place hearing in Kansas

1999State v. Cook, 259 Kan. 370, 376 , 913 P.2d 97 (1996).

1999State v. Cook, 259 Kan. 370, 376 , 913 P.2d 97 (1996).

1997A witness is deemed unavailable pursuant to K.S.A. 60-459(g) when the witness is “(4) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process, or (5) absent from the place of hearing because the proponent of his or her statement does not know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his or her whereabouts.” The standard for determining if a witness is unavailable is the “reasonable diligence rule,” State v. Vargas, 260 Kan. 791, 799 , 926 P.2d 223 (1996), requiring a “ ‘good faith effort to obtain the witness’ presence at trial.’ ” (Quoting State v. Watie, Heard

1997A witness is deemed unavailable pursuant to K.S.A. 60-459(g) when the witness is “(4) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process, or (5) absent from the place of hearing because the proponent of his or her statement does not know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his or her whereabouts.” The standard for determining if a witness is unavailable is the “reasonable diligence rule,” State v. Vargas, 260 Kan. 791, 799 , 926 P.2d 223 (1996), requiring a “ ‘good faith effort to obtain the witness’ presence at trial.’ ” (Quoting State v. Watie, Heard

1975In State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P. 2d 833 , the rule is stated as follows: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 , 20 L.

1975In State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P. 2d 833 , the rule is stated as follows: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 , 20 L.

1975In State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P. 2d 833 , the rule is stated as follows: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 , 20 L.

1975In State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P. 2d 833 , the rule is stated as follows: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 , 20 L.

2014The State contends Gleason’s adamant refusal to testify rendered him unavailable as that term has been interpreted by this court in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and in the context of K.S.A. 60-459(g): “ ‘Unavailable as a witness’ includes situations where the witness is (1) exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant, or (2) disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (3) unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness, or (4) ab

2014The State contends Gleason’s adamant refusal to testify rendered him unavailable as that term has been interpreted by this court in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and in the context of K.S.A. 60-459(g): “ ‘Unavailable as a witness’ includes situations where the witness is (1) exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant, or (2) disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (3) unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness, or (4) ab

2014The State contends Gleason’s adamant refusal to testify rendered him unavailable as that term has been interpreted by this court in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and in the context of K.S.A. 60-459(g): “ ‘Unavailable as a witness’ includes situations where the witness is (1) exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant, or (2) disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (3) unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness, or (4) ab

2014The State contends Gleason’s adamant refusal to testify rendered him unavailable as that term has been interpreted by this court in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and in the context of K.S.A. 60-459(g): “ ‘Unavailable as a witness’ includes situations where the witness is (1) exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant, or (2) disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (3) unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness, or (4) ab

1997A witness is deemed unavailable pursuant to K.S.A. 60-459(g) when the witness is “(4) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process, or (5) absent from the place of hearing because the proponent of his or her statement does not know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his or her whereabouts.” The standard for determining if a witness is unavailable is the “reasonable diligence rule,” State v. Vargas, 260 Kan. 791, 799 , 926 P.2d 223 (1996), requiring a “ ‘good faith effort to obtain the witness’ presence at trial.’ ” (Quoting State v. Watie, Heard

1997A witness is deemed unavailable pursuant to K.S.A. 60-459(g) when the witness is “(4) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its process, or (5) absent from the place of hearing because the proponent of his or her statement does not know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his or her whereabouts.” The standard for determining if a witness is unavailable is the “reasonable diligence rule,” State v. Vargas, 260 Kan. 791, 799 , 926 P.2d 223 (1996), requiring a “ ‘good faith effort to obtain the witness’ presence at trial.’ ” (Quoting State v. Watie, Heard

1996State v. Alderdice, 221 Kan. 684, 686-87 , 561 P.2d 845 (1977).

1996State v. Alderdice, 221 Kan. 684, 686-87 , 561 P.2d 845 (1977).

1977“But a witness is not unavailable (1) if the judge finds that his . . . absence is due to . . . the culpable neglect of such party . . .” We discussed both statutes at length in State v. Steward, 219 Kan. 256, 262-265 , 547 P. 2d 773 .

1977“But a witness is not unavailable (1) if the judge finds that his . . . absence is due to . . . the culpable neglect of such party . . .” We discussed both statutes at length in State v. Steward, 219 Kan. 256, 262-265 , 547 P. 2d 773 .

1973In Gardner v. Pereboom, 197 Kan. 188 , 416 P. 2d 67 , we held that if concurrent acts of negligence of joint tort-feasors contribute to bringing about injury to a third party, the degree of culpability is immaterial.

1973In Gardner v. Pereboom, 197 Kan. 188 , 416 P. 2d 67 , we held that if concurrent acts of negligence of joint tort-feasors contribute to bringing about injury to a third party, the degree of culpability is immaterial.

1921The special ground upon which the trial court sustained the demurrer is thus stated: “Ordinarily if a consignor of goods alleges negligence or misconduct of a factor the burden lies on the consignor to prove it, but when a prima facie case of negligence of the factor is established the burden is on the latter to show facts relieving him from liability.” (Brown v. Funck’s Estate, 89 Kan. 601 , syl. ¶ 3, 132 Pac. 202 .) This rule of law is a sound one, which might have found an appropriate place in an instruction for the purpose of guiding the jury in passing upon the conflict in the evidence.

1921The special ground upon which the trial court sustained the demurrer is thus stated: “Ordinarily if a consignor of goods alleges negligence or misconduct of a factor the burden lies on the consignor to prove it, but when a prima facie case of negligence of the factor is established the burden is on the latter to show facts relieving him from liability.” (Brown v. Funck’s Estate, 89 Kan. 601 , syl. ¶ 3, 132 Pac. 202 .) This rule of law is a sound one, which might have found an appropriate place in an instruction for the purpose of guiding the jury in passing upon the conflict in the evidence.

1885(Railroad Co. v. Morgan, 31 Kas. 77 .) Nor do we think that the failure of the company to observe a statutory rule applicable only outside of cities can be attributed to it as negligence in the case of an injury done at a place where the rule is not operative or applicable, as within the limits of a city.