assumption analysis in Oregon

2019The court nevertheless concluded that "[i]f, as the trial court expressly found, the assumption clause was inserted in the paper 'by and through a mistake or oversight of the scrivener, and without the knowledge or consent of either the grantor or grantee,' [the plaintiff] is entitled to a reformation of the deed * * *." Id. at 600 , 183 P. 776 .

2019The court nevertheless concluded that "[i]f, as the trial court expressly found, the assumption clause was inserted in the paper 'by and through a mistake or oversight of the scrivener, and without the knowledge or consent of either the grantor or grantee,' [the plaintiff] is entitled to a reformation of the deed * * *." Id. at 600 , 183 P. 776 .

1992Although they are internally sensible, Denton Plastics and State v. Long, supra , *42 are hard to reconcile with Dollarhide .

1992Although they are internally sensible, Denton Plastics and State v. Long, supra, are hard to reconcile with Dollarhide .

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1980Collateral estoppel applies "only to material issues or determinative facts which were actually or necessarily adjudicated in the prior action.” Jones v. Flannigan, 270 or 121, 124, 526 P2d 543 (1974).

1968The decision ivas based upon the principle that although an employer is not ordinarily liable for the acts of an independent contractor employed by him, this immunity from liability is not extended to an employer “who orders work to be performed from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences must be expected to arise unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented.” ② ( 230 Or at 220 , 368 P2d at 740 .) Plaintiff’s argument proceeds upon the assumption that this principle, which recognizes the liability of an employer for the acts of an independent con

1968The decision ivas based upon the principle that although an employer is not ordinarily liable for the acts of an independent contractor employed by him, this immunity from liability is not extended to an employer “who orders work to be performed from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences must be expected to arise unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented.” ② ( 230 Or at 220 , 368 P2d at 740 .) Plaintiff’s argument proceeds upon the assumption that this principle, which recognizes the liability of an employer for the acts of an independent con

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): "It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth." [3] Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963). [4] See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 37 (1953), stating that "the indemnity principle would require the acceptance of value to the owner as the only strictly relevant value." Compar

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): "It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth." [3] Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963). [4] See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 37 (1953), stating that "the indemnity principle would require the acceptance of value to the owner as the only strictly relevant value." Compar

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): "It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth." [3] Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963). [4] See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 37 (1953), stating that "the indemnity principle would require the acceptance of value to the owner as the only strictly relevant value." Compar

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): "It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth." [3] Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963). [4] See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 37 (1953), stating that "the indemnity principle would require the acceptance of value to the owner as the only strictly relevant value." Compar

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): “It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth.” Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963).

1964Co., 188 Wash 512, 516, 63 P2d 418 (1936): "It is settled law in this state that the owner of property may testify to its value upon the assumption or presumption that he is so far familiar with the property and its uses as to know its worth." [3] Cf. State Highway Commission v. Assembly of God et al, 230 Or 167, 177 , 368 P2d 937 (1962); Freedman v. Cholick et ux, 233 Or 569, 577 , 379 P2d 575 (1963). [4] See 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain § 37 (1953), stating that "the indemnity principle would require the acceptance of value to the owner as the only strictly relevant value." Compar

1918If the general scope and purpose of the legislation under consideration are constitutional and constitutional means are provided for effecting the general purpose of the legislation the entire statute will not be declared void because one or more of the details, or minor provisions, or incidental clauses are not in accordance with the Constitution; provided, the invalid part may be eliminated without materially affecting the general purpose: Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33 ( 52 S. E. 267 ); State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J.

1918If the general scope and purpose of the legislation under consideration are constitutional and constitutional means are provided for effecting the general purpose of the legislation the entire statute will not be declared void because one or more of the details, or minor provisions, or incidental clauses are not in accordance with the Constitution; provided, the invalid part may be eliminated without materially affecting the general purpose: Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33 ( 52 S. E. 267 ); State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J.