place claim in Florida

2015Moreover, in order to assist both the appellant in identifying issues for his pro se brief and the appellate court in its own review to determine whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous, appellate counsel must in its Anders brief “refet[] to anything in the record that might- arguably support the appeal.” 2 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 . *6 Counsel’s representation in this ease that she “is unable to make a good faith argument that reversible error occurred in the trial court” seems to this court to place the bar somewhat higher than that intended by the guidance in An-ders.

2015Moreover, in order to assist both the appellant in identifying issues for his pro se brief and the appellate court in its own review to determine whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous, appellate counsel must in its Anders brief “refet[] to anything in the record that might- arguably support the appeal.” 2 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 . *6 Counsel’s representation in this ease that she “is unable to make a good faith argument that reversible error occurred in the trial court” seems to this court to place the bar somewhat higher than that intended by the guidance in An-ders.

1985Although it is plausibly argued by the defendants that we must distinguish between where a cause of action arises (said by them to be the place where the claim originates) and when a cause of action accrues (said by them to be the time when the statute of limitations begins to run) and that discovery of the existence of a cause of action is relevant only to the latter inquiry, our examination of Florida case law discloses that no such distinction has ever been made and that, to the contrary, the terms "arise" and "arose" have consistently been used interchangeably with the terms "accrue" and "

1985Cf. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Squires Development Corp., 387 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (splitting causes of action); Gaboury v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 316 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (venue case).

1985Cf. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Squires Development Corp., 387 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (splitting causes of action); Gaboury v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 316 So.2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (venue case).

1985Although it is plausibly argued by the defendants that we must distinguish between where a cause of action arises (said by them to be the place where the claim originates) and when a cause of action accrues (said by them to be the time when the statute of limitations begins to run) and that discovery of the existence of a cause of action is relevant only to the latter inquiry, our examination of Florida case law discloses that no such distinction has ever been made and that, to the contrary, the terms "arise" and "arose" have consistently been used interchangeably with the terms "accrue" and "

1985Although it is plausibly argued by the defendants that we must distinguish between where a cause of action arises (said by them to be the place where the claim originates) and when a cause of action accrues (said by them to be the time when the statute of limitations begins to run) and that discovery of the existence of a cause of action is relevant only to the latter inquiry, our examination of Florida case law discloses that no such distinction has ever been made and that, to the contrary, the terms "arise" and "arose" have consistently been used interchangeably with the terms "accrue" and "

1985Although it is plausibly argued by the defendants that we must distinguish between where a cause of action arises (said by them to be the place where the claim originates) and when a cause of action accrues (said by them to be the time when the statute of limitations begins to run) and that discovery of the existence of a cause of action is relevant only to the latter inquiry, our examination of Florida case law discloses that no such distinction has ever been made and that, to the contrary, the terms "arise" and "arose" have consistently been used interchangeably with the terms "accrue" and "

1981Discussing privacy expectations in a prison environment, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962), said: [T]o say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's "house" or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or his effects, is at best a novel argument.

1981Discussing privacy expectations in a prison environment, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962), said: [T]o say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's "house" or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional immunity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or his effects, is at best a novel argument.

1978E.g ., Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 , 195 (5th Cir. 1973); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 , 158 (M.D.Ga. 1977). (3) Use of the place rule ( i.e ., requiring each candidate in an at-large election to designate a particular seat for which he or she is running).

1978E.g ., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 766 (1973); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 , 617 , 619 (M.D.Ala. 1974). (4) A majority vote requirement in primary elections.

1978E.g ., Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 , 195 (5th Cir. 1973); Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 , 158 (M.D.Ga. 1977). (3) Use of the place rule ( i.e ., requiring each candidate in an at-large election to designate a particular seat for which he or she is running).

1978E.g ., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 766 (1973); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 , 617 , 619 (M.D.Ala. 1974). (4) A majority vote requirement in primary elections.

1934Rep. 65 , Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the Court, said: “The new Chancery Act expressly repeals Chapter 13660, Acts of 1929, supra, and Section 48 thereof was obviously adopted to supply a new rule in harmony with the Federal rule to take the place of the rule which was abolished with the repeal of Chapter 13660.” The learned Justice also said that the Act “completely revises the chancery practice in this State.” See also State v. Rowe, 110 Fla. 141 , 148 South.

1934Rep. 65 , Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the Court, said: “The new Chancery Act expressly repeals Chapter 13660, Acts of 1929, supra, and Section 48 thereof was obviously adopted to supply a new rule in harmony with the Federal rule to take the place of the rule which was abolished with the repeal of Chapter 13660.” The learned Justice also said that the Act “completely revises the chancery practice in this State.” See also State v. Rowe, 110 Fla. 141 , 148 South.