place claim in New York

2001General Municipal Law § 50-e (2) provides, inter alia, that a notice of claim shall set forth “the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose.” The requirement that a notice of claim set forth the place where the claim arose is met when the notice describes the location with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to locate the alleged defect and to conduct a meaningful investigation so as to assess the merits of the claim before conditions change and memories fade (see, Thomas v Town of Oyster Bay, 190 AD2d 731 ; Miles v City of New York, 173 AD2d 298, 299 ; C

1998In view of the greater particularity required in the description of the defects of this kind in notices of claim (see, Schwartz v City of New York, 250 NY 332 ; Fendig v City of New York, 132 AD2d 520 ; Levine v City of New York, 111 AD2d 785 ; Caselli v New York, 105 AD2d 251 ), the notice of claim, which described the place where the claim arose as “the exit way of the Municipal Parking Field designated Number LV-2 located in Locust Valley”, did not sufficiently describe the accident site (see, Santiago v New York City Hous.

2010More than two years after the plaintiffs claim accrued, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the notice of claim did not comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e (2), in that it failed to set forth, with sufficient particularity, the place where the claim arose (see Eherts v County of Orange, 215 AD2d 524, 525 [1995]; Thomas v Town of Oyster Bay, 190 AD2d 731 [1993]; Cappadonna v New York City Tr.

2001General Municipal Law § 50-e (2) provides, inter alia, that a notice of claim shall set forth “the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose.” The requirement that a notice of claim set forth the place where the claim arose is met when the notice describes the location with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to locate the alleged defect and to conduct a meaningful investigation so as to assess the merits of the claim before conditions change and memories fade (see, Thomas v Town of Oyster Bay, 190 AD2d 731 ; Miles v City of New York, 173 AD2d 298, 299 ; C

2024Court of Claims Act § 10(8)(a) provides that a court may grant an application to treat an NOI as a claim if, among other things, the NOI "was timely served, and contains facts sufficient to constitute a claim; and the granting of the application would not prejudice the defendant." Court of Claims Act § 11(b) requires a claim to specify: (1) the nature of the claim; (2) the time when it arose; (3) the place where the claim arose; (4) the items of damage or injuries claimed; and (5) the total sum claimed ( see Brown v State of New York , 220 AD3d 703, 704 ).

2023Even when a claimant has no other avenue of recovery ( see Olsen v State of New York , 45 AD3d 824 ), this failure is a fatal jurisdictional defect ( see Kolnacki v State of New York , 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 ; Matter of DeMairo v State of New York , 172 AD3d 856 ).

2023Even when a claimant has no other avenue of recovery ( see Olsen v State of New York , 45 AD3d 824 ), this failure is a fatal jurisdictional defect ( see Kolnacki v State of New York , 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 ; Matter of DeMairo v State of New York , 172 AD3d 856 ).

2019Here, claimant sufficiently specified the nature of the claim, the time when and the place where the claim arose, and the injuries claimed to have been sustained, i.e., "injuries to his shoulder, bicep, and elbow" ( see § 11 [b]; Demonstoy , 130 AD3d at 1337-1338 ; cf. Davis , 64 AD3d at 1197 ).

2019Here, claimant sufficiently specified the nature of the claim, the time when and the place where the claim arose, and the injuries claimed to have been sustained, i.e., "injuries to his shoulder, bicep, and elbow" ( see § 11 [b]; Demonstoy , 130 AD3d at 1337-1338 ; cf. Davis , 64 AD3d at 1197 ).

2004When the claim proceeds on a negligence theory, there must also be proof of a requisite causal link between the bank’s conduct and the loss, as when “a reasonable investigation by the bank initiated at an earlier date would have uncovered [the] embezzlement.” (Home Sav. of Am. v Amoros, 233 AD2d at 42 .) The parties do not address the fiduciary cases, even though the alleged fiduciary relationship between Mr. Stern and plaintiffs has a central place in their claim.

2002(See Common Council of City of Gloversville v Town Bd., supra; Tamburo v P & C Food Mkts., 36 AD2d 1017 [4th Dept 1971]; Chalfonte Realty Corp. v Streator, Inc., 142 Misc 2d 501 [Civ Ct, NY County]; Union Hosp. of Bronx v Henry, 132 Misc 2d 1049 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 1986].) Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, petitioner’s failure to provide respondents with the correct place of the hearing warrants dismissal.

2002(See Common Council of City of Gloversville v Town Bd., supra; Tamburo v P & C Food Mkts., 36 AD2d 1017 [4th Dept 1971]; Chalfonte Realty Corp. v Streator, Inc., 142 Misc 2d 501 [Civ Ct, NY County]; Union Hosp. of Bronx v Henry, 132 Misc 2d 1049 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 1986].) Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, petitioner’s failure to provide respondents with the correct place of the hearing warrants dismissal.

2002(See Common Council of City of Gloversville v Town Bd., supra; Tamburo v P & C Food Mkts., 36 AD2d 1017 [4th Dept 1971]; Chalfonte Realty Corp. v Streator, Inc., 142 Misc 2d 501 [Civ Ct, NY County]; Union Hosp. of Bronx v Henry, 132 Misc 2d 1049 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 1986].) Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, petitioner’s failure to provide respondents with the correct place of the hearing warrants dismissal.

2002(Matter of Lincoln Plaza Tenants Corp. v Dinkins, 171 AD2d 577 [1st Dept 1991].) Further, the failure to provide respondents with the information as required by the statutes deprives this court of personal jurisdiction over respondents.

2001General Municipal Law § 50-e (2) provides, inter alia, that a notice of claim shall set forth “the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose.” The requirement that a notice of claim set forth the place where the claim arose is met when the notice describes the location with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to locate the alleged defect and to conduct a meaningful investigation so as to assess the merits of the claim before conditions change and memories fade (see, Thomas v Town of Oyster Bay, 190 AD2d 731 ; Miles v City of New York, 173 AD2d 298, 299 ; C

1998Auth., 220 AD2d 655 ; Frankfort v City of New York, 159 AD2d 680 ; Harper v City of New York, 129 AD2d 770 ; Caselli v City of New York, supra; Matter of Klobnock v City of New York, 80 AD2d 854 ).

1998In view of the greater particularity required in the description of the defects of this kind in notices of claim (see, Schwartz v City of New York, 250 NY 332 ; Fendig v City of New York, 132 AD2d 520 ; Levine v City of New York, 111 AD2d 785 ; Caselli v New York, 105 AD2d 251 ), the notice of claim, which described the place where the claim arose as “the exit way of the Municipal Parking Field designated Number LV-2 located in Locust Valley”, did not sufficiently describe the accident site (see, Santiago v New York City Hous.

1998In view of the greater particularity required in the description of the defects of this kind in notices of claim (see, Schwartz v City of New York, 250 NY 332 ; Fendig v City of New York, 132 AD2d 520 ; Levine v City of New York, 111 AD2d 785 ; Caselli v New York, 105 AD2d 251 ), the notice of claim, which described the place where the claim arose as “the exit way of the Municipal Parking Field designated Number LV-2 located in Locust Valley”, did not sufficiently describe the accident site (see, Santiago v New York City Hous.

1998However, “[e]very element in a notice of intention need not be set forth with formalistic rigidity and it should not be scrutinized as strictly as a pleading” (Cannon v State of New York, 163 Misc 2d 623, 626 ).

1998Auth., 220 AD2d 655 ; Frankfort v City of New York, 159 AD2d 680 ; Harper v City of New York, 129 AD2d 770 ; Caselli v City of New York, supra; Matter of Klobnock v City of New York, 80 AD2d 854 ).

1998Auth., 220 AD2d 655 ; Frankfort v City of New York, 159 AD2d 680 ; Harper v City of New York, 129 AD2d 770 ; Caselli v City of New York, supra; Matter of Klobnock v City of New York, 80 AD2d 854 ).

1998Auth., 220 AD2d 655 ; Frankfort v City of New York, 159 AD2d 680 ; Harper v City of New York, 129 AD2d 770 ; Caselli v City of New York, supra; Matter of Klobnock v City of New York, 80 AD2d 854 ).