party invoking doctrine in District of Columbia

2002We have also previously set forth the elements of estoppel, while noting that the doctrine is “not judicially favored,” Wieck, supra, 383 A.2d at 10 (references and citations omitted), and that its application is “ ‘limited [to] situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine.’ ” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Stewart, 278 A.2d 117, 119 (D.C.1971) (citation and footnote omitted)).

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

2025Nicklin v. Stonesdale Unit Owners’ Ass’n, 307 A.3d 477 , 488 (D.C. 2024) (“The doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense that applies only where the party invoking the doctrine shows ‘an undue and unexplained delay on the part of one party which works an injustice to the other party.’” (quoting Amidon v. Amidon, 280 A.2d 82, 84 (D.C. 1971))).

2024The doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense that applies only where the party invoking the doctrine shows “an undue and unexplained delay on the part of one party which works an injustice to the other party.” Amidon v. Amidon, 280 A.2d 82, 84 (D.C. 1971); see also Am.

2002We have also previously set forth the elements of estoppel, while noting that the doctrine is “not judicially favored,” Wieck, supra, 383 A.2d at 10 (references and citations omitted), and that its application is “ ‘limited [to] situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine.’ ” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Stewart, 278 A.2d 117, 119 (D.C.1971) (citation and footnote omitted)).

2002We have also previously set forth the elements of estoppel, while noting that the doctrine is “not judicially favored,” Wieck, supra, 383 A.2d at 10 (references and citations omitted), and that its application is “ ‘limited [to] situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine.’ ” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Stewart, 278 A.2d 117, 119 (D.C.1971) (citation and footnote omitted)).

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

1978Furthermore, as stated in District of Columbia v. Stewart, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 117, 119 (1971): While estoppel may be applied to the District of Columbia in certain limited situations when the equities are strongly in favor of the party invoking the doctrine ( District of Columbia v. Cahill, 60 App.D.C. 342 , 54 F.2d 453 (1931), cited in footnote], the District of Columbia must first have authority to act before conduct of its employees can be the basis of an estoppel defense.

1995The privilege also protects communications from attorney to client if they "rest on confidential information obtained from the client"; or (2) if the party invoking the privilege demonstrates with reasonable certainty that "the lawyer's communication rested in significant and inseparable part on the client's confidential disclosure." Id. 237 U.S.App.D.C. at 317 , 737 F.2d at 99 (citation omitted).

1995The privilege also protects communications from attorney to client if they "rest on confidential information obtained from the client"; or (2) if the party invoking the privilege demonstrates with reasonable certainty that "the lawyer's communication rested in significant and inseparable part on the client's confidential disclosure." Id. 237 U.S.App.D.C. at 317 , 737 F.2d at 99 (citation omitted).