assumption immunity in Oklahoma

1931In the case of Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 Pac. 240 this court in the opinion, at page 246, said: “The assumption clause in a deed is inserted primarily for the protection of the grantor, and where the debt is a personal obligation of the grantor, it is necessary for his protection that the assumption clause be inserted, and not for the benefit of the mortgagee. * * * “It has also been repeatedly held that, where a grantee buys property subject to a mortgage, which he does not assume and agree to pay, said grantee does not become personally liable for the payment of the mortgage

1931In the case of Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 Pac. 240 this court in the opinion, at page 246, said: “The assumption clause in a deed is inserted primarily for the protection of the grantor, and where the debt is a personal obligation of the grantor, it is necessary for his protection that the assumption clause be inserted, and not for the benefit of the mortgagee. * * * “It has also been repeatedly held that, where a grantee buys property subject to a mortgage, which he does not assume and agree to pay, said grantee does not become personally liable for the payment of the mortgage

1998The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed., 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine." Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1704. .

1998The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed., 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine." Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1704. .

1998The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed., 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine." Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1704. .

1998The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed., 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned statement of doctrine." Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1704. .

1945Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240, 243 ; Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, 135 N. W. 708 ; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522 , 15 P. 100 . *390 “This court said, in Beardsley v. Stephens, supra, that: “Before a third party should be allowed to adopt an agreement • entered into for his benefit, it is incumbent upon said third party to show that it was the intention on the part of the parties to the contract .that the third party should be benefited thereby.

1935Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240 ; Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, 135 N. W. 708 ; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522 , 15 P. 100 . *541 This court said, in Beardsley v. Stephens, supra, that: “Before a third party should be allowed to adopt an agreement entered into for his benefit, it is encumbent upon said third party to show that it was the intention on the part of the parties to the contract that the third party should be benefited thereby.

1945Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240, 243 ; Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, 135 N. W. 708 ; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522 , 15 P. 100 . *390 “This court said, in Beardsley v. Stephens, supra, that: “Before a third party should be allowed to adopt an agreement • entered into for his benefit, it is incumbent upon said third party to show that it was the intention on the part of the parties to the contract .that the third party should be benefited thereby.

1945Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240, 243 ; Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, 135 N. W. 708 ; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal. 522 , 15 P. 100 . *390 “This court said, in Beardsley v. Stephens, supra, that: “Before a third party should be allowed to adopt an agreement • entered into for his benefit, it is incumbent upon said third party to show that it was the intention on the part of the parties to the contract .that the third party should be benefited thereby.

1998State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 , 118 S.Ct. 275 , 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). [2] The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed. 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned st

1998State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 , 118 S.Ct. 275 , 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). [2] The Manufacturing Technologies opinion describes tribal immunity as a doctrine developed by accident, by passing reference in such opinions as Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 , 39 S.Ct. 109 , 63 L.Ed. 291 (1919); explains that it was reiterated with little analysis in opinions such as Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977); and characterizes tribal immunity as "at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, not a reasoned st

1951That it is subject to be modified by the state in the exercise of its police power, we held in Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Bond, 173 Okla. 348 , 48 P. 2d 820 .

1951That it is subject to be modified by the state in the exercise of its police power, we held in Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Bond, 173 Okla. 348 , 48 P. 2d 820 .

1942McCoy v. Spears, 186 Okla. 33 , 95 P. 2d 865 ; McBirney v. Bader, 181 Okla. 237 , 73 P. 2d 156 ; Aetna Life Ins.

1942McCoy v. Spears, 186 Okla. 33 , 95 P. 2d 865 ; McBirney v. Bader, 181 Okla. 237 , 73 P. 2d 156 ; Aetna Life Ins.

1942McCoy v. Spears, 186 Okla. 33 , 95 P. 2d 865 ; McBirney v. Bader, 181 Okla. 237 , 73 P. 2d 156 ; Aetna Life Ins.

1942McCoy v. Spears, 186 Okla. 33 , 95 P. 2d 865 ; McBirney v. Bader, 181 Okla. 237 , 73 P. 2d 156 ; Aetna Life Ins.

1939Federal courts uniformly adhere to the latter doctrine (citing cases).” In the case of Morris v. Mix, 4 Kan.

1936There being no evidence in this case to support any finding except that the assumption clause relied upon by plaintiff was inserted in the deed by mistake, the court must hoid that the case of Cushing v. Newbern, 75 Okla. 258 , 183 P. 409 , is controlling.

1936There being no evidence in this case to support any finding except that the assumption clause relied upon by plaintiff was inserted in the deed by mistake, the court must hoid that the case of Cushing v. Newbern, 75 Okla. 258 , 183 P. 409 , is controlling.

1935Having come to the conclusion from a consideration of the evidence that the defendant never at any time agreed to assume or pay the Clarendon mortgage, and that the assumption clause was inserted in the Clarendon deed through inadvertence or mistake, and that the defendant is not estopped by her conduct from relying upon her defense, and that the right of no third party has intervened, we hold that it was competent for the Clarendons and the defendant to correct the mistake and eliminate the assumption clause by the correction deed of December 30, 1933. 18 Corpus Juris, page 217, par. 130; Chu

1935Having come to the conclusion from a consideration of the evidence that the defendant never at any time agreed to assume or pay the Clarendon mortgage, and that the assumption clause was inserted in the Clarendon deed through inadvertence or mistake, and that the defendant is not estopped by her conduct from relying upon her defense, and that the right of no third party has intervened, we hold that it was competent for the Clarendons and the defendant to correct the mistake and eliminate the assumption clause by the correction deed of December 30, 1933. 18 Corpus Juris, page 217, par. 130; Chu

1935Having come to the conclusion from a consideration of the evidence that the defendant never at any time agreed to assume or pay the Clarendon mortgage, and that the assumption clause was inserted in the Clarendon deed through inadvertence or mistake, and that the defendant is not estopped by her conduct from relying upon her defense, and that the right of no third party has intervened, we hold that it was competent for the Clarendons and the defendant to correct the mistake and eliminate the assumption clause by the correction deed of December 30, 1933. 18 Corpus Juris, page 217, par. 130; Chu

1935Ed. 667 The general doctrine is laid down in 18 Corpus Juris, p. 217, par. 130, that: “Where there is no fraud, the rights of a third party have not intervened and equity could have reformed the deed, it may be amended by subsequent instrument so as to effectuate the intention of the parties.” In Shearer v. Huff, supra, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky said: “As respects correction by quitclaim deed, the. parties agreeing can do for themselves all that equity could do for them.” The Supreme Court of United States held in Keller v. Ashford, supra, that the mortgagee has no greater right than th

1935Having come to the conclusion from a consideration of the evidence that the defendant never at any time agreed to assume or pay the Clarendon mortgage, and that the assumption clause was inserted in the Clarendon deed through inadvertence or mistake, and that the defendant is not estopped by her conduct from relying upon her defense, and that the right of no third party has intervened, we hold that it was competent for the Clarendons and the defendant to correct the mistake and eliminate the assumption clause by the correction deed of December 30, 1933. 18 Corpus Juris, page 217, par. 130; Chu

1935Having come to the conclusion from a consideration of the evidence that the defendant never at any time agreed to assume or pay the Clarendon mortgage, and that the assumption clause was inserted in the Clarendon deed through inadvertence or mistake, and that the defendant is not estopped by her conduct from relying upon her defense, and that the right of no third party has intervened, we hold that it was competent for the Clarendons and the defendant to correct the mistake and eliminate the assumption clause by the correction deed of December 30, 1933. 18 Corpus Juris, page 217, par. 130; Chu

1931Baily v. State, 72 Okla. 203 , 179 Pac. 615 ; Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okla. 555 , 129 Pac. 2 .

1931Baily v. State, 72 Okla. 203 , 179 Pac. 615 ; Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okla. 555 , 129 Pac. 2 .

1931Baily v. State, 72 Okla. 203 , 179 Pac. 615 ; Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okla. 555 , 129 Pac. 2 .

1931Baily v. State, 72 Okla. 203 , 179 Pac. 615 ; Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okla. 555 , 129 Pac. 2 .