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8 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mack v. LaValley
green
2 sentences2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the 2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the | 2 | 2002–2021 |
Mack v. LaValley
green
2 sentences2021Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 718 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999). 2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the | 2 | 2002–2021 |
Rametta v. Stella
green
2 sentences2006Under this rule, “a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990). 2006Under this rule, “a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990). | 2 | 1999–2006 |
Brennan v. Burger King Corp.
green
2 sentences1999The legislature abolished the common-law collateral source rule when it enacted § 52-225a (a), and “[i]t is a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed so as not to exceed, modify or enlarge [their] provisions beyond [their] scope by the mechanics of statutory construction.” Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn. App. 76, 82-83 , 698 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204 , 707 A.2d 30 (1998). 1999The legislature abolished the common-law collateral source rule when it enacted § 52-225a (a), and “[i]t is a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed so as not to exceed, modify or enlarge [their] provisions beyond [their] scope by the mechanics of statutory construction.” Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn. App. 76, 82-83 , 698 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204 , 707 A.2d 30 (1998). | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Brennan v. Burger King Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1999The legislature abolished the common-law collateral source rule when it enacted § 52-225a (a), and “[i]t is a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed so as not to exceed, modify or enlarge [their] provisions beyond [their] scope by the mechanics of statutory construction.” Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn. App. 76, 82-83 , 698 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204 , 707 A.2d 30 (1998). 1999The legislature abolished the common-law collateral source rule when it enacted § 52-225a (a), and “[i]t is a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed so as not to exceed, modify or enlarge [their] provisions beyond [their] scope by the mechanics of statutory construction.” Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn. App. 76, 82-83 , 698 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204 , 707 A.2d 30 (1998). | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Alvarado v. Black
green
2 sentences2004See Jones v. Riley, supra, 263 Conn. 103 (noting § 52-225a abolished common-law collateral source rule in all personal injury actions); Alvarado v. Black, 248 Conn. 409, 417 , 728 A.2d 500 (1999) (same). 2004See Jones v. Riley, supra, 263 Conn. 103 (noting § 52-225a abolished common-law collateral source rule in all personal injury actions); Alvarado v. Black, 248 Conn. 409, 417 , 728 A.2d 500 (1999) (same). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jones v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2004The legislature enacted § 52-225a et seq., “in derogation of the common-law collateral source rule.” Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 348 , 838 A.2d 170 (2004). 2004The legislature enacted § 52-225a et seq., “in derogation of the common-law collateral source rule.” Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 348 , 838 A.2d 170 (2004). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Dime Savings Bank v. Arpaia
green
1 sentence2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Nash v. Yap
green
2 sentences1999The legislation reflects “the understanding that the entitlement of an injured party to be made whole does not include an entitlement to a double recovery for the same loss.” Nash v. Yap, 247 Conn. 638, 649 , 726 A.2d 92 (1999). 1999The legislation reflects “the understanding that the entitlement of an injured party to be made whole does not include an entitlement to a double recovery for the same loss.” Nash v. Yap, 247 Conn. 638, 649 , 726 A.2d 92 (1999). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 133 , 479 A.2d 231 (1984). 1997Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 133 , 479 A.2d 231 (1984). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.