 , 62 Pac. 625 ; Hastings v. Pringle, 37 Colo. 86 , 86 Pac. 93 .

1941To sustain its contention concerning the effect of an assumption clause, plaintiff urges that there is a legal presumption arising from' a deed containing such a clause, that the amount assumed and agreed to be paid was a part of the purchase price, that delivery of the deed established this presumption, and it cites in support of its contention, Cobb v. Fishel, 15 Colo. App. 384 , 62 Pac. 625 ; Hastings v. Pringle, 37 Colo. 86 , 86 Pac. 93 .

1941To sustain its contention concerning the effect of an assumption clause, plaintiff urges that there is a legal presumption arising from' a deed containing such a clause, that the amount assumed and agreed to be paid was a part of the purchase price, that delivery of the deed established this presumption, and it cites in support of its contention, Cobb v. Fishel, 15 Colo. App. 384 , 62 Pac. 625 ; Hastings v. Pringle, 37 Colo. 86 , 86 Pac. 93 .

1941In the Lloyd case we also specially approved and adopted the rule announced in Johnson v. Maier, 194 Mo. App. 169 , 187 S.W. 143 , quoting from the syllabus of the case in the Southwestern Reporter, as follows: “Where plaintiffs, who held a note secured by a deed of trust on land which was afterwards conveyed to defendant, were not misled because the deed contained a fraudulent ■ covenant obligating defendant to pay off the deed of trust, such covenant is not, being without consideration, binding on defendant, though he retained the deed after learning of its fraudulent insertion and subsequen

1941In the Lloyd case we also specially approved and adopted the rule announced in Johnson v. Maier, 194 Mo. App. 169 , 187 S.W. 143 , quoting from the syllabus of the case in the Southwestern Reporter, as follows: “Where plaintiffs, who held a note secured by a deed of trust on land which was afterwards conveyed to defendant, were not misled because the deed contained a fraudulent ■ covenant obligating defendant to pay off the deed of trust, such covenant is not, being without consideration, binding on defendant, though he retained the deed after learning of its fraudulent insertion and subsequen

1933We said: “The fact that the defendant agreed to purchase land ‘subject to a mortgage’ raises no presumption that there was an agreement to assume and pay the incumbrance. * * * Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132 , 27 L.

1933We said: “The fact that the defendant agreed to purchase land ‘subject to a mortgage’ raises no presumption that there was an agreement to assume and pay the incumbrance. * * * Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132 , 27 L.

1917Stead v. Sampson (Iowa), 155 N. W. 978 ; Haskins v. Young, 89 Conn. 66 , 92 Atl. 877 ; Bradshaw v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Oreg. 55 , 158 Pac. 275 ; Parker v. Jenks, 36 N. J.

1917Stead v. Sampson (Iowa), 155 N. W. 978 ; Haskins v. Young, 89 Conn. 66 , 92 Atl. 877 ; Bradshaw v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Oreg. 55 , 158 Pac. 275 ; Parker v. Jenks, 36 N. J.

1917Stead v. Sampson (Iowa), 155 N. W. 978 ; Haskins v. Young, 89 Conn. 66 , 92 Atl. 877 ; Bradshaw v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Oreg. 55 , 158 Pac. 275 ; Parker v. Jenks, 36 N. J.

1917Upon the proposition that it is the duty of a grantee to disaffirm the contract promptly and that he is liable to the mortgagee under these circumstances if he does not disaffirm the deed or contract, the plaintiffs in error cite the case of Sutter v. Rose, 64 Ill.

1915They call our attention to the opinions of this court in Johnson v. New York Life Co., 56 Colo. 178 , 138 Pac. 414 ; Finnell v. Franklin, 55 Colo. 156 , 134 Pac. 122 , and Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203 , 27 Pac. 254 , 25 Am.

1915They call our attention to the opinions of this court in Johnson v. New York Life Co., 56 Colo. 178 , 138 Pac. 414 ; Finnell v. Franklin, 55 Colo. 156 , 134 Pac. 122 , and Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203 , 27 Pac. 254 , 25 Am.

1915They call our attention to the opinions of this court in Johnson v. New York Life Co., 56 Colo. 178 , 138 Pac. 414 ; Finnell v. Franklin, 55 Colo. 156 , 134 Pac. 122 , and Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203 , 27 Pac. 254 , 25 Am.

1915They call our attention to the opinions of this court in Johnson v. New York Life Co., 56 Colo. 178 , 138 Pac. 414 ; Finnell v. Franklin, 55 Colo. 156 , 134 Pac. 122 , and Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203 , 27 Pac. 254 , 25 Am.

1915They call our attention to the opinions of this court in Johnson v. New York Life Co., 56 Colo. 178 , 138 Pac. 414 ; Finnell v. Franklin, 55 Colo. 156 , 134 Pac. 122 , and Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203 , 27 Pac. 254 , 25 Am.

1897Upon the question of the admissibility of the original contract between Wellington and appellants, to contradict the assumption clause in the deed, we are cited to the cases of Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 182 ; Drury v. Hayden, 111 U. S. 223 .