party invoking doctrine in Illinois

2023Waters § 151). ¶ 62 Thus, where the usage of an artificial body of water has long been settled, “it may be appropriate to treat the artificial body as the legal equivalent of a natural one.” Alderson, 231 Ill. 2d at 322 . ¶ 63 As a minimum requirement, cases applying the “artificial-becomes-natural” exception “have done so only in situations where the party invoking the rule has relied upon use of the artificial body of water without dispute for a lengthy period of time.” Id. at 323 ; see People ex rel.

2023Waters § 151). ¶ 62 Thus, where the usage of an artificial body of water has long been settled, “it may be appropriate to treat the artificial body as the legal equivalent of a natural one.” Alderson, 231 Ill. 2d at 322 . ¶ 63 As a minimum requirement, cases applying the “artificial-becomes-natural” exception “have done so only in situations where the party invoking the rule has relied upon use of the artificial body of water without dispute for a lengthy period of time.” Id. at 323 ; see People ex rel.

2012Id. at 314 , 180 Ill.Dec. 17 , 606 N.E.2d 1094 .

2012Id. at 314 , 180 Ill.Dec. 17 , 606 N.E.2d 1094 .

2008See, e.g., Saelens, 7 Ill. 2d 556 (more than 50 years of uncontested use); Gough, 2 Ill. 2d 577 (40 years of uncontested use).

2008See, e.g., Saelens, 7 Ill. 2d 556 (more than 50 years of uncontested use); Gough, 2 Ill. 2d 577 (40 years of uncontested use).

2006LaSalle Bank, 355 Ill.

2006LaSalle Bank, 355 Ill.

2026Id. at 127 .

2025Id. ¶ 13 First, there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction based on the first municipal district case, as the judge there dismissed the case with prejudice based on Cole’s failure to state causes of action and the attorney litigation privilege.

2025Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398, ¶ 20 .

2024Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 13 .

2023T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Village of Hawthorn Woods, 2012 IL App (2d) 110192, ¶ 42 .

2023Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 45 . ¶ 24 Res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that arises from “the practical necessity that there be an end to litigation and that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose.” Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643 , ¶ 49.

2019App. 3d at 950 . ¶ 59 Where “the same set of facts was necessary to maintain and prove both cases, the causes of action were identical for purposes of res judicata.” Wilson, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 12 .

2012The appellate court found Rein and Hudson inapposite as the rendition of a “final” order was essential in the analysis of each. 2011 IL App (1st) 102646, ¶ 10 . ¶ 39 ANALYSIS ¶ 40 Defendants, as the parties invoking the application of res judicata, and as the litigants responsible for obtaining rulings on their motions in the circuit court, bear a substantial burden in this case. ¶ 41 The burden of showing that res judicata applies is on the party invoking the doctrine.

1995(See Evangeloff v. Evangeloff (1949), 403 Ill. 118, 126 , 85 N.E.2d 709 ; Mascenic v. Anderson (1977), 53 Ill.

1995(See Evangeloff v. Evangeloff (1949), 403 Ill. 118, 126 , 85 N.E.2d 709 ; Mascenic v. Anderson (1977), 53 Ill.

1995(See Evangeloff v. Evangeloff (1949), 403 Ill. 118, 126 , 85 N.E.2d 709 ; Mascenic v. Anderson (1977), 53 Ill.

1990Court held that, in order to enforce an insecurity clause, “the party invoking the clause must reasonably and in good faith believe that the prospect of payment or performance has somehow been impaired.” In support of this conclusion, the court looked to article 2, and cited Sheppard Federal Credit Union v. Palmer (5th Cir. 1969), 408 F.2d 1369 .

1990The Sheppard court came to the following conclusion: “In his excellent treatise on security interests, Professor Gilmore indicates that the language of UCC § 1 — 208 means in substance that ‘[t]he creditor has the right to accelerate if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable man, motivated by good faith, would have done so.’ ” ( 408 F.2d at 1371 n.2, quoting 2 G.

1989Scott v. Chicago Park District (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 65, 68-69 , 360 N.E.2d 773 .) The court has also specified in Rule 273 (107 Ill. 2d R. 273) that an adjudication on the merits does not occur if a case is dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.

1989Scott v. Chicago Park District (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 65, 68-69 , 360 N.E.2d 773 .) The court has also specified in Rule 273 (107 Ill. 2d R. 273) that an adjudication on the merits does not occur if a case is dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.

1987(O’Laughlin v. City of Chicago (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 183 , 357 N.E.2d 472 ; Space Station 2001, Inc. v. Moses (1983), 118 Ill.

1987(O’Laughlin v. City of Chicago (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 183 , 357 N.E.2d 472 ; Space Station 2001, Inc. v. Moses (1983), 118 Ill.

1987(O’Laughlin v. City of Chicago (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 183 , 357 N.E.2d 472 ; Space Station 2001, Inc. v. Moses (1983), 118 Ill.

1985(Dienstag v. Bronsen (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 49 F.R.D. 327 ; Duffy v. Currier (D.

1976This court in La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County, 61 Ill. 2d 524, 528 , considered a question of res judicata and, quoting from People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 408 , stated: “[A] final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” Thus, before an adjudication can stand as a bar to a subsequent action, it must be determined whether the first action r

1976This court in La Salle National Bank v. County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County, 61 Ill.2d 524, 528 , considered a question of res judicata and, quoting from People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 408 , stated: "[A] final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on *69 the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." Thus, before an adjudication can stand as a bar to a subsequent action, it must be determined whether the first actio